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ABSTRACT 
 In this dissertation, I consider the television show RuPaul’s Drag Race and the vast web 
of digital and broadcast media productions it has spawned, as a means to explore the changing 
cultural, technological, and economic conditions that have allowed for the emergence of a 
widespread queer media economy in which it is currently positioned as a central touchstone and 
engine of production and productivity.  I seek to understand the history and evolution of the 
changing economics and production practices of the reality television genre that led to the 
emergence of (and have been deployed, tweaked, and recirculated by) the semi-satirical Drag 
Race; to better understand its position, as a “broadcast” cable television show, in a wider 
network of “new” and “spreadable” social media enterprises flowing into and out of it; to 
analyze the artistic, aesthetic, ethical and ascetic technologies of the self practiced by the 
contestants on the show, alongside a genealogical account of their origins in queer spaces and 
subcultures; and to explore the show’s position in a wider television landscape, asking how it is 
related to other programs of the current conjuncture, its technologization and commodification of 
a queer mode of belonging, and its relationships to virtual and material queer spaces as a 
globalized cultural technology.  In this project, I hope to explicate a governmentality by which 
we learn to govern ourselves as sexual and gendered subjects, and which circuitously feeds into 
and off of the culture industries and post-industrial “creative” economic production more 
generally.  By thinking through and theorizing a political economy of drag through its 
interconnections with the popular media that circulates particular variations of it, I am seeking to 
explore the ways that the technologies of the self - the means by which we learn to fashion and 
govern ourselves - are an essential part of a genealogy of a mode of production that defines the 
cultural, political, economic, and personal practices that define our current conjuncture.   
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PREFACE: AN ICON GETS IN (GENDER) TROUBLE 
 
In early March of 2018, the British newspaper The Guardian published a feature profile 
and interview with RuPaul, meant to chronicle the TV host and pop culture figure’s long career 
and current mainstream success on the eve of the debut of the tenth season of RuPaul’s Drag 
Race.  The show’s previous season had achieved series-high ratings after migrating to VH1 from 
the gay-niche cable outlier channel (and fellow Viacom property) Logo, a move that signalled 
the series’ growing popularity and profile in mainstream popular culture, and RuPaul had won an 
Emmy for “Outstanding Host for a Reality or Reality Competition Program” for the two 
consecutive previous years.  In the feature article and interview, “RuPaul: ‘Drag is a big f-you to 
male-dominated culture,’” Decca Aitkenhead presents RuPaul as “a radical from the day he was 
born,”  who speaks in “deeply heartfelt but somewhat opaque rhetorical flourishes.”  When 
Aitkenhead asks if Drag Race has a political message, Ru says that the show “has a position on 
identity, which is really the most political you can get,” offering “a big f-you” to the notion of 
stable identities and asking us not to “take any of this shit seriously.”   
Aitkenhead insists that it  “can be tricky” to pin down “precisely what all of this means,” 
speculating that “he doesn’t want to offend anyone by explicitly acknowledging the contradiction 
between his playfully elastic sensibility and the militant earnestness of the transgender 
movement” - casually insinuating that a single “transgender movement” exists, and that it can be 
characterized as both militant and earnest.  RuPaul responds to her assertion by “carefully” 
agreeing, saying that “that’s always been the dichotomy of the trans movement versus the drag 
movement, you know,” summoning an easy split and neat division between “trans” and “drag” 
and placing them both within the boundaries of singular “movements.”  When asked if he would 
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allow “biological women” - cisgender women, or those who identify with the sex assigned to 
them at birth - who perform as drag queens to compete on Drag Race, Ru argues that “drag loses 
its sense of danger and its sense of irony once it’s not men doing it, because at its core it’s a 
social statement and a big f-you to male-dominated culture,” claiming that men performing in 
drag is “really punk rock, because it’s a real rejection of masculinity.” 
Pressed to further explain, then, how “a transgender woman [could] be a drag queen” - 
given that a number of contestants on Drag Race have identified as trans women - RuPaul begins 
to muse about some imagined transitional spectrum of bodily presentation, noting that Drag 
Race contestant Peppermint “didn’t get breast implants until after she left our show; she was 
identifying as a woman, but she hadn’t really transitioned.”  When asked if he would invite a 
contestant who had “really transitioned,” he says that he would “probably not,” because “you can 
identify as a woman and say you’re transitioning, but it changes once you start changing your 
body [...] it changes the whole concept of what we’re doing.”  Aitkenhead characterizes this 
response as thoughtful, saying that “there’s something very touching about RuPaul’s concern to 
stay abreast of subcultural developments and find a way to embrace even those he finds 
confronting,” implying that discourses about trans women who perform drag is a new 
“development” within some sort of queer “subculture” and that RuPaul was cautiously and 
patiently attempting to understand them. 
Almost immediately after the article was published, though, a multitude of queer voices - 
many belonging to former Drag Race contestants - rose up on Twitter to decry Ru’s comments 
as ignorant, transphobic, dangerous, and hurtful.  Within a day or two, opinion articles and think 
pieces were published across a wide range of media outlets.  A Vox headline offered to explain 
“How RuPaul’s comments on trans women led to a Drag Race revolt,” while Buzzfeed argued 
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that “RuPaul’s Version Of LGBT History Erases Decades Of Trans Drag Queens.”  A Pride.com 
article rounded up former Drag Race contestants’ tweets for an article titled “Gia Gunn, Sasha 
Velour, Willam & More Drag RuPaul for Transphobic Comments” - using “drag” in a now-
common verb form meaning to expose somebody’s ignorance or uncouth behavior - while an 
article published by them. presented original interviews with drag performers under the headline 
“These Trans and Cis Female Drag Queens Have Some WORDS for RuPaul.”  Mainstream 
entertainment publications Entertainment Weekly and Billboard, which have offered regular 
coverage about Drag Race for the past few years, published news stories about the backlash to 
RuPaul’s comments, and the subsequent apologies he made via Twitter. 
The 2018 Guardian interview provides a snapshot, illustrating the ascendance of 
RuPaul’s Drag Race to a position of broad cultural prominence and its central position in queer 
popular culture at a very particular conjunction, in which trans* visibility and self-determination 
and “queer” identities and discourses have moved into mainstream political, cultural, and 
economic consideration.  For maybe the first time since its 1980s inception as an “LGBT 
community,” the imagined coalition of individuals, communities, and activist groups collected 
under the umbrella terms “queer” and “LGBT*QIA+” has begun to have a public reckoning with 
itself in mainstream popular and social media, with Drag Race taking center stage.  When it was 
first broadcast in 2009 on the gay-themed cable channel Logo, Drag Race was an extremely low-
budget affair, in which its producers literally greased their camera lenses to produce a soft-focus 
effect to hide the economy sets and lighting.  As each season achieved increasingly larger 
ratings, its budget and production values increased and the talent pool from which it drew its 
competitors broadened, some of whom were inspired to take up drag as a career after watching 
the show.  Steadily growing more popular and more widely discussed by entertainment media 
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like Entertainment Weekly and Billboard, the show migrated in 2017 to Logo’s fellow Viacom 
channel VH1, owing to “RuPaul’s Emmy win and a ratings record-breaking season of [spinoff 
series] ‘All Stars,’” according to Logo programming executive Pamela Post, who claimed that 
the move would “allow more fans to experience the energy, heart and talent these fierce Queens 
bring to the stage every week” (Andreeva).  Like his three consecutive Emmy award wins for 
“Outstanding Host for a Reality or Reality-Competition Program” in 2016, 2017, and 2018, 
RuPaul’s high-profile feature interview in one of the UK’s major newspapers demonstrates an 
unprecedented amount of popular interest in drag and drag queens, and the queer cultures they 
represent.  And the commotion his remarks stirred up make it clear that this gay icon - whose 
success in mainstream popular culture for over 30 years marks him as a trailblazer for queers, 
femmes, and the gender-nonconforming - and his show serve as a touchstone and flashpoint 
around which queer people rally and argue about their identities, communities, and 
representation in popular media.  While questions about what exactly drag is, who is allowed to 
perform it, how those performers identify themselves, and why minority gender identities and 
identities organized around sexual desire are both related to and distinct from one another are not 
new, their sudden eruption around a popular cable television show certainly is. 
Because of its massive success and singularity in an ever-changing globalized media 
landscape, Drag Race begs to be analyzed along a converging set of histories and lineages: as a 
particular variation and queer take on “Reality TV” and the subgenre of talent competitions 
organized around creative industries; as a platform for queer artists to construct multi-media 
brands and fashion themselves as icons and celebrities; as a popularization of a suite of queer 
performing arts traditions with a century-long history; and as an ark and archive (and site of 
contestation) of popular histories of queer people and their identities, communities, and 
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struggles.  Two books of scholarly essays about the show have been published in the past half-
decade - The Makeup of RuPaul’s Drag Race: Essays on the Queen of Reality Shows (2014) and 
RuPaul’s Drag Race and the Shifting Visibility of Drag Culture: The Boundaries of Reality TV 
(2017) - and dozens more have appeared in journals from a variety of disciplines, like Social 
Semiotics (Heller), Queer Studies in Media & Popular Culture (Shetina), and Theatre 
Symposium (Sandoval).  This wide-ranging scholarship has theorized and analyzed the show to 
explore questions about performance, identity, neoliberalism, linguistics, camp, “queer 
belonging,” “gender equity,” “racial realness,” pop stardom, homonormativity, “homonormative 
misogyny,” global fandoms, consumption, stereotypes, bodies, visibility, new media, digital 
networks, self-love, pedagogy, and authenticity - among many other topics across a wide array of 
scholarly traditions.   
While this plethora of scholarly interest in Drag Race speaks to its dynamic position at an 
intersection of many popular and academic discourses, and continues an ongoing academic 
interest in theorizing drag that stretches back to the 1970s, there is still much terrain that remains 
unconsidered and undertheorized.  Much of this literature hinges on intersectional questions of 
representation and visibility, sharing a focus on ideology, normativity, and hegemony that owes 
much to a tradition of critical theory that this dissertation seeks to question and complicate.  As I 
will discuss later in this chapter, Judith Butler’s work on gender “performativity,” which is 
anchored by her analysis of drag in general and the famed documentary Paris is Burning 
specifically, looms perhaps too large in the growing canon of scholarship on Drag Race that 
considers questions of identity, subjectivity, and gender.  Her theorization of gender performance 
in Gender Trouble and in subsequent work relies upon a deployment of Foucault that - while 
opening up important questions about the intersections of gender, bodies, power, and the 
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discourses and economies of sexuality that helped to bring together queer and feminist 
scholarship - ultimately places an emphasis on highly selective elements of his methods and 
theories, and fails to consider the breadth of his genealogical work on the technologies of the self 
that occupied his final years.  And while many essays about Drag Race discuss some of the 
contours and histories of reality television production and its relationship to other shows in its 
subgenre, there has yet to appear a full consideration of the ways the show has deployed the 
economic strategies and logics of an evolving mode of production, or the ways its has modified 
and transformed this mode of production by means of a distinctive queer sensibility. 
In this dissertation, I will address these theoretical gaps and argue for the necessity of a 
more refined Foucaultian theorization of self - one that addresses specific media practices and a 
broader collection of texts, beyond the legacy of Paris Is Burning, to better understand the 
context in which Drag Race has emerged, and by which to analyze the political, cultural, and 
economic practices, logics, and meanings that circulate through this dynamic queer television 
show.  I will examine RuPaul’s Drag Race as a central nexus or emergent node in a series of 
interconnected discourses that have come together at our current conjuncture, in order to better 
understand how those discourses operate and intersect - and what they can tell us about the 
workings of power in the era of catastrophic capitalism (a term I deploy to collapse what is 
varyingly called “late” or “financialized” capitalism and entrepreneurial logics of government, in 
order to highlight the preeminent threat of catastrophic climate change accelerated by the global 
industrial and economic practices of capitalist enterprise fueled by toxic masculinity).  I seek to 
understand the history and evolution of the changing economics and production practices of the 
reality television genre that led to the emergence of (and have been deployed, tweaked, and 
recirculated by) the semi-satirical Drag Race; to better understand its position, as a “broadcast” 
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cable television show, in a wider network of “new” and “spreadable” social media enterprises 
flowing into and out of it; to analyze the artistic, aesthetic, ethical and ascetic technologies of the 
self practiced by the contestants on the show, alongside a genealogical account of their origins in 
queer spaces and subcultures; and to explore the show’s position in a wider television landscape, 
asking how it is related to other programs of the current conjuncture, its technologization and 
commodification of a queer mode of belonging, and its relationships to virtual and material queer 
spaces as a globalized cultural technology.  In this project, I hope to explicate a governmentality 
- or governmental rationality, a relationship of self to self and self to others - by which we learn 
to govern ourselves as sexual and gendered subjects, and which circuitously feeds into and off of 
the culture industries and post-industrial “creative” economic production more generally.  By 
thinking through and theorizing a political economy of drag through its interconnections with the 
popular media that circulates particular variations of it, I am seeking to explore the ways that the 
technologies of the self - the means by which we learn to fashion and govern ourselves - are an 
essential part of a genealogy of a mode of production that defines the cultural, political, 
economic, and personal practices that define our current conjuncture.  If making and remaking 
ourselves is increasingly required of a service- and aesthetic-labor-focused economy, and if 
reality television has come to represent and reinforce the self-fashioning and self-enterprising 
governmentality by which we are expected to make ourselves suitable to participate in the 
catastrophic capitalist order, I want to know how the arch and campy queer practices of drag 
might resist (or prove perfectly flexible for) this predominant logic and mode of production. 
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CHAPTER ONE: KEYWORDS 
 
In this chapter, I will begin to map a historical and philosophical matrix in which I seek 
to position RuPaul’s Drag Race, in order to analyze its content and to explore the shifting 
cultural, economic, and political practices and logics through which it has emerged as a popular 
culture text.  This matrix is comprised of a series of keywords that have shifting meanings, 
inflections, and applications as cultural, linguistic, and philosophical practices across different 
spaces and times, providing my inquiry a historical ground on which to ask theoretical questions. 
Because my exploration of Drag Race is explicitly concerned with the way the show produces or 
utilizes queer subjectivities and communities, and its engagement with popular histories about 
the evolution of queer identities and affective/political social bonds, I will begin by tracing some 
of the main genealogical lines that have led to our current “queer” conjuncture, establishing a 
working vocabulary to discuss the individuals and institutions through which these practices and 
identities circulate by describing some of the shifting deployments of “gay,” “queer,” and 
“trans*.”  Via this genealogy, I hope to render visible the emergence of the historical formation 
of discourses - originating in spaces and media networks crafted by marginalized people 
attempting to fashion themselves and practice their freedoms in particular ways - that intersect 
with (and have been co-opted by) popular representations in 20th and 21st century reality 
television and related media.  I will then move to the other three keywords that comprise my 
analytical toolkit - “drag,” “technologies of the self” and “aesthetics of existence” - which will 
also provide an opportunity to review of some of the scholarly literature that has previously 
engaged with drag to theorize gender, identity, and subjectivity, and to demonstrate how this 
dissertation offers an intervention into this literature via a Foucaultian consideration of Drag 
Race. 
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“Gay”  
It is no small challenge to attempt to sort out the many overlapping, conflicting, 
boundary-shifting, binary-denying sets of practices and identities that are now often glossed as 
“queer” or collapsed within the ungainly acronym “LGBTQIA+” - which itself is not even the 
only acronym circulated by those who might place themselves within (or be imagined by others 
to belong) within its protean boundaries.  Medical and scholarly discourses, popular media, 
political activism, urban community centers, subcultures sprung up around various arts (theater, 
dance, music, fashion, literature, etc.) and health outreach organizations represent just a handful 
of the many institutions by which sexual minorities and gender nonconforming individuals and 
social groups have attempted to create and identify themselves, or by which others have 
attempted to make them legible, stable, analyzable entities.  Meanwhile, the everyday lived 
experience of many of the folks who might be imagined to exist within these legible discourses 
frequently confound or disrupt any sort of easy understanding or definition of discrete categories 
of gender identity, sexuality, or the commingled overlapping space between gender and 
sexuality.  Other vectors of individual experience that impact agency and mobility in late 
capitalism - especially class, race, ability, and geography - further blur boundaries in the 
mapping of sexual and gender identities, and confound any attempts to speak of a “gay 
community” or an “LGBT community.” 
 In academic discourses about gender and sexuality which have now crossed into popular 
circulation thanks to social media and texts like Drag Race, it has become an accepted truth that 
gender and sexuality are discrete areas of human identity and practice.  As scholar David 
Valentine describes it, “in much contemporary social theory and grassroots political activism, it 
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is a matter of faith and theory that ‘‘gender’’ and ‘‘sexuality’’ are distinct— if related —arenas 
of human experience, experiences which are neither reducible to one another nor which can be 
explained by the other.”  He insists that gender and sexuality “are neither self-evident 
experiences nor natural explanatory frameworks,” but are in fact “categories with complicated 
histories and politics” which are deeply enmeshed with one another (15).  As far back as the late 
nineteenth century, when the practices of “sodomy” were “reorganized into a form of 
pathological personhood that we would today call ‘homosexuality,’” the identification of this 
new pathology “was seen to be evident in what contemporary social theorists would deem visibly 
physical and behavioral markers of non-normative gender expression” (Valentine, 40).  In 
sexological discourses from the turn of the century, male homosexuality was understood “as an 
intermediate or third sex, evident in the adoption of feminine practices and behaviors to which 
erotic attraction to other men was intimately bound” (Valentine, 41).  So even at this first 
moment when, in Foucault’s formulation, “the homosexual was now a species’’ following the 
sodomite as “a temporary aberration,” the practice of gender was conflated with erotics 
organized around gendered preferences (1990 [1978]: 43). 
In this context that Foucault describes - characterized by “urbanization, changing forms 
of state organization, and the reshaping of kin and labor relations” - in which same-sex erotic 
subcultures first began to form, there were also immediate conflicts and divisions in the 
formation of new subjectivities (Valentine, 40).  While sexological discourses read feminine 
practices and same-sex attraction on the homosexual body, “well-known, self-identified 
homosexual men of the period such as André Gide” actively rejected “the characterization of 
homosexuality as a form of gendered inversion and [claimed] that homosexuality was morally 
and physically normal,” beginning to speak out “for a ‘movement for masculine culture’” 
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(Valentine, 42).  New homosexual subjectivities in the first part of the twentieth century “were 
formed in opposition to medical and popular discourses linking (male) homosexuality to 
(feminine) gender,” while new feminized subject positions, like “fairies,” were “spurned by 
mainly white, middle-class homosexual men who were developing gender-normative 
understanding of their same-sex desire” (Valentine, 42).  These subcultures and subjectivities 
were also forging transatlantic connections between urban centers in the United States, England, 
Germany and France, with language, arts, acts, and discourses circulating with newly mobile 
populations and through new media channels.   
In the United States, most popular histories of queer people posit the 1969 Stonewall riots 
as the first moment when gays busted out of “the closet” - but George Chauncey’s historical 
scholarship has demonstrated that in the first few decades of the twentieth century “a gay world 
flourished quite conspicuously in New York City.”  Only later, “with the repression 
accompanying the repeal of Prohibition and the conformity of Cold War culture,” was the 
“‘closet’ confining gays in 1969 [...] constructed” (Cohen, 685).  In that flourishing era, “gay 
sexuality created a culture practiced in public,” making use of “the streets, parks, beaches, bars, 
restaurants, cafeterias, theaters, public restrooms, dance halls, YMCAs [...] and bathhouses of a 
swiftly commercializing city” for sex and socialization.  While gay sex and burgeoning 
subcultures organized around it were flourishing, “gay” identity didn’t yet exist, though.  A 
binary between “homosexual” and “heterosexual” identities was still “formative, with male 
sexual identities being constructed from a combination of gender presentation and sex acts that a 
man was willing to perform,” with the “fairy” - a working-class “effeminate man who openly 
transgressed gender and sexual boundaries, and patterned himself on the working-class, female 
sex worker” - standing at the “organizational center of this sexual system” (Stack, 2).  A firmer 
 12 
sense of bounded sexualities only came about when a racialized “middle-class vision of 
stigmatized homosexual versus normalized heterosexual intruded on this Eden, gradually in the 
century's first two decades and more intensively in the 1930s,” after which “the binary structure 
of our current, supposedly liberated, era emerged” (Cohen, 685). 
 In the years following WWI, movements began in Germany, England and the U.S. 
organized around “homosexual emancipation,” seeking to decriminalize same-sex sex acts which 
had been prohibited by law since the late 19th century.  Early organizations include the Bund für 
Menschenrechte (Federation for Human Rights), which was formed in Germany in 1919, and the 
Society for Human Rights, established in Chicago in 1924.  Founded by Henry Gerber, the 
Society for Human Rights published the first gay publication in the U.S., Friendship and 
Freedom, through which he hoped to “keep the homophile world in touch with the progress of 
our efforts” (Baim, 34).  The establishment of these organizations elucidate the era’s growing 
institutionalization of homosexual identities and the production of nascent gay communities that 
sought specifically to counteract the stigmatizing discourses of medicine and law.  One of the 
developing strategies for escaping these discourses was to adopt new names for same-sex 
identification, leading to the invention of the term “homophile” and the gradual cooptation of the 
word “gay” as an entendre and sly signifier. 
 The word “gay” has carried a number of interesting associations in its English usage 
since the 14th century, meaning "shining, glittering, gleaming, bright, vivid," but also "full of 
joy, merry; light-hearted, carefree," and even "wanton, lewd, and lascivious."  By the late 19th 
century, it had begun to carry “an overall tinge of promiscuity,” as a “gay house” had become 
slang for a brothel (Harper).  Slang dictionaries from the early 20th century attest to “gay cat” 
being adopted as slang for male homosexual prostitutes as early at the 1890s; by the 1930s, 
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winking references to gay connoting homosexuality could even be found in Hollywood films, 
like the Carey Grant vehicle Bringing Up Baby from 1938.  “Gay” functioned as a campy 
entendre that slowly became a normalized signifier for homosexual men; it applied to 
homosexual women as well, but was not adopted as a self-identifying signifier in the same way, 
likely owing to the popularity of the term “lesbian.” 
 While increasing steadily in popular use throughout the 20th century, the term “gay” 
wouldn’t become the near-universal signifier and subject position adopted by men who engage in 
sex with other men until its institutionalization in the U.S. via an explosion of political activist 
groups that emerged in the wake of the Stonewall riots.  In the immediate aftermath of the riots, a 
number of rioters organized the Gay Liberation Front in order to continue their protests against 
the harassment of gay bar patrons and criminalization of homosexual acts and gender 
nonconformity (Abelove).  In the months following the riots, more political action organizations 
arose, like the Gay Activists Alliance, in New York but also across urban areas in the U.S. where 
gay subcultures had become inspired by the demonstrations following Stonewall.  A year after 
the riots began, on June 28th, 1970, the Christopher Street Gay Liberation Day Parade was held, 
instituting the first “Gay Pride” parade in U.S. history. 
 Gay thus became the preferred self-designation of homosexual men and a wide spectrum 
of gender-variant male-bodied and female-bodied people who belonged to gay countercultures 
and frequented gay bars in the era.  To this day, “gay” remains the most fully accepted and 
institutionalized way to describe men who have erotic desires for other men, and is still adopted 
by many other queer folks who may not be so easily designated.  The 1970s also saw a 
concurrent (and in many ways reactionary) development of autonomous lesbian feminist groups, 
which sought to distinguish and develop tactics to combat the intertwined forces of institutional 
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sexism and homophobia.  In the late 1980s, in the midst of intense political activism organized 
around the fever-pitch of the AIDS crisis, a coalition was born: LGBT, bringing together lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, and transgender/transsexual identifying individuals and groups - politically, 
rhetorically, and linguistically, if not as often in actual spaces or practices.  And in the sustained 
era of AIDS-related activism and scholarship in the early 1990s, the popularity of the LGBT 
acronym would be joined by another designation: the reclamation of a former pejorative, 
“queer.” 
 
“Queer” 
 In the first few months of 1990, the word “queer” became institutionalized in both 
activist and academic contexts.  According to David Halperin, the phrase “queer theory” was 
coined by scholar Teresa de Lauretis “as a joke,” when she was pressed to come up with a title 
for a conference she convened at UC Santa Cruz in February 1990 (2003, 339).  Having heard 
the word queer “being tossed about in a gay-affirmative sense by activists, street kids, and 
members of the art world in New York during the late 1980s,” de Lauretis hoped that its 
deployment would “unsettle the complacency of ‘lesbian and gay studies,’” a designation that 
she considered too “established and often convenient” (2003, 340).  A month later, in New York 
City, four members of the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT UP), a prominent direct 
action activist group, formed a new activist collective named Queer Nation in direct response to 
the escalation of violence against queer people in New York.  In June of that year, at the New 
York Gay Pride Parade, an anonymous polemic titled “Queers Read This” was circulated, calling 
queers to political action and offering an argument for adopting the word queer: 
Well, yes, "gay" is great. It has its place. But when a lot of lesbians and gay men wake up 
in the morning we feel angry and disgusted, not gay. So we've chosen to call ourselves 
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queer. Using "queer" is a way of reminding us how we are perceived by the rest of the 
world.  
 
 This anger and disgust - the sense of disruption - was what de Lauretis had hoped to bring 
to “Gay and Lesbian Studies” with the mischievous choice of “queer theory.”  According to 
Halperin, de Lauretis has freighted this term with hopes of shaking up a number of dominant 
assumptions and trends in scholarship: she wanted to question why it was accepted that “the 
relation of lesbian to gay male topics in this emerging field was equitable, perfectly balanced, 
and completely understood,” and why these topics needed to “evolve together.”  The field had 
also been mostly dominated by the empirical work of social scientists, and she hoped to “open a 
wider space within it for reflections of a theoretical order” and bring more complex 
considerations to a “monolithic, homogenizing discourse of (homo)sexual difference” while 
potentially offering an “escape from the hegemony of white, male, middle-class models of 
analysis” (Halperin 2003, 340).  In Halperin’s account, “queer theory” was thus, at its first 
instantiation, “a placeholder for a hypothetical knowledge-practice not yet in existence, but 
whose consummation was devoutly to be wished,” which more-or-less immediately “became the 
name of an already established school of theory” with a “set of specific doctrines, a singular, 
substantive perspective on the world, a particular theorization of human experience, equivalent in 
that respect to psychoanalytic or Marxist theory”- even though in reality, “no such theory 
existed” (2003, 340). 
 Ironically, though, given de Lauretis’s desire to disrupt the homogenizing tendencies of 
scholarly institutionalization, queer theory had soon “achieved what lesbian and gay studies, 
despite its many scholarly and critical accomplishments, had been unable to bring about: namely, 
the entry of queer scholarship into the academy, the creation of jobs in queer studies, and the 
acquisition of academic respectability for queer work” (Halperin 2003, 340).  In the first five 
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years of the 1990s, “this new field emerged out of feminism, bringing with it a thorough critique 
of the category of woman and purporting to answer the charges of essentialism lodged against 
the identity-based politics of the 1970s and 1980s,” leading to “the institutional codification of 
this field with release of The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader and the formation of new 
departments focused on sexuality studies” (Pergadia, 172).  Queer theory was soon appearing 
“on the shelves of bookstores and in advertisements for academic jobs,” where it was able to 
elide the more directly-sexual descriptors of “gay” and “lesbian,” and it also “harmonized very 
nicely with the contemporary critique of feminist and gay/lesbian identity politics, promoting the 
assumption that ‘queer’ was some sort of advanced, postmodern identity, and that queer theory 
had superseded both feminism and lesbian/gay studies” (Halperin 2003, 340).  Halperin finds 
“something odd, suspiciously odd, about the rapidity with which queer theory [...] has been 
embraced by, canonized by, and absorbed into our (largely heterosexual) institutions of 
knowledge, as lesbian and gay studies never were,” and claims that it “has proven to be much 
more congenial to established institutions of the liberal academy” than the field of lesbian and 
gay studies that it displaced (2003, 341).   
Amidst this polemic against the misuse and abuse of queer theory, Halperin does provide 
a substantial list of things that this newly institutionalized field has helped to accomplish: 
Queer theory has effectively re-opened the question of the relations between sexuality and 
gender, both as analytic categories and as lived experiences; it has created greater 
opportunities for transgender studies; it has pursued the task (begun long before within the 
sphere of lesbian/gay studies) of detaching the critique of gender and sexuality from 
narrowly conceived notions of lesbian and gay identity; it has supported non-normative 
expressions of gender and sexuality, encouraging both theoretical and political resistance to 
normalization; it has underwritten a number of crucial theoretical critiques of homophobia 
and heterosexism; it has redefined the practice of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
history; and it has dramatized the far-reaching theoretical promise of work in lesbian and 
gay studies. (2003, 341) 
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Still, despite all of these gains, the legacy of queer theory and its impact on the radical potential 
of queer identities is as complex and contradictory as the practices and subjectivities it gestures 
toward including/producing.  Halperin argues that queer theory has ultimately functioned as a 
means “to despecify the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, or transgressive content of 
queerness, thereby abstracting ‘queer’ and turning it into a generic badge of subversiveness, a 
more trendy version of ‘liberal,’” allowing anybody “who claims to be progressive” to have a 
“vested interest in owning a share of it” (2003, 341). 
 In the decades following its adoption by both radical activists and scholars across a wide 
ideological and political spectrum, “queer” has continued to be deployed in an expanding array 
of academic, activist, and popular contexts.  In our current conjuncture, queer has become a near-
neutral umbrella term that is meant to be inclusive of all non-normative sexualities and forms of 
gender expression, which provides the possibility for imagining or constructing communities and 
coalitions among diverse populations and subgroups, but which also risks eliding differences in 
power, mobility, and access among those who consider themselves queer.  Its rising popularity 
has also led to “queer” being understood as a new market segment and revenue stream for an 
emerging media and advertising niche.  According to a press release announcing the launch of 
the Condé Nast “next-generation community platform” them. (the period is included in the title, 
perhaps as a queer semiotic flourish) - which is essentially a digital magazine that publishes 
articles and short-form YouTube video content - the publication “chronicles and celebrates the 
stories, people and voices that are emerging and inspiring all of us, ranging in topics from pop 
culture and style to politics and news, all through the lens of today’s LGBTQ community.”  
Alongside the advertiser-targeted information that “them. is the first project from Condé Nast’s 
new incubator, created to develop new brands and businesses for the company’s consumer 
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audience and advertising partners alike,” the press release touts that “60% of Gen Z consumers 
support brands that take a stand on issues they believe in personally, and more than half of Gen Z 
identifies as queer” and will soon “represent 40% of all U.S. consumers.”   
 Whether Condé Nast’s demographic data is accurate or not, their press release and 
investment in them. speaks to the normalization and institutionalization of “queer” as a subject 
position and community creator/designator.  Where queer communities might have once been 
imagined or brought to life in particular cultural, geographical, political, or scholarly contexts, 
they are now being targeted and produced by mainstream media outlets, and the vernacular and 
linguistic forms of expression belonging to queer traditions are filtering into legacy and social 
media networks.  RuPaul’s Drag Race is one of the vehicles by which this has been 
accomplished, alongside queer-themed and mainstream media publications like Out, Gay Times, 
The Advocate, and Entertainment Weekly.  One of the major developments that has accompanied 
the rise of so-called queer theory, activism, and media has been a shifting of emphasis to the 
intersections of gender and sexuality that arise under this umbrella term, and providing political 
and mainstream media attention to the rights, identities, and practices of trans* people. 
 
“Trans*” 
 The cover of the June 9, 2014 issue of Time magazine featured a glamorous shot of 
actress Laverne Cox, accompanying the headline “The Transgender Tipping Point: America’s 
next civil rights frontier.”  Later that year, Vice published an article titled “Is Pop Culture Having 
a Trans Moment?” that listed a series of developments for transgender visibility and civil rights: 
Chelsea Manning had publicly come out as transgender, new protections for trans* people had 
been added by the Obama administration to the Employment Discrimination Act, Laverne Cox 
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had become a household name via the success of Netflix’s Orange is the New Black, Chaz Bono 
had appeared on Dancing With the Stars, Jared Leto had won an Oscar for portraying a trans* 
woman in Dallas Buyers Club, and Transparent was set to debut on Amazon Prime before the 
end of the year.  The narrative of these stories was fairly cut and dry: after decades of being 
marginalized, derided, and misunderstood in popular culture - and even in the “LGBT” cultures 
and communities to which they are imagined to belong - transgender people were finally 
emerging into mainstream representation, and were perhaps on the verge of popular 
understanding and acceptance.  While this story is absolutely true and life-affirming to untold 
numbers of trans*-identifying people who have found themselves and each other through real 
and virtual communities, and come to be connected and recognized by such representations in 
popular media, it also presents “transgender” as an essentially settled and stable subject position, 
upended from a more complicated history of intersecting discursive regimes.  What 
“transgender” has signified historically, and who it might describe even today, is not so simple a 
matter. 
 The first attempts to define and describe gender nonconforming individuals in the modern 
era come from the same sexological discourses that invented “the homosexual,” and complex 
intersections of gender and sexuality made the distinctions between homosexuality and gender 
“inverts” blurry from the start.  In the first decade of the 20th century, sexologist Magnus 
Hirschfeld “distinguished between (primarily heterosexual) male transvestism and male 
homosexuality,” but he also insisted on a “third-sex model” to describe male homosexuality that 
“implicitly drew on the idea of a certain femininity” that was integral to homosexual desire.  In 
his work In Die Transvestiten, he wrote that “most of them [his male transvestite subjects] wish 
they had been born female, a wish that is certainly expressed in great measure by [male] 
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homosexuals’’ (Valentine, 41).  The term “transvestite” survives to this day to describe “cross-
dressing” men who derive erotic pleasure from the act of dressing in women’s clothing and 
practicing the arts of feminine makeup and hairstyles, though this is considered distinct - in 
medical, activist, and popular discourses - from the personal and political formations aligned 
around “transsexual” and “transgender” identities and subject positions.  This is complicated, 
though, by the personal adoption and public deployment of the term by historical figures like 
Sylvia Rivera - an icon of the Stonewall riots who is considered by some to be a transgender 
icon, and others a drag queen - who described herself as a transvestite, founded the Street 
Transvestite Action Revolutionaries, and published an essay in 1971 titled “Transvestites: Your 
Half Sisters and Half Brothers of the Revolution," in which she wrote that “transvestites are 
homosexual men and women who dress in clothes of the opposite sex." 
 The term “transsexual” also has its origins in the sexological discourses of the early 20th 
century, and became a medicalized term in the 1950s with the emergence of “sexual 
reassignment surgery” (SRS), deployed to describe individuals who had received bodily 
modification procedures to confirm the gender they identified as.  Similar procedures are 
conducted today, though they are now popularly described as “gender confirmation surgery.”  In 
this mid-century era, “various kinds of self-named fairies, queens, butches, femmes, 
homosexuals, transvestites, and latterly, transexuals were coming to understand themselves 
through scientific and judicial categories but were also generating distinctions for and among 
themselves” in what has been described as a “taxonomic revolution,” but the category 
“transgender” did not arrive until the early 1990s (Valentine, 42-3).  From the time that it did 
emerge, transgender “has come to be understood as a collective category of identity which 
incorporates a diverse array of male and female-bodied gender variant people who had 
 21 
previously been understood as distinct kinds of persons, including self-identified transexuals and 
transvestites” (Valentine, 4).  While there were various inflections of the term deployed 
sporadically before the 1990s, its modern usage can be traced to “Leslie Feinberg’s early call for 
‘transgender liberation’ in 1992,” which counts as one of “the first published uses of the 
collective form of transgender which explicitly politicized transgender identification beyond 
individual radical acts and called for a social movement organized around its terms.” It is this 
“collective sense” of the term which “most activists and social service providers adopted in the 
early 1990s” (Valentine, 33). 
Depending on place, race, class, and personal history, some individuals may identify as 
either transgender or transexual, both, neither, gay, femme, butch, transvestite - not to mention 
genderqueer, genderfuck, nonbinary, agender, gender variant, etc.  The scholar David Valentine 
provides a valiant attempt at collecting a “relatively modest list” of the sorts of people and 
identity categories whom “activists, providers, and scholars” might include in the 
“collective/spectrum/umbrella” category of transgender: ”transexuals, transvestites, cross-
dressers, men or women of transgender or transexual experience, drag queens, drag kings, female 
or male impersonators, genderqueers, intersexuals, hermaphrodites, fem queens, girls, boys, 
trannies, feminine gay men, butch lesbians, male-to-female, female-to-male, female embodied 
masculine persons, and even, simply, men or women” (33). 
 While it emerged as an umbrella category in activist contexts in order to unite and forge 
new networks between this wide array of individuals, transgender has been critiqued “by many 
who are seen to fall under its purview in institutional terms,” including “FTM [female-to-male], 
transgender-identified butches, and female-bodied masculine people [who] have argued that it is 
formed implicitly on a male-to-female model that cannot account for the complexity of butch/ 
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FTM experience.”  Other groups, like  “a younger generation of self-proclaimed genderqueers” 
have rejected transgender as a category “at least in part because of its institutionalization [...] in 
an enormous range of contexts” (Valentine, 34).  Nonetheless, transgender has become 
popularized as a new form of collectivity, unique among categories in the politics of identity in 
the sense that it “has arisen out of a realignment - contested as it may be - of the kinds of 
individuals who see themselves or are seen as being part of the collectivity, and who were 
previously accounted for by other terms including ‘homosexuality,’ ‘transexuality,’ and 
‘transvestism’” (Valentine, 37).  Transgender has an enormous flexibility “for explaining and 
describing phenomena, people, and practices across time and space” which can allow for “the 
listing of people at the edges of the boundaries, like feminine gay men or butch lesbians, while 
omitting others,” and sometimes lets a single group stand in for others “while giving the 
impression of collectivity.”  Valentine argues, though, that “the very flexibility of transgender” - 
the possibility of using it “without specifying who is being invoked,” grants it “its strength as a 
tool of political organizing” (39).  The political aims of transgender activist groups included the 
attempt to wrest “control over the meanings and definitions of gender variance from medical and 
mental health professionals,” aiming to displace discourses of “individual pathology” with an 
alternate set of ”claims about citizenship, self-determination, and freedom from violence and 
discrimination,” as well as offering “a way of organizing a politics of gender variance that 
differentiated it from homosexuality” (Valentine, 33). 
 This latter point indicates the ongoing tensions between groups and individuals collapsed 
and coalesced by categories like LGBTQIA+ or queer, as friction between the aims, tactics, and 
strategies of gay and lesbian and transgender activism and lived experience have frequently led 
to boundary skirmishes and competing interests.  When self-identified transexuals began to 
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emerge in popular consciousness in the U.S. in the mid-20th century, many middle class white 
gays and lesbians “insisted on gender-normative presentation as the hallmark of homosexual 
identification and rejected other sexual/gender subcultures as ‘deviants,’” which also functioned 
as “a rejection of class and racial otherness.”  This was partially owed to an insistence on 
avoiding “overt” or visible homosexuality, because it “was not compatible with middle-class 
employment” (Valentine, 43).  And while contemporary transgender theory, identification, and 
activism asserts that homosexuality and transgender identity are distinct from one another, 
Valentine argues that this “is in fact a remarkably recent distinction,” as the categories have been 
- and continue to be - intertwined in complicated ways (40).   
Further complicating these distinctions and the competing discourses circulating through 
them are their intersections with feminism and the movement for women’s liberation, as “the 
history of non-normative gender/ sexual identities and practices for female-bodied people cannot 
be separated from the history of women’s struggles for full citizenship in the United States in the 
twentieth century” (Valentine, 46).  The place of female-bodied butches, female-to-male 
transgender people, and other non-normative gender individuals within lesbian and feminist 
activist groups has its own long history of debate, activism, and struggle.  Feminist theory has 
also provided an alternative site for thinking about the relationship of sex, gender, and sexuality - 
removed from medicalized sexological discourses - with “the distinction between biological sex 
and social gender” forming a central tenet of second-wave feminism, and feminist discourses 
insisting on “the distinction between gender and sexuality” as early as the 1970s (Valentine, 58).  
Valentine argues, though, that “the ‘gender’ that underpins ‘transgender’ and marks it as distinct 
from the ‘sexuality’ of mainstream gay and lesbian politics is one rooted in a sexological rather 
than feminist tradition” (59).  He is careful to point out that this does not mean that transgender 
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identities and activism are in any way anti-feminist, but that feminism has historically explored 
“the sexual and the gendered [...] as systemic and related to inequalities borne by women and 
female bodied people,” while the insistence on a “distinction between ‘transgender’ and 
‘homosexuality’ in LGBT activism (and some scholarship)” lean on “historical discourses which 
gloss over the different experiences of male- and female-bodied people and which see gender 
and sexuality in terms of individual and internal identity” (59).  There are diffuse spaces, social 
groups, and bodies of knowledge and practice where the different experiences and expressions of 
gender - as well as the policing of boundaries between transgender and gay identities and the 
privileging of male-bodied people - can be observed as a constant dynamic.  Among them is the 
wide and wild world of gender performance popularly known as “drag.” 
  
“Drag” 
As a figure in contemporary popular culture, the “drag queen” is commonly understood 
to be a gay, male-bodied person who dresses in exaggerated women’s clothing, makeup, and 
wigs in order to perform some sort of live music and dance routine.  This is, for the most part, 
the sort of “drag” that is featured on RuPaul’s Drag Race, and which RuPaul himself helped to 
popularize via popular music and television in the 1990s.  But even though a wide variety of drag 
performers and their unique aesthetics, politics, practices, and philosophies have been granted a 
popular platform on Drag Race, the performances of the show’s 126 drag queen contestants (to 
date) represent only a small sliver of the activities historically collapsed under the name of drag.  
Because this dissertation is primarily concerned with Drag Race itself, and will therefore largely 
be interested in the particular lineage of drag that informs its contestants’ practices, I want to 
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clarify how this lineage has evolved and to delineate it from some of the many other activities, 
practices, and meanings that are attached to “drag” in current contexts.   
While there is a centuries-long history in modern Western theater culture of male-bodied 
actors performing in women’s clothing as cross-gender characters - as well as historical evidence 
for gender inversion and cross-dressing in the ritual and religious ceremonies that evolved into 
the arts of “drama” in ancient Greece - the modern “drag queen” of the sort that populates Drag 
Race owes its lineage to a specific tradition that arose in the late-19th century, in vaudeville 
contexts (Roschke).  Many of the “female impersonators” of late-19th century vaudeville had no 
erotic or social connections to the emerging homosexual identities and cultures of the era, which 
were themselves circulating in theater and vaudeville venues and companies.  Historian of drag 
Joe Jeffreys therefore asserts that “the first true drag queens” did not emerge until the 1930s, 
when the sexological discourse of “the third sex” made its way “into the popular culture and 
linked drag with homosexuality” (Roschke).  With the appearance of clandestine and legal gay 
bars in urban areas throughout the U.S. in the first few decades of the 20th century, a new 
“lower” form of gender performance - in contrast to the “female impersonation” acts of 
vaudeville - blossomed.  According to Jeffreys, many of the vaudeville cross-dressing performers 
took offense at the designation of drag queen, as “this was a lower classification of the streets 
and bars and amateur compared to the female impersonation they offered” (Roschke). 
This tradition continues to this day, as gay and trans*-identified drag queens perform in 
gay bars in the U.S. and across the world, utilizing exaggerated “feminine” aesthetics, 
impersonating iconic singers, and dancing and lip syncing in productions of varying scale and 
quality.  This is also the sort of drag that has become well-known in broader popular culture, 
owing to RuPaul’s success as a pop music and music-video star in the early 1990s, as well as 
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Hollywood films like To Wong Foo, Thanks for Everything! Julie Newmar and The Birdcage, 
tabloid talk shows like Jenny Jones and The Sally Jessy Raphael Show, and the rising awareness 
of cult figures like Divine, owed to VHS and cable TV circulation of independent films and other 
fringe media.  In some spaces and subcultures organized around gender performance, this 
“female impersonation” tradition of drag that has been further popularized by Drag Race is 
referred to as “straight ahead drag,” and is distinguished from a wide variety of other practices 
that turn the aesthetics and tropes of gender into spectacular, confrontational, radical live 
entertainment (Hankins, 442).  Before the “female impersonator” became a popularized fixture in 
mainstream media and performance spaces, known to the straight world through film and 
television and Las Vegas residencies, much of the knowledge about and around this kind of drag 
has come from decades of scholarly fascination with the drag queen. 
The figure of the drag queen has loomed large in gay and lesbian scholarship since well 
before such work became institutionalized in the 1980s and 1990s.  One of the earliest scholarly 
works regarding gay identity, subculture, and community, cultural anthropologist Esther 
Newton’s Mother Camp - first published in 1972 - is a brilliant ethnographic account of the drag 
queen worlds of Chicago and Kansas City in the late 1960s.  While the 1960s had seen 
somewhat-sympathetic attempts by sociologists to account for the composition of the 
“homosexual community” (Leznoff and Westley) or to describe the pathologies of “sexual 
deviance” (Gagnon and Simon), Newton’s work represented the very first ethnography of gay 
communities in the U.S..  Newton conducted her ethnographic work for her PhD dissertation at 
the University of Chicago, and engaged the communities she worked in from a personally 
sympathetic position as a politically active lesbian feminist.  As she recalled in the year 2000, her 
PhD advisor David Schneider had encouraged her to defend the scholarly merit of her work on 
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the grounds that “female impersonators [...] were a group of human beings and so necessarily 
had a culture worth studying,” claiming that “the insight that gays were not just a category of 
sick isolates, but a group, and so had a culture, was a breathtaking leap whose daring is hard to 
recapture now” (Newton 2000, 216).  While some genealogies of queer theory tend to point to its 
origin in the feminist literature that took up European poststructuralist scholarship in the 1980s, 
especially in Gayle Rubin and Judith Butler’s work, which I will discuss shortly, Newton’s 
seminal text - building upon the sociological works of Kenneth Plummer and Mary McIntosh - 
demonstrates the ways that anthropological scholarship on gay sexualities and drag queens 
provided insightful and nuanced theorization of gender and sexuality. 
Rubin describes Mother Camp as “a masterful synthesis linking gender, class, stigma, 
self-presentation, and the political economies of marginal sexualities in the period before 
Stonewall,” in which Newton innovatively used the “tools and tactical moves” of sociology to 
forge a “newer lineage of anthropologists,” though unfortunately for over a decade it “stood 
alone, an exceptional document with no apparent successors or company” (Rubin, 51-2).  The 
singularity of the work is owed perhaps to her own gay identity and the powerful allure of drag 
itself, as she recalled that her project developed largely because she “had been thrilled by 
performances of the gaudy, daring female impersonators whom [she] saw in gay bars,” and knew 
that “in the neighborhoods of Chicago, [there] was a gay community of which I was a part, 
whose stories and aspirations could and should be translated into the terms I had been learning as 
a student of anthropology, terms like culture, performance, and ritual” (2002, vii, italics in 
original).  While Newton’s work is situated within the discipline of anthropology, her analysis 
and insight extend to prescient discussions of the way gay culture and the figure of the drag 
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queen were taken up and recontextualized in mass media, and also offers a reading of drag’s 
subversive gender play that later informed Butler’s more widely influential Gender Trouble. 
In a preface written for the 1979 edition of Mother Camp, Newton describes drag queens 
as “gay male culture ‘heroes’ in the mid-sixties” who “both defied and upheld societal attitudes 
toward ‘queers’” (1979, xi-xii).  Taking stock of the changing political and cultural landscape in 
the decade since she had conducted her ethnographic research, she is astonished to see that “gay 
books and films appear at a rate undreamt of in the sixties,” and that “the business world, having 
discovered that gay people spend money, is taking advantage of the new openness to direct 
products toward the ‘gay market’” (1979, xii).  This analysis of the commercialization of queer 
cultures and production of gay consumption cultures wildly predates similar work that would not 
come for over a decade later.  She even offers some insightful queer media studies analysis, 
arguing that “recent movies point to a cooptatíon of drag symbols and camp sensibility by the 
mass media,” offering Outrageous (1977) and The Rocky Horror Picture Show as examples and 
noting that “if the symbolism of [Rocky Horror] is familiar, the fact that it was made, and that 
apparently thousands of American adolescents flocked to see it at midnight showings is not” 
(1979, xii).  Newton captures the beginning of a movement that continues to this day - and which 
Drag Race is often accused of contributing to - in which “the gay sensibility, like that of other 
minorities before it, is finding, in watered down form, a larger audience,” but she warns that “just 
as gay sensibility and even real-live drag queens are making their way into mass culture, the 
conditions that nourished them are changing.”  In 1979, she frets that while “camp humor was an 
assertion of gay existence, much of its content was self-hating, denigrating, and incompatible 
with the assertions of gay pride, whose aim is perhaps not the end of drag, but at least the 
transformation of [its] ethos” as described by the queens chronicled in Mother Camp (1979, xii). 
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In Newton’s analysis of the changing political landscape for gay and lesbian activist 
groups, she centers gender, intrinsically linking homophobia, misogyny, and sexual violence in 
the same network of power relations.  Noting that the 1970s had seen some political gains by gay 
rights groups, Newton warns that “gay men are kidding themselves if they think the deeper 
stigma of homosexuatity can be eliminated while the antagonistic and asymmetrical relations 
between men and women persist,” arguing that “so long as women are degraded, yet powerful 
enough to constitute a threat, gay men will always be traitors in the ‘battle of the sexes’” and 
that, “so long as current models of sexuality persist and predominate, gay men will always be 
‘like’ women” (1979, xiii).  The intertwined rise of the Women’s Liberation and Gay Liberation 
movements led her “to experience the arbitrariness of our sex roles,” and she argues that “the 
structure of sex roles is maintained by the acquiescence of all the participants who accept theír 
fate as natural and legitimate” (1979, xvi).  She characterizes the drag queens she studied in the 
language of struggle against adversity, saying that they “were tough; they knew how to fight and 
suffer with comic grace [and] had the simple dignity of those who have nothing else but their 
refusal to be crushed” (1979, xiv).  Essential to their tenacity is their verbal wit and dexterity 
with camp humor, which “ultimately grows out of the incongruities and absurdities of the 
patriarchal nuclear family; for example, the incongruity between the sacred, idealized Mother 
and the profane, obscene Woman” (1979, xx). 
Newton describes “drag” as “primarily refer[ring] to the wearing apparel and accessories 
that designate a human being as male or female, when it is worn by the opposite sex,” but she 
argues that because it focuses “on the outward appearance of role, drag implies that sex role and, 
by extension, role in general is something superficial, which can be manipulated, put on and off 
again at will” (1979, 109).  Thus she locates something emancipatory in the arts of drag, as a 
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means to challenge the “acquiescence” to “arbitrary” sex roles that are assumed to be “natural 
and legitimate.”  She obviously admires the ways that gay male culture has fashioned resistant 
attitudes via camp sensibilities, claiming that “most of the sex role and other impersonations that 
male homosexuals do are done with ease, grace, and especially humor,” and arguing that “the 
necessity to play at life, living role after superficial role, should not be the cause of bitterness or 
despair” (1979, 109).   
As I will argue later in this dissertation, I think that Newton’s prescient and celebratory 
account of drag as a resistant means of self-fashioning - and as a potent site of allyship and cross 
identification between queer rights and the continued work of feminist struggles - is still a lucid 
and relevant theoretical frame by which to analyze drag today, and begins to work toward my 
own reading of drag practices through Foucault’s concepts of the “technologies of the self” and 
“aesthetics of existence.”  Mother Camp’s ethnographic work also demonstrates, crucially, an 
incipient political economy of drag, with Newton pointing out that “female impersonators are all 
professional performers [who] receive a regular salary for their specialized service: entertaining 
audiences,” but work “long hours for little pay” (1979, 4).  In Chapter 2, I will begin to consider 
the ways in which drag in general offers a opportunities for queer artists to be paid for their 
creative labors, and begin to explore the ways that Drag Race both exploits and enhances the 
queer economies of drag arts. 
Newton’s lively and celebratory ethnography stood alone for many years, though there 
have since been a few similar ethnographic accounts of drag cultures published in the last thirty 
years (Tewksbury 1994; Schacht 1998; Rupp & Taylor 2003).  Her insistence that gay male 
culture, and drag queens specifically, offered libratory models that aligned with the aims of 
feminist activism has not been shared by all, however.  There is scant scholarly literature about 
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drag queens between the publishing of Mother Camp in 1972 and Butler’s Gender Trouble in 
1990, but they occasionally became a target for feminist scholars who were dubious of its 
political merits.  In 1985, Jill Dolan argued that “the camp context of most gay male drag makes 
it doubtful that the intent is to deconstruct socialized gender,” citing Susan Sontag’s reading of 
“camp sensibility as the emphasis of style over content, as the love of artifice, superficiality and 
instant character, and as a disengagement with underlying meaning,” characterizing camp 
therefore as shallow and apolitical (Dolan, 8).  She dismisses any complexity in the practice of 
gender, as well as the very real violence often visited upon queens and male-bodied femmes, 
arguing that “the stakes in the gender game aren't as high for these particular gay men [because] 
they can easily assume female roles, knowing that offstage, they wear the clothes of the social 
elite” (Dolan, 8). 
This aligns with Gayle Rubin’s account of the frictions between feminist activism and 
gay male culture in the late 1970s and early 1980s, in which “very little gay male behavior 
actually was granted the feminist seal of approval” (1994, 76).  According to Rubin, “most of the 
actual practice of gay male culture was objectionable to many feminists, who mercilessly 
condemned drag and cross-dressing, gay public sex, gay male promiscuity, gay male 
masculinity, gay leather, gay fist-fucking, gay cruising, and just about everything else gay men 
did” (1994, 76).  This prevailing attitude was baffling to Rubin because “it took relatively minor, 
relatively powerless sexual practices and populations and targeted them as the primary enemy of 
women’s freedom and well being,” while simultaneously “exonerat[ing] the more powerful 
institutions of male supremacy and the traditional loci for feminist agitation” like “the family, 
religion, job discrimination and economic dependency, forced reproduction, biased education, 
lack of legal rights, and civil status, etc.” (77).  While Rubin and Butler’s work in the 1980s 
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would begin to bring together feminist and queer scholarship in ways that rehabilitated the 
relationships between feminist activism and gay male culture, there has still been relatively little 
work that examines the drag queen as a figure who can in fact bridge some of the overlapping 
concerns in these discourses. 
While Newton’s Mother Camp is revered as groundbreaking and canonical scholarly 
work on drag, the scholarly fascination with drag that continues to this day began in earnest with 
the arrival of Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble in 1990.  And because Butler’s seminal 
poststructuralist-feminist theorization of gender does not include ethnographic, performance 
studies, or media studies methods by which to examine drag queens in the settings they might be 
encountered, she relies in fact on Newton’s text when bringing the figure of the drag queen into 
her analysis.  While Butler’s foundational queer theory is insightful and compelling, and marks 
an important, pivotal shift in feminist writing about gender and sexuality, her analysis of drag 
lacks any consideration of its concrete practices, and glosses over the complexities the social and 
economic conditions in which it has historically been practiced.   
In Gender Trouble, Butler essentially agrees with Newton’s arguments for the subversive 
potential of drag, crediting Newton with the insight that in drag, “the structure of impersonation 
reveals one of the key fabricating mechanisms through which the social construction of gender 
takes place,” arguing that she “would suggest as well that drag fully subverts the distinction 
between inner and outer psychic space and effectively mocks both the expressive model of 
gender and the notion of a true gender identity” (1999 [1990], 174).  This provides an illustration 
of the “performativity” of gender itself, as “the notion of an original or primary gender identity is 
often parodied within the cultural practices of drag,” and Butler notes that historically, “within 
feminist theory, such parodic identities have been understood to be either degrading to women, 
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in the case of drag and cross-dressing, or an uncritical appropriation of sex-role stereotyping” 
(1999 [1990], 174).  Drag thus allows Butler to reach one of her central arguments, that “in 
imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself - as well as its 
contingency” (1999 [1990], 175, italics in original).  She describes drag as a form of “parody” of 
“the very notion of an original” (1999 [1990], 175), which allows us to see that “hegemonic 
heterosexuality is itself a constant and repeated effort to imitate its own idealizations [which] sets 
up pathologizing practices and normalizing sciences in order to consecrate its claim on 
originality and propriety” (1997, 384).  While “gender parody reveals that the original identity 
after which gender fashions itself is an imitation without an origin” (1999 [1990], 175), she also 
warns that “the gender meanings taken up in these parodic styles are clearly part of hegemonic, 
misogynist culture [which] are nevertheless denaturalized and mobilized through their parodic 
recontextualization” (1999 [1990], 176). 
To a certain extent, Butler’s arguments about drag constitute a reiteration of Newton’s 
theorization that drag reveals the playful theatricality - in Butler’s formulation, performativity - 
lurking behind our everyday adoption of “sex roles,” and also aligns with one of RuPaul’s 
favorite aphoristic catch phrases (turned pop song): “We’re all born naked, and the rest is drag.”  
But in reducing drag to a “parody” that reveals gender as “an imitation without an origin,” Butler 
flattens the material and historical practices of drag (and gender) into a discursive realm of 
linguistic signification, removing them from their complex relationships to economic, political, 
and aesthetic networks of power.  She also fails to consider that drag is not exclusively about 
gender, even if it takes the play of gender practice as its main mode of signification.  The 
donning of different personas and bodily forms in drag involves the conscious and aesthetic 
reconstruction of self, and allows for a wide variety of modulations of vocal, verbal, vernacular, 
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and visual expressions that play with - and often expand and exceed - expectations of “gender 
meanings.”  And in many of the practices and institutions organized around “female 
impersonation” - such as the Miss Continental pageant, traditionally dominated by trans* drag 
queens - the comedic and campy form of drag is subjugated to iterations devoted to glamor, 
pageantry, glitter and glitz and the veneration of so-called feminine beauty.  Even if it is 
important that it not become rigidly attached to certain bodies or prized as the only way of 
valuing a performance of woman-as-gender, the feminine, effeminate, femme techniques of 
beauty and aesthetic living are important sites for the contestation of gendered meanings, and the 
political, cultural, and economic power that circulates through them.  In drag pageantry - as in 
gay worship of female pop icons - there is the possibility of an aesthetic appreciation of the arts 
of femininity that dislodge them from the objectifying logics of the world’s Trumpy Miss 
Universe pageants. 
Butler’s lack of consideration for the concrete practices of drag is of a piece with her 
overreliance on linguistic signification, and a theory of power relations that relies on an 
oversimplification and mischaracterization of Foucault’s work.  Worrying that a focus on 
“representation” allows for “relations of domination and exclusion” to be “inadvertently 
sustained” when those who are described by “the category of women [...] are constructed through 
the exclusion of those who fail to conform to unspoken normative requirements,” Butler claims 
to offer “a feminist genealogy” of this category by tracing “the political operations that produce 
and conceal what qualifies as the juridical subject of feminism” (1999 [1990], 9).  Claiming that 
“the juridical structures of language and politics constitute the contemporary field of power,” 
Butler concludes that “there is no position outside this field, but only a critical genealogy of its 
own legitimating practices,” thus making her task to offer “within this constituted frame a 
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critique of the categories of identity that contemporary juridical structures engender, naturalize, 
and immobilize” (1999 [1990], 8).  According to her reading of his work, “Foucault points out 
that juridical systems of power produce the subjects they subsequently come to represent,” 
concluding therefore that “the juridical formation of language and politics that represents women 
as ‘the subject’ of feminism is itself a discursive formation and effect of a given version of 
representational politics” (1999 [1990], 4).  This “juridical” framework by which she 
understands power is threaded throughout Gender Trouble, allowing her to argue for the 
“disciplinary production of gender” which creates a “false stabilization of gender in the interests 
of the heterosexual construction and regulation of sexuality within the reproductive domain” 
(1999 [1990], 172). 
In Butler’s formulation, there are “regulatory practices that generate coherent identities 
through the matrix of coherent gender norms,” resulting in a “heterosexualization of desire” that 
“ requires and institutes the production of discrete and asymmetrical oppositions between 
‘feminine’ and ‘masculine’” (1999 [1990], 23).  She also describes a “cultural matrix through 
which gender identity has become intelligible,” in which “those in which gender does not follow 
from sex and those in which the practices of desire do not ‘follow’ from either sex or gender” are 
not allowed to “exist,” explaining that “following” is a “a political relation of entailment 
instituted by the cultural laws that establish and regulate the shape and meaning of sexuality” 
(1999 [1990], 24).  But what she refers to variously as a “matrix of norms,” a “heterosexual 
matrix,” a “cultural matrix,” and a “matrix of intelligibility” is not ever described by concrete, 
historical practices.  She begins to offer an accurate reading of Foucault’s methods when she 
claims that he would “assume that the category of sex, whether masculine or feminine, is a 
production of a diffuse regulatory economy of sexuality,” as his investment was precisely in 
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locating diffuse sites through which practices and techniques circulated and evolved (1999 
[1990], 24).  This immediately gets muddled, though, when Butler claims that Monique Wittig 
“concurs, however paradoxically, with Foucault in claiming that the category of sex would itself 
disappear and, indeed, dissipate through the disruption and displacement of heterosexual 
hegemony” (1999 [1990], 25).  Foucault never made such a claim, and his theoretical apparatus 
does not really accommodate something along the lines of hegemony, certainly not in the realm 
of sexuality.   
This misrepresentation of his work on the history of sexual practices and regulations - 
confusing or collapsing them with her use of the term sex to describe the body’s biological sex 
characteristics - continues when she claims that for Foucault, “the substantive grammar of sex 
imposes an artificial binary relation between the sexes, as well as an artificial internal coherence 
within each term of that binary,” and that this “binary regulation of sexuality suppresses the 
subversive multiplicity of a sexuality that disrupts heterosexual, reproductive, and 
medicojuridical hegemonies” (1999 [1990], 26).  Butler ignores the nuanced distinctions in 
different forms of power in Foucault’s work - with juridical, disciplinary, and biopolitical power 
representing different regimes, deployed in specific ways at distinct points in place and time.  
Rather than tending to the concrete practices by which non-normative genders are produced or 
regulated - looking, perhaps, to the production of knowledge and practice that takes place in drag 
and ball scenes, for instance - Butler collapses the “regulatory economy” of sexuality into an 
oppressive, autonomous, centralized “heterosexual hegemony.”  Because of this, Butler fails to 
see that gender is not organized juridically, is not simply passed on or enforced from some 
central heteronormative center, but is taken up as art, as technique, as techne, as technology, and 
that drag is a major producer of gender techniques. Drag allows queer women and men to adapt 
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and mutate gender expressions taken from fashion, art, music, television, film, and to refashion it 
to produce new knowledges about masculinity, femininity, and personal and collective identities. 
This framework for examining the power relations and political-economic conditions of 
sexual minorities and the gender-nonconforming leads Butler to a tragically misbegotten reading 
of Paris Is Burning, the seminal documentary released the same year as Gender Trouble that 
introduced the Harlem ball scene to a wider audience of film connoisseurs and academics.  
Butler’s most basic comprehension of the world captured in film is questionable, given her inapt 
description of the drag balls as “attended by and performed by ‘men’ who are either African-
American or Latino,” despite many of the film’s subjects variance across the spectrum of gender 
presentations and performance (1997, 386).  Butler wants to know what the film “suggests about 
the simultaneous production and subjugation of subjects in a culture that appears to arrange 
always and in every way for the annihilation of queers but that nevertheless produces occasional 
spaces in which those annihilating norms, those killing ideals of gender and race, are mimed, 
reworked, resignified” (1997, 384).  Focusing on the tragic figure of Venus Xtravaganza, a 
trans* sex worker who was murdered shortly after her participation in the film, Butler claims that 
she, “and Paris Is Burning more generally, call into question whether parodying the dominant 
norms is enough to displace them - indeed, whether the denaturalization of gender cannot be the 
very vehicle for a reconsolidation of hegemonic norms” (1997, 384).  This reading of her trans* 
femininity as “parody” can perhaps be charitably read as a misunderstanding of the various 
meanings and expressions of gender circulating among the drag ball participants who appear in 
the film, though the fact that Venus explicitly describes herself as a transsexual woman in the 
film make this reading difficult.  The brutality of Butler’s theoretical reading of this human 
figure is compounded by her formulation that for “as much as there is defiance and affirmation, 
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the creation of kinship and of glory in [Paris Is Burning], there is also the kind of reiteration of 
norms that cannot be called subversive and that leads to the death of Venus Xtravagana” (1997, 
384).  This essentially blames Venus’s gender performance for her own death, offering this as a 
means to deny a universally subversive quality to drag performance - collapsing distinct 
practices of gender that are interrelated in the drag ball economy into a single category, and 
placing it in a cause-and-effect relationship to the violence committed against sex workers and 
trans* women by their male tricks.  It is certainly within our scholarly purview to explore how 
and why normative gender expression is violently surveilled and policed everyday by those who 
have been trained to fear anything that strays from the cultural identity that grants them purpose, 
power, privilege, and place, and to think through the economics and politics of gender that result 
in trans* women working as sex workers, and that make sex work vulnerable to violence.  Yes, 
every day, trans* women are murdered, drag queens are harrassed, lesbians are assaulted and 
demeaned and queers of all stripes are insulted and attacked and barred from participation in all 
sorts of private and public organizations. But this does not mean that gender norms, hegemonic 
though they may seem, are juridical, or centralized - they are circulated in a fashion that allows 
for all sorts of tactical interventions and innovative practices to challenge what has come before. 
In his outstanding ethnographic-theoretical work on drag kings - who, along with  
burlesque dancers, and genderfuck performers represent just a few of the myriad varieties of 
gender performers who lie outside the realm of “drag” as represented by the queens of Drag 
Race, even though they can be found performing in live venues and producing digital media all 
across the U.S. - Jack Halberstam offers a warm acknowledgement of the importance of Butler’s 
work, but also warns that “academic theorizations have a limit and that there are often huge gaps 
between the kinds of knowledges and ‘facts’ we produce as ‘theory’ and the kinds of knowledges 
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and facts that are there to be learned in subcultural venues” (1997, 108).  Halberstam’s 
ethnography supplies a concise overview of drag kinging’s history, whose practitioners have 
received far less attention in scholarship and popular culture than drag queens over the years, but 
also warns that his project’s aim “is not to provide a history of male impersonation by black 
women in the first half of the century, but only to create the possibility of different traditions of 
cross-dressing and drag for different lesbian communities and to suggest that the history of 
female masculinity itself and drag king culture is necessarily multiple” (1997, 106).  The marked 
imbalance in popular and scholarly interest in drag queens and drag kings is owed partially to the 
fact that drag kinging has only really coalesced as a performance tradition since the 1990s, 
marking it as a much more recent phenomenon.  Because of his ethnographic approach, 
Halberstam lets drag speak for itself, discovering that “many of the drag kings [...] had quite 
elaborate ways of articulating their understandings of drag king culture and drag king genders,” 
but that their personal theories “bore an extremely complex and indeed ambiguous relation to 
what circulates as ‘gender theory’ in academia,” even among those kings who themselves “knew 
some gender theory and were familiar with both Judith Butler's and Esther Newton's work” 
(1997, 108).  Noting that Butler herself was uncomfortable with the “bad reading” of Gender 
Trouble’s notion of performativity as the ability to “choose your gender from the closet” each 
morning, Halberstam is amused to discover that some drag kings “literally did describe waking 
in the morning and picking clothes and genders out of closets and hanging them up at the end of 
the day,” which Halberstam reads as “elaborate identifications, rather than the naive 
misunderstandings of the mechanics of identity that they sometimes appear to be” (1997, 109).   
A sharp theorician himself, Halberstam thinks through some of the “excellent reasons 
why nonacademic theories of gender identity may diverge sharply or even run counter to 
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academic ones,” including the fact that “academic theory does not have to be beholden to 
subjective experience in any linear way,” and thus often “becomes useful to the extent that it 
advances beyond the merely descriptive and takes the risk of providing shapes and forms for 
subjectivity” (1997, 109).  Halberstam characterizes Butler’s theory of gender as the “premise 
that gender is a construction that looks natural and sometimes feels chosen,” offering his own 
understanding that “the very elasticity of the gender binary in particular [...] allows the biological 
categories of male and female to hold sway, despite widespread proof that the binary has been 
engulfed by local and folk productions of wild gender” (1997, 109).  His ethnography of drag 
kings is an attempt to respond to Gayle Rubin’s “call for empirical projects on gender and sexual 
communities that can convey ‘the rich complexity of erotic meaning and conduct,’” noting that 
this call “acknowledges the fact that all too often academic theories ignore the so-called real 
world” (1997, 109).  However, he also argues that “the ‘real world’ also ignores theory at its 
peril,” as without “theoretical models of drag, the drag king scene can be quickly dismissed by 
popular media as a glorification of male masculinity or as evidence of a lesbian fascination with 
men” (1997, 109). 
The disparity between popular media portrayals of gay male/trans* woman cultures and 
lesbian/trans* man cultures - epitomized by the popularity of Drag Race and the essential 
absence of drag king representation - highlights some of the tensions in political and aesthetic 
tactics and strategies deployed, historically, by the varied groups collected under umbrella terms 
like “queer” and “LGBT*IA+.”  Drag Race’s colorful aesthetic and vibrant poppy attitude has 
allowed its brand to extend itself into hugely successful and family-friendly DragCon 
conferences, in which its contestant-queens interact with a fan base comprised partially of young 
children, which contrasts with some of drag’s historically pricklier and punkier approaches to 
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challenging straight culture’s violent marginalization of queer populations.  In Halberstam’s 
Queer Art of Failure, alongside loving and reparative analyses of the quietly queer content of 
animated family films like Chicken Run and Fantastic Mr. Fox, Halberstam questions the limited 
range of the camp cannon to which Drag Race owes much of its linguistic and cultural legacy.  
In his reading of the “antisocial queer aesthetics” of Lee Edelman and Leo Bersani, Halberstam 
critiques the narrow camp archive they draw from, which “binds itself to a narrow range of 
affective responses” like “fatigue, ennui, boredom, indifference, ironic distancing, indirectness, 
arch dismissal, insincerity, and camp” (2011, 109).  He argues that queer scholarship needs to 
also engage the “bleak and angry territories” of “dyke anger, anticolonial despair, racial rage, 
counterhegemonic violence, [and] punk pugilism” if they are to “turn away from the comfort 
zone of polite exchange in order to embrace a truly political negativity,” in order to “fail, to 
make a mess, to fuck shit up, to be loud, unruly, impolite, to breed resentment, to bash back, to 
speak up and out, to disrupt, assassinate, shock, and annihilate” (2011, 109). 
This disruptive, angry, annihilating attitude is what animates José Munoz’s dynamic 
theorization of drag in his reading of the work of Vaginal Davis in Disidentifications.  This 
seminal work in the canon of queer of color critique situates Davis’s drag as a central example of 
the promise of disidentification, highlighting the way “her uses of humor and parody function as 
disidentificatory strategies [with an] effect on the dominant public sphere” in the mode of “a 
counterpublic terrorism,” locating in her “cultural productions [...] a radical impulse toward 
cultural critique” which often escape the notice of “some of drag's most avid supporters: 
academics and other drag queens” (1997, 86).  Munoz argues that drag offers “modalities of 
performing the self, disidentification and passing” which are also “often strategies of survival” 
that often allow for “subjects [to] fully come into subjectivity in ways that are both ennobling 
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and fierce” (1997, 92).  He explicitly juxtaposes the kind of “terroristic” and disidentifacatory 
drag that Davis performs against the legacy of RuPaul him/herself, arguing that “the mass 
commercialization of drag” became evident with the advent of film like To Wong Foo, Thanks 
for Everything, Julie Newmar and The Bird Cage, and “in VH1's broadcasts of RuPaul's talk 
show,” which represented, to Munoz, a form of “commercial drag [that] presents a sanitized and 
desexualized queer subject for mass consumption, representing a certain strand of integrationist 
liberal pluralism” (1997, 85).  RuPaul, in Munoz’s formulation, acted as a “sanitized queen [...] 
meant to be enjoyed as an entertainer who will hopefully lead to social understanding and 
tolerance” (1997, 85). 
Munoz argues that this late-1990s “boom” in mainstream interest in drag illustrates “a 
liberal-pluralist mode of political strategizing [that] only eventuates a certain absorption, but 
nothing like a productive engagement, with difference,” with the proliferation of drag queens in 
mass media occurring simultaneously with an “erosion of gay civil rights” in U.S. political 
culture (1997, 85).  He argued that “corporate-sponsored drag” like RuPaul’s VH1 talk show had 
“to some degree become incorporated within the dominant culture,” which did not have the same 
political import of “a queerer modality of drag that is performed by queer-identified drag artists 
in spaces of queer consumption” like that of Vaginal Davis (1997, 85).  While insisting that he 
did not wish to “assign one set of drag strategies and practices the title of ‘bad’ drag and the 
other ‘good,’” Munoz still wanted to “emphasize the ways in which Davis's terroristic drag” 
invokes “uncertain desires” that could work to “confound and subvert the social fabric” and 
invoke more imaginative subject positions, “while sanitized corporate drag and even traditional 
gay drag is unable to achieve such effects” (1997, 85-6). 
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While I agree with Halberstam and Munoz’s insistence on the political potency of gnarly, 
angry, “terroristic” and punk affective and aesthetic responses to straight culture, I question the 
dismissal of “sanitized corporate drag” and “traditional gay drag” for their potency as sites of 
alternative knowledge production about gender and sexuality.  The fetishization of the dangerous 
or disruptive nature of punk aesthetics and attitudes carries the risk of harboring masculinist 
denigration of femininity that venerates and valorizes a particularly aggressive and violent 
masculine mode of being.  The rough-edges of punk certainly offer the potential for disruption, 
but surely its fashions and styles of disruption do not hold a monopoly on alternative modes of 
being.  Drag is a diffuse site of practices, and those that partake in the celebration of glamorous 
techniques of femininity, effeminacy, and femme-dom - even if it's not innate and not every-
body's chosen style - can offer a vulnerable, tenacious, fierce version of feminine being that is 
beautiful, striking, powerful, and potentially very critical, no matter what body or assigned 
gender one has been tasked with inhabiting upon entering this world. 
My hesitation to prize the “terroristic” over critical deployments of perhaps-more-
conventional practices of femininity should not be read as a critique of Munoz’s 
conceptualization of disidentification, however.  This powerful intervention and canonical 
reference point in the literature of queer of color critique provides a powerful means by which to 
produce and analyze resistant engagements with powerful, popular cultural and political 
discourses that operate by logics of white supremacy and misogyny.  Munoz provides a 
disidentificatory reading of Foucault’s “aesthetics of existence” and “care of the self” in his 
essay about The Real World cast member Pedro Zamora that addresses some of the shortcomings 
of Foucault’s theory for addressing questions centering around the experiences of minoritarian 
identities, while providing an insightful theoretical intervention into the way a reality television 
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commodity produced by Viacom can provide a complicated platform for activism by queers of 
color. 
 
“Technologies of the Self” & “Aesthetics of Existence” 
 In this dissertation, I approach television as a cultural technology that disseminates 
practices, procedures, and techniques by which we constitute ourselves as particular subjects and 
citizens.  It is crucial, therefore, that my methodology provide a way of reading Drag Race and 
other television texts not for the way they “represent” queer people and cultures, but for how 
they actively shape, produce, and reproduce particular kinds of subject positions, conceptions of 
self, and forms of community and belonging by circulating discourses and practices we might 
call, following Foucault, the “technologies of the self” and the “aesthetics of existence.” 
While many scholars working in queer theory, literary analysis, and media studies have 
been guided by Foucault’s scholarship and vast body of original theoretical concepts, the fact 
that his work never directly discussed television - or really any cultural technologies or texts 
from the second half of the 20th century on - demands that any application of his thought to 
contemporary culture be carefully placed in a context that respects the genealogical and 
historical rigor of his methods.  In this project, I am especially interested in thinking about the 
technological, cultural, and political-economic discourses circulating through Drag Race and its 
place in a wider network of media texts and artifacts by considering how they might animate or 
draw from the practices and institutions Foucault described as the “technologies of the self” and 
the “aesthetics of existence.”  In the writing and lectures of the final years of his life, Foucault 
traced genealogies of the evolving practices and philosophies surrounding the ethics of the “care 
of the self” that stretch from the pre-Hellenic world of ancient Greece, through the Christian era, 
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and into the early Modern context of Enlightenment thought.  While he occasionally mentioned 
ways in which these practices had survived to - or been resurrected in - the Western cultures of 
20th century modernity, in interviews or offhand comments during lectures, the lineage traced by 
his scholarship was largely focused on ancient, medieval, and early modern practices.  I therefore 
think it is necessary to clearly define what he meant when describing “technologies of the self” 
or “aesthetics of existence” - and consider how other contemporary scholarship has deployed his 
philosophies in analyses of popular media and communication technologies - in order to consider 
how they might describe practices, knowledges, and power relationships in our current juncture. 
Foucault contextualizes the interrelated Delphic precepts of “Know Thyself” and “Take 
Care of Yourself” - gnōthi seauton & epimeleia heautou - and wonders why, in modern 
philosophy, we have “accorded so much privilege, value, and intensity to the ‘know yourself’ 
and omitted, or at least, left in the shadow, this notion of care of the self” which in fact “framed 
the principle of ‘know yourself’ from the start” and also “supported an extremely rich and dense 
set of notions, practices, ways of being, forms of existence” (2005, 12).  The concept of 
epimeleia heautou means “taking care of one’s self,” but it does not mean “simply being 
interested in oneself, nor does it mean having a certain tendency to self-attachment or self-
fascination,” but very specifically means “working on” or “being concerned with” things.  
Foucault considers it “a very powerful word” that “describes a sort of work, an activity” and 
“implies attention, knowledge, technique” (1997, 269).  While Foucault is interested in the way 
spiritual/philosophical knowledges can foster individual transformation - “in the way in which 
the subject constitutes himself in an active fashion, by the practices of self” - he advises us that 
“these practices are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself,” but are 
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instead “patterns that he finds in his culture and which are proposed, suggested and imposed on 
him by his culture, his society and his social group” (1984, 122). 
Foucault explores the ways that technologies of the self take up the logics of 
governmentality, and the exercise of ethics and aesthetics as a “practice of freedom” via the 
relationship of self to self and self to others.  In the ancient world, “not to be a slave (of another 
city, of those who surround you, of those who govern you, of one’s own passions) was an 
absolutely fundamental theme,” making “the concern for liberty [...] a basic and constant 
problem” and leading to the elaboration of “an entire ethics which turned about the care for the 
self and which gave ancient ethics its very particular form” (1984, 116).  This nexus of 
technologies of the self, ethics, and governmentality are also explicitly linked to discourses of 
queer identity and subjectification.  Foucault dislikes discourses of sexual liberation, which 
presume that desire or sexuality must be “set free,” but do not consider the actual ethical 
practices of freedom, or “practical forms of liberty” that must be taken up in response to the 
relationships of power opened up by liberation (1984, 114).  Liberty and ethics are mutually 
constituted, as “liberty is the ontological condition of ethics,” while “ethics is the deliberate form 
assumed by liberty” (1984, 115).   
Foucault demonstrates how the Greeks problematized individual freedom as an ethical 
problem, and how “labor of self on self” was the means by which they achieved a “concrete 
expression of liberty.”  For them, ethos was manifested in the visible comportment of clothing, 
gait, “the poise with which he reacts to events” - the “subject’s mode of being” conveyed via 
elements of personal style that could be valued as “good, beautiful, honorable, worthy.”  In this 
culture of ethical care of the self and freedom as practice, “liberty is then in itself political,” and 
has a “political model” in the notion that “being free means not being a slave to one’s self and to 
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one’s appetites, which supposes that one establishes over one’s self a certain relation of 
domination, of mastery, which was called arche - power, authority” (1984, 117). 
Technologies of the self were meant to “give to their life certain values,” like leaving 
behind “an exalted reputation” or to “give the maximum possible brilliance to their lives” by 
“making one’s life into an object for a sort of knowledge, for a tekhnē - for an art” (1997, 271).  
Foucault bemoans the fact that “we have hardly any remnant of the idea in our society that the 
principal work of art which one must take care of, the main area to which one must apply 
aesthetic values, is oneself, one’s life, one’s existence.”  The aesthetic commitment to living life 
artfully began to disappear when “Christianity substituted the idea of a self that one had to 
renounce [...] for the idea of a self that had to be created as a work of art” (1997, 271).   
In our own modern society, “art has become something that is related only to objects and 
not to individuals or to life,” and further has become “something which is specialized or done by 
experts who are artists,” and Foucault wants to know why “everyone’s life [can’t] become a 
work of art” and why “the lamp or the house [should] be an art object but not our life?” (1997, 
261).  Through this notion of an aesthetics of existence, he returns to the fact that the self is not 
something to be revealed, and has no a priori nature, and argues that because “the self is not 
given to us [...] there is only one practical consequence: we have to create ourselves as a work of 
art” (1997, 262).  This is a route by which we might found a new form of ethical relationship, 
which is badly needed, “since most of us no longer believe that ethics is founded in religion, nor 
do we want a legal system to intervene in our moral, personal, private life.”  Foucault sees the 
liberation movements of his era struggling because “they need an ethics, but they cannot find any 
other ethics than an ethics founded on so-called scientific knowledge of what the self is, what 
desire is, what the unconscious is, and so on” (1997, 255). 
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The technologies of the self “permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the 
help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to attain a certain state of happiness, 
purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.”  It is in the “contact between the technologies of 
domination of others and those of the self” that he locates governmentality, and notes that he has 
perhaps “insisted too much in the technology of domination and power” and has become “more 
and more interested in the interaction between oneself and others and in the technologies of 
individual domination, the history of how an individual acts upon himself, in the technology of 
self” (1988 [1982]).  He also notes that these technologies of the self “can be found in all 
cultures in different forms,” but because they “do not require the same material apparatus as the 
production of objects,” they are thus “often invisible techniques” that are “frequently linked to 
the techniques for the direction of others.”  He offers as an example “educational institutions” in 
which “one is managing others and teaching them to manage themselves” (1997, 277).  While 
the technologies of sign systems can constitute subjects in symbolic forms, Foucault tells us that 
we can’t simply say that “the subject is constituted in a symbolic system,” because it’s “not just 
in the play of symbols that the subject is constituted,” as it is also “constituted in real practices - 
historically analyzable practices” which we can call “a technology of the constitution of the self 
which cuts across symbolic systems while using them” (1997, 277). 
While Foucault’s genealogies of technologies of the self did not extend to their 
formulations in the 20th century, contemporary scholars have analyzed reality television 
programming as a site where such technologies of the self are deployed to support the 
governmental rationality of late capitalist democratic regimes, achieving a means of governing 
subjects at a distance.  James Hay finds resonances with Foucault in the work of Raymond 
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Williams, whose “emphasis on the development of technologies for overcoming and managing 
the extensiveness of Modern forms of community [...] makes his work consonant with Foucault’s 
writing about ‘governmentality’” (2000, 71).  To Williams, communities are not only managed 
via the “cultural technology” of television, as they must be actively produced and maintained by 
“a system of communication [that] relies on a broad array of technologies” (2000, 71).  This 
resonates especially with the notion of governmentality as a means of governing at a distance; 
while television “was instrumental to the overall reproduction and maintenance of the social 
formation at its most general and local levels,” this instrumentality “was never a matter of direct 
government control nor, for that matter, of direct control by the broadcasting industry” (Hay, 
2000, 58). 
Ouellette and Hay look specifically to reality television to “trace the techniques of the 
self that have proliferated” in the evolving genre’s expanding discourses in the first decade of 
our millenium, in order to “[chart] a changing rationality of liberal governing as well as 
television’s role in demonstrating and enacting it” (2008, 79).  They analyze a number of 
programs, discovering “strategies for working on and governing the self” - like “calculated 
decision-making, personal accountability, and self-esteem” - offered as instruction to participants 
and viewers alike (2008, 82).  Acknowledging that for Foucault, “techniques of the self must 
always be contextualized,” because they are “specific knowledges and self-shaping practices that 
can and do change historically,” they conclude that “the techniques of the self circulating on and 
through popular reality TV often have something to do with the cultivation of self-empowerment 
through personal responsibility and choice” (2008, 79). 
While much of our own juncture’s reality programming continues this tradition analyzed 
by Ouellette and Hay - such as Netflix’s new “instant hotel” competition show, Instant Hotel, 
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turning the “sharing economy” phenomenon of turning one’s home into a hotel into a reality 
television competition - Drag Race has a complex relationship with these discourses of self-
management and personal responsibility.  In the chapters that follow, I will explore the ways that 
the show’s production of queer culture and subjects represents a distinct arrangement of 
technologies of selfhood that both reflect and challenge the governmental rationality of our 
current juncture. 
 
Next Time on… This Dissertation 
These keywords provide me a theoretical framework by which to analyze Drag Race, but in 
order to understand the context in which this show operates, I must first provide an historical 
account of the evolving mode of production in which it takes part.  In Chapter Two, I will trace a 
history of reality television programming as a way of articulating the evolution of a mode of 
production that has allowed individuals and studios in the creative industries to shift, expand, and 
adopt new practices to navigate changing political and economic conditions in the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries.  As global economic activity has moved increasingly into a post-industrial 
mode that emphasizes design and aesthetics - relying on service-oriented, flexible, and widely 
distributed immaterial labor to produce commodities, feelings, experiences and consumable 
culture - and as television technologies have converged with digital, networked, spreadable 
social media and seen a rapid expansion of the means to produce and distribute television 
programs, gaining traction as a technological regime via the mantra of a “creative economy” that 
valorizes entrepreneurialism and consumer interactivity and self-expressivity, reality television 
has offered a malleable mode of production to studios and networks seeking to circumvent 
unionized talent (like writers and actors), enlist the labor of viewers via interactive participation, 
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and fill out programming blocks with quick, cheap programming.  From nearly the very 
beginning of the emergence of this mode of production, queer identities and culture have 
provided producers and networks with fodder that could be explicitly marketed to narrowly 
targeted youth-oriented and upscale-lifestyle audiences, with the liberal authenticity and novelty 
of queer lives - and the expertise of fashionable queer aesthetes - providing novel forms of 
television entertainment and consolidating the niche brand identities of cable channels like MTV, 
Bravo, and Logo.  I will argue that in just the past decade, as mobile devices and 
streaming/social platforms like YouTube, Snapchat, and Netflix have become widely proliferated 
and increasingly popular, reality television’s flexible mode of production has once again aided 
media corporations and commodity producers in navigating the social, technological, and 
economic shifts of this current era, with Drag Race serving as a premier example of an 
entertainment enterprise that brings traditional broadcast practices together with outreach into 
digital and mobile media, as well as offering content that can not only target (and create) new 
youth-focused markets but also exploit hyper-individualized, tailored, mediated taste cultures. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THE HISTORY OF REALITY TV AS A MODE OF PRODUCTION 
 
Previously On This Dissertation... 
In Chapter One, I began to map a historical and philosophical matrix in which I seek to 
position RuPaul’s Drag Race, in order to analyze its content and to explore the shifting cultural, 
economic, and political practices and logics through which it has emerged as a popular culture 
enterprise of multimedia productions.  This matrix is comprised of a series of keywords that have 
shifting meanings, inflections, and applications as cultural, linguistic, and philosophical practices 
across different spaces and times, providing my inquiry a historical ground on which to ask 
theoretical questions.  Because my exploration of Drag Race is explicitly concerned with the 
way the show produces or utilizes queer subjectivities and communities, and its engagement with 
popular histories about the evolution of queer identities and affective/political social bonds, I 
began by tracing some of the main genealogical lines that have led to our current “queer” 
conjuncture, establishing a working vocabulary to discuss the individuals and institutions 
through which these practices and identities circulate. 
To do this, I sketched the complicated genealogies of three central terms that have 
become popular signifiers in the identity practices of sexual minorities and gender-
nonconforming folks: 
● Gay, though now essentially universally adopted in popular, personal, and political 
contexts to identify primarily same-sex attracted men and women, was originally a 
cheeky slang term for homosexual prostitutes, which later became an encoded way for 
queer people to identify one another.  It emerged as a personal and political identifier in 
the mid-20th century, overtaking “homophile” as the preferred nomenclature for so-
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called homosexual (and transsexual) groups who sought to self-identify in language not 
wedded to sexological and psychological discourses. 
● Queer, once a pejorative insult hurled at the sexual- and gender-nonconforming, 
exploded in usage in the midst of AIDS-era activism and scholarship in the early 1990s, 
taken up by scholars and activists as a gay-affirmative identifier following its popular 
use by the “street kids” and artists of New York City.  It has since become a positive 
umbrella term adopted by a wide spectrum of individuals collapsed under the 
“LGBT*QIA+” collection of identities, finding its way into mainstream media, 
consumer culture, and everyday use, while “queer theory” has become an 
institutionalized and interdisciplinary part of Western scholarship, primarily in the 
humanities. 
● Trans*, which signifies a spectrum of identities and practices that were historically 
referred to as “transsexual,” “transvestite,” in popular usage largely refers to people 
who identify as transgender.  While “transsexual” is still used by many individuals as a 
means of defining and describing themselves, its origins in sexological discourses of 
the 1950s led to the later emergence of “transgender” as a collective political and 
activist form of identification meant to gain some distance from this medicalized 
history.  “Trans* studies” constitutes a large body of scholarship that intersects with 
“queer theory” and “gay and lesbian studies” - as well as feminist scholarship - with 
tensions, collaborations, and boundary skirmishes animating the commonalities and 
different aims and methods among these intermingled disciplines. 
 Following this genealogical glossary of queer identifiers, I spent the rest of Chapter One 
outlining the central terrain that this dissertation’s exploration of Drag Race is built upon, via 
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keyword definitions for “drag” and two Foucaultian concepts: the “technologies of the self” and 
the “aesthetics of existence.”  In defining “drag” as a keyword, I drew attention to the fact that 
there is an enormous variety of gender-focused practices and performances - but that it is 
popularly understood to signify the kinds of “female impersonator” drag queens that populate 
Drag Race’s contestant pool, comprised largely of male-bodied gays and a smaller number of 
trans women.  I offered a review of the academic discourses that have taken up drag as a site for 
theorizing gender and sexuality, as well as a subculture and set of social and artistic practices 
studied by anthropologists, sociologists, and queer and feminist writers.  I focused especially on 
Judith Butler’s widely-referenced Gender Trouble, arguing that this foundational queer theory 
text is insightful and compelling, and marks an important, pivotal shift in feminist writing about 
gender and sexuality, but also that its analysis of drag lacks any consideration of its concrete 
practices, and glosses over the complexities the social and economic conditions in which it has 
historically been practiced - removing drag from its relationships to economic, political, and 
aesthetic networks of power, pivoting around a theory of power relations that relies on an 
oversimplification and mischaracterization of Foucault’s work. 
 In providing definitions and context for Foucault’s writing on the “technologies of the 
self” and “aesthetics of existence,”  I argued that in his genealogy of the practices of the care of 
the self in the ancient world, he is interested in the way spiritual/philosophical knowledges can 
foster individual transformation and explores the ways that technologies of the self take up the 
logics of governmentality - locating interconnections in the exercise of ethics and aesthetics as a 
“practice of freedom” via the relationship of self to self and self to others.  I argue that the nexus 
of technologies of the self, ethics, and governmentality are also explicitly linked to discourses of 
queer identity and subjectification.  The technologies of the self were articulated to the aesthetics 
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of existence in ancient ethics in the sense that such technologies were meant to “give to [..] life 
certain values,” like leaving behind “an exalted reputation” or to “give the maximum possible 
brilliance to their lives” by “making one’s life into an object for a sort of knowledge, for a tekhnē 
- for an art” (1997, 271).   
 I concluded this keyword entry and the chapter by arguing that, while Foucault’s 
genealogies of technologies of the self did not extend to their formulations in the 20th century, 
contemporary scholars have analyzed reality television programming as a site where such 
technologies of the self are deployed to support the governmental rationality of neoliberal 
regimes, achieving a means of governing subjects at a distance.  And while this theoretical frame 
allows us to examine practices of self-formation, they require a broader articulation to political 
and economic logics that circulate across different registers and scales of personal and social 
experience.  Thus in the present chapter, I will explore the concrete historical practices of 
television production that led to the emergence of Drag Race, and how these histories illustrate 
changing labor conditions, economic logics, and technological and cultural shifts  moving into 
the 21st century, characterizing a new mode of production, in order to begin to consider the ways 
Drag Race merges this mode of production with a commercialization of queer communities, 
identities, and desires for belonging.  Foucault’s investigation of the technologies of the self 
traces the evolution of a number of different practices from the ancient Greek and Roman world, 
through their uptake and modification in Christian culture, but sees them largely disappearing in 
a different inflections and understanding of the self in the philosophical and scientific discourses 
of the early Modern era, following the Enlightenment.  While he does briefly reference the 
reemergence of certain practices that are resonant with ancient technologies of the self - in, for 
instance, Freudian psychology - and also makes fleeting mentions of the intersections of self-care 
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and governmental logics in the “sexual liberation” movements of the late 20th century, his work 
on the care and technologies of the self never examined specific practices emerging after the 
Industrial Revolution.  In other words, his research did not take up the evolution of the 
techniques, knowledges, and governmental logics of self-fashioning and self-management - and 
the proliferating means of producing and distributing them - which came about in the new 
political and economic relations occasioned by the rise of capitalism and democratic states.   
However, I believe that Foucault’s genealogies of the technologies of the self can provide 
a crucial lens by which to analyze the evolution of techniques of self-fashioning and the 
governmental relationship of the self to the self from the early capitalist era until today, when we 
can find them produced and proliferated by a network of individuals and institutions brought 
together at surprising nexuses - for instance, even in a silly little drag queen reality show like 
Drag Race.  This theoretical framework can also speak productively to the tradition of 
autonomist Marxist scholarship that has sought to understand the relationships between culture, 
labor, ownership of the means of production (and social reproduction) and its effects on 
individuals, demonstrating the ways the “means of production” have become individualized and 
networked over the course of the 20th and 21st Centuries, allowing “what we do and feel outside 
the job [to] also be channeled into the profits of employers, spon-sors, and capitalism at large” 
(Hearn 2013, 170).  I thus seek, in this chapter, to trace the transformations of a “mode of 
production” as employed by the industrial practices of reality television production, utilized to 
distribute labor and extract knowledge and resources from the consumers, contestants, experts 
and entertainers woven together by the digital media tentacles of traditional broadcast 
institutions.  This will allow me to continue, in the final three chapters of this dissertation, to 
consider the ways in which unique individual queer identity practices have not only been 
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informed by knowledges and techniques - technologies of the self - distributed by broadcast and 
digital, social, networked media, but also constitute a resource and site of production of new 
practices, aesthetics, and commodities to be extracted by an ever-more-individuated consumer 
culture.   
 
A Political Economy of Drag 
While this dissertation takes RuPaul’s Drag Race as its central object of analysis, it is 
concerned more broadly with articulating the political economy of drag in the year 2019, as part 
of a genealogy of a mode of production that deploys a governmental rationality - or 
governmentality - that circulates not only in the industrial practices of Hollywood and 
independent cultural productions, but also in the knowledges and practices that constitute the 
technologies of the self, by which we learn to form and reform ourselves as subjects and selves.  
A political economy of drag must consider not only the ever-evolving industrial context in which 
a reality competition show like Drag Race can emerge and flourish, but also the ways that 
cultural production feeds off of and back into the flexible practices of selfhood that originate in 
marginal locations of minoritarian cultures like the gay bar.  A full account of a “political 
economy” of drag must thus examine the logics of governmentality - how one governs 
themselves, and governs others - manifested in the technologies of the self that have proliferated 
in queer culture, and to articulate the ways in which these have been taken up by or informed by 
the shifting neoliberal logics of capitalist industrial production, and distributed locally and 
globally via diffuse spaces and digital technologies.  As I began to discuss in Chapter One, queer 
culture in general, and drag more specifically, has historically coalesced around alternative sites 
and networks for the production and dissemination of knowledges and practices about selfhood, 
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identities, and communities of kinship that have resisted being fully assimilated into broader 
cultural and economic circuits.  But the relationships and circuitous interchanges between the 
practices of identity formation within queer cultures and “mainstream” capitalist consumer 
culture are complex, and require careful consideration.  This chapter will chart some of these 
movements via an examination of evolving reality television practices in order to articulate the 
prevailing “mode of production” of catastrophic capitalism, yoking together economic and 
governmental rationalities that extend from the post-industrial practices of the most powerful 
institutions down to the level of individual self-fashioning. 
Describing the conditions of Drag Race’s emergence and success demands the charting 
of a number of converging historical lineages constituting a network of power relationships: the 
refining of neoliberal forms of political and economic governance that have wrought enormous 
changes in labor conditions and the extraction of wealth via an emphasis on immaterial forms of 
labor, the proliferation of reality television production practices, huge shifts in media industries 
and technologies, the rise of branding as a corporate and personal project, the evolution of 
celebrity as a commodity, the history of queer commodity cultures, innovations in niche 
marketing driving and being driven by “new” and spreadable media, and the circuitous 
interrelationships among all of these conditions.  While I could conceivably begin to describe 
this conjunction at any of these points of articulation, as it escapes simple chronology in its 
overlapping genealogical lineages, I choose to begin with the emergence of reality television, as 
its founding logics and evolving practices have been taken up as central tenets of the prevailing 
“mode of production” of catastrophic capitalism that I seek to describe in this chapter. 
  
The Emergence of a New Mode of Production 
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In describing reality television not as a genre, but as a mode of production by which the 
practice of producing television programs fundamentally shifted to accommodate (and innovate) 
rapid economic and industrial changes, it is necessary to position its emergence at a distinct 
moment in the evolution of media, advertising, and consumer culture at large.  This lineage 
reaches back to the dawn of industrial production itself, with the emergence of technologies that 
allowed the  mass production and distribution of print media in the 19th century, leading to the 
development of mass media, marketing, and popular culture.  The rise of radio, film, and 
television production in the first half of the 20th century - alongside the continued proliferation 
of newspapers, magazines, and mass market paperback books - allowed for the development of 
marketing and advertising industries that targeted mass audiences, establishing branding and 
storytelling practices that sought to interpellate audiences into salable subject positions organized 
around the consumption of particular commodities.  Throughout the 20th century, though, social 
and political changes wrought by economic shifts and the activism of marginalized groups - 
African Americans, women, and queers, for instance - began to create feedback loops with 
consumer culture, allowing advertisers, media producers, and lifestyle and cultural industries to 
begin to target specific markets with tailored messages and commodities, especially via print 
media.  Just as Western political economies began to shift into a “post-Fordist” capitalist mode in 
the second half the 20th century - characterized by an emphasis on flexible and specialized 
industrial practices, brand messaging, aesthetics, and design - a combination of innovations in 
television technologies emerged that would give rise to narrowly targeted, niche-focused 
consumer culture via basic cable channels. 
While the nationwide cable-broadcast era of television did not begin in earnest until the 
late 1970s, coaxial cable itself has a much longer history, through which the convergence of 
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telephone, radio, and television technologies and commercial industries proves to long predate 
the “convergence” era of “new” digital media (Parsons, 2008).  Coaxial cable was invented in 
the 1880s, and was employed in the 1930s by AT&T to expand the bandwidth for transmitting 
telephone calls on their network.  Although radio and television networks relied primarily on 
telephone lines to connect the signal chains by which they distributed mass-produced content to 
local affiliates, coaxial cable was also instrumental in the development of the dominant 
commercial television networks that arose in the U.S. in the 1940s and 1950s (NBC, CBS, ABC 
and DuMont), allowing for live broadcast of East Coast programs by affiliates in the midwest.  
Nonetheless, cable infrastructure and television set technology was not yet in place to distribute 
coaxial cable programming directly to households; despite many experiments and one-off 
commercial cable ventures and outliers like community-antenna distribution networks, television 
content was limited to the 12-or-so channels allowed by the VHF range of the electromagnetic 
spectrum.  Because the terrestrial, radio-wave based television broadcasting that proliferated 
widely in the U.S. following World War II was established largely by the commercial networks 
that had consolidated and monopolized radio broadcasting as an industrial practice in the earlier 
part of the 20th century, it followed radio’s mass-production model, with local affiliates relying 
largely on content provided by their major networks.  In a pattern that has repeated across 
technological and industrial shifts in entertainment media to this day, terrestrial broadcast 
television networks also migrated programs, formats, advertising sponsors and popular stars that 
had already proven successful on radio. 
Following over two decades of technological, regulatory, and commercial 
experimentation in regional cable television broadcasting, the late 1970s saw a boom in cable 
providers attempting to establish markets in most major urban areas, owed partially to the 
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proliferation of satellite-based networks that could provide unique, specialized content to fill the 
many new channels made available by coaxial bandwidth.  While this innovative evolution in 
television broadcasting created the first markets in which households paid for access to 
programming, nascent cable networks adopted the commercial, advertising-supported model of 
terrestrial airwave networks - selling audiences to advertisers - while also recouping costs via 
cable operator licensing fees.  This meant that for the first time, television started to offer 
commodity capitalism the sort of specialized markets previously opened up by niche magazine 
publishing, fostering the conditions for the evolution of branding strategies as corporations 
sought to align themselves with nationally-broadcast, narrowly-focused television programming.  
This early cable era is also notable for the federally-mandated requirement that cable operators 
provide the regions they serviced with local cable-access channels, which combined with the 
proliferation of consumer video cameras and recording equipment led to a boom in non-
corporate, “amateur” television production across the U.S.. As I will discuss further in Chapter 3, 
it was in fact a local cable-access channel that first broadcast RuPaul onto television screens in 
Atlanta, and brought him into a drag-centered counterculture from which he would craft and 
polish the persona that presides over Drag Race today.  But despite the small flourishing of local 
television culture and via the distributed means of production fostered by cable-access, the 
booming cable industries in fact destabilized and refashioned consumer culture at large in the 
U.S., leading to the emergence of reality television as a flexible mode of production that helped 
corporate networks cut costs, bust unions, generate new sources of revenue and talent, and refine 
branding and sponsorship practices to fit the changing political economy of an increasingly 
globalized, digitized world.  While I will elaborate in Chapters 3 and 4 on the ways that reality 
television has again, in the past decade, assisted in accommodating further shifts in branding, 
 62 
advertising, and commodity capitalism - as the niche-market era has evolved into a suite of fully-
individuated targeting practices, seeking to extract and commodify individual tastes, experiences, 
and identities - for the rest of this chapter, I want to situate the emergence and evolution of 
reality television, starting with the destabilized industrial conditions of the late 1980s. 
In his often-cited account of the political economic origins of reality television, Chad 
Raphael describes the way this mode of production - he calls it “Reali-TV,” using this as “an 
umbrella term for a number of programming trends” - emerged “in the late 1980s in response to 
the economic restructuring of U.S. television,” characterized by the rapid expansion of “video 
distribution channels,” competition from the proliferation of cable channels, local independent 
stations, VCRs, and the launch of FOX, an increasingly fragmented audience targeted by 
advertisers who had to spread their limited resources more widely amongst “a larger pool of 
distributors,” the rise in large “corporate debt incurred by the big three networks after each was 
sold in the mid-198os” and new changes, driven by advertisers, “in audience-measurement 
techniques designed to identify spe-cific market segments” (124).  While networks thus had less 
to spend on programming, production companies were simultaneously dealing with rising 
production budgets for scripted dramas and sitcoms, “driven up primarily by ‘above the line’ 
costs such as talent, direction, scriptwriting, music composition, computer animation, and 
location costs” - which was exacerbated by increased reliance on a star system to mitigate “the 
greater risks of capital involved in the creation of new shows by increasingly demanding names 
associated with a prior record of success” - and also seeing “smaller per-show revenues” while 
accepting “smaller license fees for their programs than they had commanded from the networks 
before the new era of competition” (126).  On top of this, “changes in federal tax laws eliminated 
producers' investment tax credits,” so they now had to deficit-finance most of the programs they 
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produced, “in hopes the show would survive three network seasons, providing enough episodes 
for domestic and foreign syndication and a chance to recoup their initial investments” (126). 
In the wake of these shifts, producers and broadcasters began to experiment with cost-
cutting forms of television production. Raphael cites FOX's America's Most Wanted  as “one of 
the trendsetters of Reali-TV when it premiered in 1987,” noting that the program “used different 
freelance crews for each segment” it produced, a practice picked up by other “crime-time” shows 
and “even some newsmagazines, such as CBS Street Stories, [which] turned to freelance camera 
crews and news producers” (129).  Some new formats did away entirely with paid camera crews, 
relying “on amateur camcorder enthusiasts and freelance professionals” to create “home video” 
packages like America’s Funniest Home Videos (Raphael, 129).  In addition to bypassing paid 
below-the-line labor, “reality programming offered producers a way to prepare for potential 
strikes because these shows did not rely on scripts or acting talent” or actors’ agents’ fees, and 
also allowed studios to create programs that “could be produced more quickly than fictional 
shows” (Collins, 96).  Whole departments of below-the-line laborers were cut out by the flexible 
logics of this new mode of television production, with “crime-time and emergency shows 
minimiz[ing] costs of sets, props, and costumes by convincing the agencies they profile[d] to 
donate police cars, equipment, and even uniforms for the production crew, so they could pass for 
police at crime scenes” (Raphael, 130).  Collins argues that these “low-end production values 
were embraced as a cost-cutting strategy, while also operating to make rhetorical claims on 
representing ‘the real,’” especially in programs claiming to document the workings of agencies 
like the police or the FBI. 
 In her transatlantic history of reality television, Misha Kavka argues that this “first 
generation of reality TV” that came about with the flourishing of labor-exploiting flexible 
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production practices can be divided in two: “reality crime programmes” from the early 1990s, 
and “British docusoaps in the second half of the 1990s,” claiming that these new formats 
“shift[ed] audience expectations of how reality can or should be mediated on television,” with 
“low-gauge visuals and everyday subject matter” that manufactured “entertainment from the 
trivia of reality” (Kavka, 48).  Kavka’s account reiterates the ways these early reality formats 
began crossing between U.S. and European markets, another characteristic of this mode of 
production that still characterizes its practice today.  America’s Most Wanted, for instance, “was 
modelled on the mid-1980s British programme Crimewatch UK (BBC, 1984–), which was itself 
adapted from a long-running German programme called Aktenzeichen XY – Ungelöst” from the 
1960s (Kavka, 53).  Because many of these shows were able to recoup “production costs with the 
first U.S. network showing, any further syndication represents pure profit,” leading to outright 
foreign syndication of many programs, as well as “licensing the program's concept for local 
production with local subjects” in foreign markets (Raphael, 134).  In an early indicator of the 
neoliberal logics both enacted and facilitated by this mode of production, the proliferation of 
reality programs “abroad, especially in Europe, was aided by the wide-spread movement to 
privatize and deregulate broadcasting” (Raphael, 135).  While the British “docusoap” programs 
that Kavka regards as continuing the “crime-time” lineage of reality television did not proliferate 
in the U.S. - their format would only come about in mockumentary form later, with the U.S. 
adaptation of The Office - they also mark this mode of production’s interest in creating media 
commodities out of narratives of people at work.  Naturalizing labor conditions by making them 
appear as a pleasant backdrop for light human drama - or naturalizing the violent force of armed 
agents of the state - while also foregrounding “the experiences of ordinary people,” the content 
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of these first reality formats reiterated the economic logics by which they were produced (Kavka, 
50). 
 Even though The Real World first aired in 1992 - four years before the first “docusoaps” 
of Kavka’s “first generation of reality TV” - she places it, genealogically, as the origin of a 
second generation of programs that she distinguishes by “the introduction of competition under 
conditions of comprehensive surveillance” (76, italics in original).  While this makes a certain 
sort of sense in terms of the evolution of formats and subgenres of reality programming - Big 
Brother is essentially a gamified version of The Real World, and the spinoff series Road Rules 
and Real World/Road Rules Challenge (later just The Challenge) were among the first reality 
shows to bring in competition and game show elements - her account removes The Real World 
from its foundational context as an inexpensive extension of MTV’s brand, as well as one of its 
first forays into original programming following the fashion review show House of Style and the 
game show Remote Control. 
 When The Real World first launched, MTV executive Lauren Corrao told the Los Angeles 
Times that the show “grew out of the network's interest in putting on a soap opera” that they 
could “put an MTV twist on”(Cerone).  They consulted producing team Jon Murray and Mary-
Ellis Bunim largely because of Bunim had “produced some 2,500 hours worth of soaps” for 
various networks before pivoting her career to developing new formats with Murray in the late 
1980s.  It was Bunim who suggested “that MTV try a reality-based approach,” and the network 
“quickly latched onto the wish-fulfillment element for MTV viewers” that could be fostered by 
the reality mode of production.  Of course, the bottom line was the main impetus, as “a scripted 
soap opera was an enormous investment” that “would have cost [MTV] several million dollars,” 
which was not a regular practice for a network that had relied historically on airing music videos 
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- content provided for free by record industry promotional departments.  Even within reality 
formats, The Real World’s cost was “a bargain at $107,000 an episode, about a third of the cost 
of most half-hour, reality-based programs,” with its “cast” members paid “$2,600 each, which 
bought their story rights for the three-month period of the show plus unlimited videotape access 
into their personal lives” (Cerone).   
Kavka highlights Murray and Bunim’s innovation in treating their recruitment process 
like a casting call for a scripted series, despite the disparity in pay compared to hiring union-
supported performers, arguing that “in its mode of production, The Real World broke the mould 
of both the televised drama series and the fly-on-the-wall documentary” by “shar[ing] control of 
the production with the cast members, whose actions and interactions made up the content of the 
show” (Kavka, 79).  This marks an important evolution in this mode of production, wherein 
narratives must be constructed from “only a tiny fraction of the footage shot” by story producers 
and video editors who would not demand the WGA-supported salaries and benefits of 
scriptwriters (Kavka, 80).  Because there is little control over what actually happens while 
filming non-actors in relatively unproduced situations, the process of selecting participants was a 
central point of influence for this mode of production, as “casting for character consistency lays 
the groundwork for narratives and characterisation to be strengthened in post-production” 
(Kavka, 81).  Thus in the casting process for this pivotal program in the history of reality TV, we 
also find the first iterations of this mode of production’s alignment with (or innovation of) the 
neoliberal economic demand for low-paid workers with telegenic personalities who could 
perform the labor traditionally split up amongst multiple crew members.   
 The young and charismatic cast of The Real World was also central to the extension of 
MTV’s brand into reality programming, demonstrating an early affinity between this mode of 
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production, the logics of branding, and the cultivation of youth commodity cultures by 
advertisers.  MTV’s corporate strategies and innovations in the mode of production were another 
response to increased competition amongst television networks, successfully leaning into a shift 
to constructing new audiences to target.  Joseph Turow, assessing changes in advertising 
methods in the mid-1990s, argued that economic and technological changes were bringing about 
"a major shift in balance between society-making media and segment-making media," noting that 
through much of the 20th century, it was newspapers and magazines that "served as a way to 
reinforce, extend, even create, identities for an impressive array of segments that advertisers have 
cared about," while radio and television networks were able to "reach across these groups" to 
function as "society-making media" (1997, 3).  However, by the late-1990s, "fundamental 
changes taking place in the television industry" began to lead national advertisers "to search out 
and exploit differences between consumers," seeking innovative ways to "[enter] individuals' 
private spaces [...] with lifestyle-specific news, information, entertainment, and, especially, 
commercial messages," while also "tailoring public spaces" like concerts and conferences to 
"attract customers who fit narrow profiles demanded by particular sponsors" (1997, 4).  These 
"target-minded media firms" sought to build "primary media communities," via media that 
fosters a close relationship with viewers or readers who feel that their chosen medium "reaches 
people like them, resonates with their personal beliefs, and helps them chart their position in the 
larger world" (1997, 4).  As I will detail in Chapter Three, the overlap between this corporate 
branding strategy and the traditional networks of “communities of belonging” that have 
historically brought queer people for political activism and kinship have found a new articulation 
in Drag Race, which has monetized and expanded the “queer community” in its expanding 
entertainment empire. 
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At the dawn of the cable niche era, MTV and Nickelodeon - both Viacom cable channels 
- were "pioneer attempts to establish this sort of ad-sponsored communion on cable television," 
acting as "lifestyle parades that invite their target audiences [...] into a sense of belonging that 
goes far beyond the coaxial wire" (1997, 5).  Turow describes this "sense of belonging" as a 
means to "cultivate a must-see, must-read, must-share mentality that makes the audience feel part 
of a family, attached to the program hosts, other viewers, and sponsors" (1997, 5).  For MTV, 
The Real World became an immediate part of its brand, making reality programming an essential 
part of the network’s identity - and means of establishing a “sense of belonging” with its 
audience - that continues to this day.  It also marked an important intersection in the economic 
logics that would lead to the increased participation of queer people as visible, above-the-line 
talent on television - albeit often in the cost-cutting, non-unionized form of reality non-actors - as 
brands like MTV wanted to appeal to the changing sensibilities of the youth cultures they were 
both fashioning and responding to, and “shows such as The Real World implicitly realized that, 
for young people whose ‘real world’ included gay people, a television world excluding gay 
people would appear inauthentic” (Gamson, 233). 
In his account of the ways that the reality television mode of production has expanded the 
“visibility” of queer people, Joshua Gamson argues that “gay people have been prominent on 
reality television since very early on for some of the same reasons they were so visible on talk 
shows,” claiming that reality TV incorporated practices proliferated by 1990s talk shows into its 
flexible fold.  The Real World was a pioneer program in this sense, as it heavily featured “the 
dramatic tradition of the confessional moment, a staple of tabloid talk shows” (233).  This part of 
reality television’s lineage is only briefly mentioned in Kavka and June Deery’s historical 
accounts of the format, lumped together with newsmagazines like A Current Affair as 
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“precursors” of this mode of production.  But in accounting for the ways that queer identities - 
and the technologies of the self by which they are constructed - have been extracted and 
deployed by the governmentality of reality TV, the techniques incubated in 1990s talk shows are 
a central touchstone.  Gamson describes 1990s talk shows like The Jerry Springer Show, The 
Rikki Lake Show, and The Jenny Jones Show as “a genre built on exposing secrets, on talking 
about and with suppressed subjects, and on dramatizing personal experience,” presenting 
“something of a boon for stigmatized and marginalized social groups, armed as they were with 
discrediting secrets, scandalizing identities, enraging life experiences, and a history of being 
silenced” (227).  He argues that the talk show’s “emphasis on personal testimony and the 
expertise of personal experience made sex and gender outsiders, with their deeply personal and 
dramatically revelatory coming-out narratives, a genre staple,” with queer people frequently 
appearing in these shows as “stealers of other people’s boyfriends and girlfriends, secret 
admirers, exhibitionists, sisters of women who dress like sluts [...] as goofy, dysfunctional, 
funny, nasty, emotional, and combative as everyone else” (230).   
As reality TV’s mode of production evolved, however, this “confessional” apparatus 
taken up from talk shows - in which one’s knowledge of oneself was disclosed as truth - began to 
give way to a new governmentality, in which one’s relationship with oneself was to be retrained 
via relationships with experts who could disseminate new technologies of the self.  And queer 
people - especially gay men - continued to be included more frequently in reality programs than 
in other television formats, often providing this new governing logic of reality television with the 
sort of personality, expertise, and liberal cache typifying the demands of late capitalism’s shift to 
an emphasis on immaterial labor and cultural production.  Before I can account for the ways that 
queer practices of the self have lent themselves to reality TV’s mode of production, how these 
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have enabled and been enabled by the larger economic shifts of catastrophic capitalism, and how 
reality competition formats that led to the emergence of Drag Race helped to evolve these 
changes, I first want to elaborate some of the circuitous relationships and tensions between queer 
communities, consumptive identity practices, niche advertising, and the rise of cable networks 
like Bravo and Logo that have brought all of these lineages together into television brands 
appealing to queer people via reality programming. 
 
Gay Markets & Consumptive Cultures 
When MTV executives and Bunim-Murray productions chose to incorporate queer 
subjects into The Real World in the early 1990s, this was part of the network’s calculated attempt 
to “signal to viewers within a particular demographic and lifestyle niche that there was a special 
relationship between the channel and that niche,” in order to demonstrate “to advertisers that the 
channel had efficiently separated the desirable group from those viewers outside the target 
market” (Sender 2007, 303).  But the token inclusion of sexual and racial minorities signalled a 
desire for a multicultural youth audience - not an explicitly gay or black or latino market - as 
cable networks like MTV had to “navigate a narrow line between signaling a niche appeal and 
retaining large enough audiences” to be included in Nielsen ratings, and thus attract more 
lucrative advertising opportunities (Sender 2007, 303).  At that time, large enough queer 
audiences that could constitute a cable channel target market had not yet been constructed 
captured by the apparatuses of advertising - though the targeting of gay markets and formation of 
niche queer consumer culture was well underway.  And while the story of Drag Race and the 
evolution of reality television’s mode of production does eventually involve the creation of 
queer-focused cable television, the longer history of queer culture’s entanglement with 
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commodity culture and the targeting apparatuses of advertisers in many ways presages the 
networked “social media logics” that would come to converge with so-called “mass media 
logics,” in the language of José van Dijck. 
As Dan Baker argues, the 1970s saw a massive proliferation and circulation of gay-
themed magazines and newspapers in major urban areas in the U.S., distributed primarily in gay 
bookstores, bars, and through direct-mail services.  Unlike most print publications of the era, 
these magazines and newspapers were not financially supported by advertising, owed largely to 
the calculations of major corporations that feared social backlash for supporting marginalized, 
stigmatized queer communities.  This changed, however, in 1979, when “the first Absolut vodka 
ads ran in [nationally distributed gay magazine ] The Advocate,” which was targeted by Michel 
Roux, “a straight man” and the importer of this new Swedish liquor who was looking “for a 
niche that had not yet been exploited,” and who hoped that gay men represented “a trendy, 
fashion-setting segment of society” (Baker, 12).  He even hired famed queer artist Keith Haring 
to create the ads that ran in the magazine.  It is worth noting here that Absolut was also one of 
the first sponsors of Drag Race, with its CEO even appearing multiple times in episodes to 
consult with or judge contestants during Absolut-themed challenges, which I will discuss in more 
detail later.  With this first instance of a corporate brand seeking to target a queer audience to 
“exploit” as a new, influential, affluent market, the floodgates were opened.  Queer visibility, the 
focus of overt political activity in the decade following the Stonewall riots, had become linked to 
the legitimating practices of advertising demographics.   
Esther Newton had noted in her 1979 introduction to the second edition of Mother Camp 
that “the business world, having discovered that gay people spend money, is taking advantage of 
the new openness to direct products toward the ‘gay market’” (1979, xii), a practice that evolved 
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by the 1990s into a wider corporate strategy, involving the reconstitution of gay subjectivities in 
the mould of commodity culture.  Corporations now sought “to cultivate a narrow (and widely 
acceptable) definition of gay identity as a marketing tool, and to integrate gay people as gay 
people into a new consumer niche” (Gluckman & Reed, 7, italics mine).  This was not, however, 
a one-way process, as queer communities were also interested in fashioning themselves as 
attractive consumers.  John Campbell argues that “the development of gay marketing involved 
not only the appearance of a self-conscious lifestyle based on sexual identity [...] but also the 
construction of the image of the ‘affluent gay consumer’ by actors within LGBT communities” 
themselves, while simultaneously “gay and lesbian consumers were rendered even more 
appealing to corporate America via the contention that their social and political marginalization 
made them all the more susceptible to the advances of marketers” (667).  Following the lead of 
The Advocate, “several aspiring national gay publications began to look to corporate advertisers 
to fuel their expansion” (Campbell, 667), but with advertisers “steering toward gay publications 
that promote a stylish, widely palatable vision of gay life,” in “glossy mags” like Out and The 
Advocate, they only targeted media “that [had] been cleansed of the objectionable: phone sex 
ads, radical politics, and hard core leather culture” (Gluckman & Reed, 3-4).  This led to a trend 
in gay media, eager to court now-interested advertisers, of “the diminishment of overt political 
content in favor of ‘lifestyle’ content focused on questions of consumption” (Campbell, 668). 
It is tempting to reduce this history to a cooptation of intrinsically radical or oppositional 
queer cultures by commodity capitalism, in which a minority subculture that had flourished 
outside of the purview of cultural industries were taken up by them - extracted for their unique 
knowledges of fashion and self-fashioning, and exploited as audiences for new kinds of 
consumable identities once brought into the fold.  Many queer scholars “tend to pit gay activism 
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and gay consumerism against one another, constructing a declension narrative where gay 
activism [...] has been co-opted by the superficial allure of gay consumerism and gay visibility in 
American popular culture” (Johnson, 870).  If, as Mike Featherstone argues, postwar U.S. culture 
in the 20th century saw new forms of identity formation that signalled a shift from “unreflexively 
adopting a lifestyle, through tradition or habit,” in which “the new heroes of consumer culture 
make lifestyle a life project and display their individuality and sense of style in the particularity 
of the assemblage of goods, clothes, practices, experiences, appearance and bodily dispositions 
they design together into a lifestyle,” it could be argued that queer people have harbored 
alternative sites and subject positions that have allowed them to negotiate this consumptive self-
fashioning in resistant ways (quoted in Ouellette 2016, 55).  While queer people in the mid-to-
late 20th century U.S. of course participated in consumer culture, much of the cultural 
production that tied commodities to images of attractive lifestyles pushed them to the margins, 
and spaces like gay bars and bookstores - and traditions like drag - allowed for alternative sites 
of knowledge production and queer technologies of the self that were not (yet) circulated by 
corporate cultural industries.   
John D’Emilio describes the way the very same postwar context that gave rise to the 
proliferation of lifestyle-focused identities also produced the conditions that allowed for a 
flourishing gay counterculture.  He argues that “gay life in the 1950s and 1960s became a 
nationwide phenomenon,” with gay subculture not relegated only to major metropolises in the 
U.S., but also flourishing in “lesbian and gay male bars […] in places like Worcester, 
Massachusetts, and Buffalo, New York[,] Columbia, South Carolina, and Des Moines, Iowa” 
(1983, 107).  While the Stonewall Riots are popularly ascribed with the birth of modern gay 
rights movements, D’Emilio argues that the riots were not a singular event, but represented “a 
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massive, grass-roots liberation movement [that] could form almost overnight precisely because 
communities of lesbians and gay men existed” (D’Emilio, 107).  The proliferation of gay 
communities and identities were tied directly to the destabilizing forces of capitalism in 
D’Emilio’s account, because “as more adults [were] drawn into the free labor system […] the 
forces that propelled men and women into families and kept them there have weakened,” though 
he also argues that “the ideology of capitalist society has enshrined the family as the source of 
love, affection, and emotional security, the place where our need for stable, intimate human 
relationships is satisfied” (D’Emilio, 108).  Because of this, queer people found themselves 
forging new kinds of kinship, new forms of family, new networks of affiliation in order to 
sustain themselves in the face of growing cultural, political, and economic insecurity in the later 
half of the 20th century. 
The relationship between these alternative queer sites of kinship and consumption and the 
commodity capitalist regimes that would eventually target and transform them is not so simple, 
however.  While “studies of the gay consumer market assume that it was a byproduct of the gay 
rights political movement, rather than a catalyst for its development,” the actual history of gay 
consumer cultures tells a different story.  Long before Absolut found The Advocate, and even 
longer before ad-supported apps like Grindr and Scruff destabilized the necessity of gay spaces 
for social and sexual networking amongst queer people, gay men were actively moulding 
commodity culture to their own devices and innovating mediated means of crafting their own 
tailored networks of affiliation.  And the nature of these networks troubles the simple dichotomy 
often drawn between “political” and “consumer” identities in gay cultural production.  Historian 
David K. Johnson argues that “before there was a national gay political community there was a 
national gay commercial market and that the development of that market by a small group of gay 
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entrepreneurs was a key, overlooked catalyst to the rise of a gay movement in America” 
(Johnson, 867-8).  He traces a long history of gay men using commercial markets to slowly 
evolve their own print cultures, stretching back to “as early as the 1940s,” when men would use 
bar guides, pen pal clubs, and “the classified sections of Popular Mechanics and The Hobby 
Directory” to get in touch with each other “by signaling their interest in ‘physical culture’ and 
‘art photography’” (868-9).  This practice soon began to migrate and coalesce in the classified 
sections of physique and fitness magazines, which Johnson describes as “an outgrowth of the 
turn-of-the-century physical culture movement” that responded to “a crisis in masculinity in a 
rapidly urbanizing and industrializing America” in which “traditional markers of masculinity, 
such as land or independent business ownership, became less accessible to white, middle-class 
men,” necessitating “new markers of masculinity” like a visibly muscular physique (871). 
Johnson argues that especially “young, isolated gay men [...] living beyond major cities” 
considered these physique and fitness magazines “as a lifeline to a larger world,” demonstrating 
in his content analysis “not only that physique magazine publishers explicitly targeted a gay 
consumer market, but also that consumer items provided a means for gay men to understand 
themselves as belonging to a larger community,” with the purchasing of these magazines 
“validat[ing] their erotic attraction to other men and provid[ing] particular class-based models for 
what it meant to be gay” (Johnson, 870).  Not only did the purchasing and visible consumption 
of these magazines allow for gay men to signal their identities to one another in coded form, but 
the advertisements and classified sections of them fostered the emergence of brand-new mail-
order gay consumer markets, which “helped provide the rhetoric and construct the networks that 
fostered gay political activism” (870).  Johnson describes how the gay markets fostered by 
physique magazine print culture allowed Lloyd Spinar and Conrad Germain to found Directory 
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Services Inc. (DSI) in 1963, a “veritable gay mail-order empire” which “became the most 
aggressive supporter of freedom of expression” in the years leading up to the Stonewall Riots 
(878).  The company sold “books, records, jewelry, clothing, greeting cards, and other items to 
thousands of gay men around the United States and abroad,” but perhaps most crucially, they 
offered a directory of gay bars throughout the U.S., webbing these distinct sites of gay 
community into a network of affiliation (878). 
After achieving massive success with their mail-order company, Spinar and Germain 
began to publish their own “physique” magazines, stripping away the pretense (and front-cover 
garments) of physical fitness that defined the genre originally, offering openly adoring nude 
photographs of (mostly but not exclusively white) men.  In every issue of Butch and Tiger, the 
duo allowed “the cover of each of their magazines [to reveal] more male anatomy” than the one 
before, leading to their arrest by the U.S. district attorney on the grounds of “sending lewd 
materials through the mail” (879).  When Federal Judge Earl R. Larson ruled, shockingly, that 
Spinar and Germain were not guilty, his decision had ramifications that extended well beyond 
their publishing enterprise.  In his ruling, Larson declared that “these were gay magazines 
targeting a specifically gay market, and defend[ed] the rights of those consumers” to purchase 
them, and even claimed that “the rights of minorities expressed individually in sexual groups or 
otherwise must be respected,” predicting that “with increasing research and study, we will in the 
future come to a better understanding of ourselves, sexual deviants, and others” (Johnson, 881).  
Johnson argues that “DSI’s victory in federal district court was recognized at the time as a 
watershed moment” - even though it is now often ignored by historians of pornography, 
obscenity, and the gay movement - which immediately led to “the artistic, bodybuilding, and 
classical alibis that had been used to justify male nudity” in magazines to fall away.  In less than 
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a year, magazines featured “cover photos of naked men in bed, the sexual connotations no longer 
even thinly disguised.”  And only two months after DSI received their verdict, “Don Michaels 
began publishing a small, openly gay publication called The Los Angeles Advocate,” which 
would be renamed The Advocate, becoming by the 1970s “a prominent national gay and lesbian 
news magazine, but with a circulation still less than DSI’s Butch a decade earlier” (Johnson, 
881).  And so, the magazine later charged with beginning a process of cooptation by gay 
consumer cultures was in fact birthed in the wake of a pivotal gay-rights victory facilitated by a 
gay marketplace that had thrived for decades before that first Absolut ad. 
 
Immaterial Labor & Branded Queer Lifestyles 
 While Johnson’s history of gay markets in the pre-Stonewall era provides a complicated 
wrinkle in the narrative of queer political cultures being transformed into gay consumer cultures, 
demonstrating the complicated ways that commodities, markets, and technologies of the self 
circulate in a network of corporate and alternative sites of knowledge production and industrial 
activity, it is inarguable that gay people - especially gay men - have been deployed as “mavens 
and cheerleaders for consumption” by reality television (Gamson, 229).  If “the relative ubiquity 
of gay and lesbian characters on reality-TV shows” in the 1990s was due largely to “the 
expectations of a genre that demands diversity and conflict among participants” (and that 
deployed a confessional logic of self-disclosure which mined coming-out stories for drama and 
novelty), changes in the mode of production and governmentality of later reality programs 
reconfigured queers as personable and stylish sources of expertise in the technologies of the self 
(Sender 2007, 304).  While Kavka designates a second and third generation of reality programs 
organized, respectively, around “Surveillance & Competition” (maturing into “Transformation & 
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Challenge”) and “Economies of Celebrity,” I find it difficult to separate these genealogical 
strands in assessing the evolution of the subgenres that led to the emergence of Drag Race.  I 
also argue that all four of these defining features - surveillance, competition, transformation, and 
celebrity - are subordinate corollaries to the dominant shift in the mode of reality television 
production, its combined deployment of  “a governing logic that expects everyone to be 
‘entrepreneurs of the self' [...] who maximize their everyday choices, and manage their own fates 
and fortunes, regardless of circumstances” (Ouellette 2016, 51), with “the logics of promotion 
and branding,” characterized by “intensified product placement and branded content,” the rise of 
globally-distributed “branded formats,” and the transformation of on-screen participants into 
“branded selves” (Hearn 2013, 443). 
 It is also difficult to delineate major shifts in the “generations” of reality television 
because it is most distinguished, as a mode of production, by its very flexibility in 
accommodating new permutations, combinations, and formulations.  This is why Alison Hearn 
describes reality television as both mirror and foreguard of “broader economic and political 
changes taking place around the globe” at the turn of the century, most especially an emphasis on 
flexible accumulation, which “include strategies of permanent innovation, mobility, 
subcontracting, and just-in-time, decentralized production” combined with a reliance “on the 
production and consumption of knowledge and symbolic products, emphasizing packaging, 
image, design, and marketing over material production” (Hearn 2011, 315).  Embodying a form 
of the “social factory,” reality television’s mode of production has come to collapse “distinctions 
between life, selfhood, and labor” while “actively producing new forms of immaterial labor,” 
allowing for a never-ending performance of “yourself” on TV (Hearn 2011, 316) and creating a 
model for “the monetization of ‘being’ and the production of subjectivity” (315).   
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Reality television’s mode of production innovates and models the flexible, exploitative, 
extractive labor conditions that have proliferated across much of catastrophic global capitalism’s 
industries, providing new forms of immaterial labor that can be taken up in many other sectors of 
economic production.  Drawing on “the subjective attributes of workers, such as creativity, 
intelligence, caring, and linguistic skills, immaterial labor produces distinct communities and 
relationships, social networks, social meanings, subjectivities,” leading to a blurring of social, 
economic, political, and cultural aspects of our world (Hearn 2011, 316).  And while immaterial 
labor is now normatively expected from nearly everyone, “from software designers to waitresses, 
sex trade workers to academics,” reality television is a privileged site of its (re)production, as 
“communicative and linguistic innovative capacity and flexible self-image construction have 
now become directly productive for capital,” according to Paolo Virno, who sees “productive 
labour, in its totality, appropriat[ing] the special characteristics of the performing artist” (quoted 
in Hearn 2011, 316-7). 
 While the two programs that Kavka identifies as vanguards of the “second generation” of 
reality television - Big Brother and Survivor - both typify the shifts in its mode of production to 
an emphasis on governmental techniques of self-entrepreneurship and the proliferation of 
promotional and branding culture, another lineage of reality formats centered on culture 
industries predates these game show hits with the airing of ABC’s Making the Band in March of 
2000.  This lineage more fully embodies the evolution of the mode of production at the turn of 
the millennium, with “the culture industries provid[ing] the templates for forms of profit-
generating self-performance in all sectors of the economy” as “more and more individuals are 
required to create their own profit-producing self-brand or public persona” (Hearn 2013, 446).  
While Making the Band was not nearly as big of a hit as Survivor or Big Brother, and would be 
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eclipsed by the importing of the Idol franchise to the U.S. in 2001, its combination of talent 
competition, a “focus on the mundane grind of professionalisation” of its singers, and the 
“construction of stars out of 'ordinary' people by industry experts” provided an innovation in 
reality television’s turn to culture industries as fodder for drama and instruction (Stahl, 313).  
That its basic format - early episodes focused on auditioning singers who will comprise a newly-
manufactured boy band by infamous self-styled impresario Lou Pearlman, and later episodes 
documenting their conditioning and formation into that band, O-Town - was lifted from another 
program (New Zealand’s Popstars, which also “inspired” the Idol franchise) without directly 
licensing it demonstrates another crucial aspect of the flexible economic logics of reality 
television’s mode of production. 
 But if Making the Band innovated this turn in reality programming, and American Idol 
transmuted it into an audience-participation based empire, it was America’s Next Top Model that 
fully brought the governmental and self-promotional logics of reality television to life, pivoting 
crucially around the immaterial labor of producing feminine beauty as a commodity that can be 
articulated to and deployed by corporate advertising culture.  Additionally, ANTM must be 
credited with innovating the reality-competition format in 2003, organizing it for the first time 
around a single, ruling personality (Tyra), who sits at a table surrounded by councilors, and acts 
as sole final authority in choosing which of the “bottom two” contestants of the week stays, and 
who goes.  The staging and logics of this format would be replicated a year later in Mark 
Burnett’s brand-saturated (and fatefully, ultimately, reality-altering) program The Apprentice, 
and of course provide the template by which Drag Race centers its competition on the ultimate 
judgment of RuPaul his/herself, though RPDR gives campy and occasionally-critical twists to the 
evaluative industry logics that predominate in ANTM’s eliminations.  For in ANTM, the reality 
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TV mode of production and larger changes in the economic and political structures of the global 
capitalist order collide quite spectacularly.  As Laurie Ouellette argues, ANTM “intersects with 
broader trends, including cheaper modes of production, the rise of aesthetic labor, the 
feminization of job skills in post-industrial societies, and the extent to which today's workers are 
encouraged to envision themselves as ‘entrepreneurs of the self’ rather than relying on unions or 
long-term job security” (2013, 169).  Structured as a competition, the show “exploits the labor of 
unpaid female contestants who are often lower income and women of color,” rewarding as 
winner the contestant who “transforms herself into her own best asset” after being “cruelly 
subjected to others (producers, experts, cultural intermediaries, judges) who profit from her 
labor,” while she is expected and “invited to ‘maximize’ herself for her own gain” (2013, 169).   
Like Hearn, Ouellette argues that reality television’s mode of production hinges on the 
exploitation of immaterial labor, as “the post-industrial economy hinges more on the 
commodification of feelings, images, attitudes, styles, identities, and expressions of social life” 
(2013, 170).  ANTM is an exemplary model of this mode of production, especially because “the 
rise of fashion modeling anticipated the mainstreaming of such immate-rial labor,” becoming 
prominent in an post-industrial era in which “non-material goods such as services, ideas and 
images have become products of capitalist development and circulation,” while simultaneously 
providing “a testing ground for collapsing boundaries between life and work” (2013, 171).  
While I will argue in Chapter Three that Drag Race does not simply reiterate this flexible mode 
of production, as it provides some space for queer critique and redeployment of its logics, it 
should be noted here that ANTM’s basic structure clearly provided the template for Drag Race’s 
semi-parodic iteration of a reality competition show, and that RuPaul launched his televisual pop 
culture career when MTV started airing the music video for his song “Supermodel (You Better 
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Work),” in which he cannily put a drag spin on the burgeoning supermodel craze of the 1990s.  
That he was later hired by MAC cosmetics as a model demonstrates his deftness at reading 
cultural and industrial trends, and innovating novel forms of self-promotion, via drag, that 
allowed him to insert himself into powerful (figurative and literal) channels. 
 Ouellette also argues that ANTM itself does a little bit of critical work in exposing some 
of the workings of the culture industries, even as it reiterates and popularizes their exploitative 
logics in the name of its game.  She claims that the show draws attention to “the mechanics of 
commercial image production,” allowing the viewer “to witness the rehearsing, staging, 
direction, and reshooting that produces ‘desirable’ women in magazines and TV commercials,” 
thereby “demystifying the process whereby women are objectified, put on display, and fetishized 
for profit-making purposes” (2013, 170).  But simultaneously, the contestants “literally are 
commodities,” with the competition centering on “the market calculations of image-makers and 
the labor of the aspiring models, who must learn to create and perform salable versions of 
femininity” (2013, 170).  Ouellette claims that this “destroys some of the power and pleasure 
associated with the ‘male gaze,'” making it “difficult to revel in a fantasy about the female body 
when the production of that fantasy is exposed,” with the practices of producing femininity - 
“endless makeup and dieting, Brazilian waxes and hair extensions” - rendered visible (2013, 
170).  This is another thread that I will pick up in Chapter Three, as Drag Race does similar 
work in drawing attention to the production of femininity via the practices and technologies of 
the self, but in a context removed from the culture industries’ circulation of femininity as a 
commodity.   
 Hearn and Ouellette both draw attention to the intersection, in reality television’s mode of 
production, of pedagogical and self-management techniques, aesthetic labor, and promotional 
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self-branding culture.  Hearn argues that “individuals [...] turn to the promotional pedagogy and 
aesthetic codes of commercial media, technology, and social networks in order to reassure 
themselves that they exist and are worth something,” identifying “personal insecurity” as a 
“highly productive symptom upon which a collapsing capitalist system, searching zombie-like 
for new forms of value, feeds,” with reality television’s “branded content, formats, products, 
services, and monetized self-brands” acting as paradigms “of these new processes of capitalist 
valorization and accumulation” (Hearn 2013, 451).  Ouellette cites Angela McRobbie to make a 
similar argument focused on the rise of aesthetic labor, “particularly in the growing retail and 
service industries” that seek an “attractive and stylish” workforce, claiming that this has helped 
give rise to a “burgeoning culture of beauty treatments, fitness, and cosmetic surgery” to reshape 
a precarious laboring class into aesthetically disciplined, self-enterprising competitors (2013, 
171).  While competition formats like ANTM and Project Runway reinforce the hierarchical, 
expertise-based logics of the fashion and modeling industries - and employ queer experts like 
ANTM’s Jay Manuel and J. Alexander (aka Mr. Jay and Miss J) and Project Runway’s Tim Gunn 
and Isaac Mizrahi - the merging of governmental technologies of the self, logics of branding, and 
specifically queer knowledges about self-fashioning were more perfectly intertwined in Queer 
Eye for the Straight Guy.   
Describing the second “maturing” half of her second generation of reality programs, 
Kavka argues that Queer Eye signalled a turn in which “reality television  [...] becomes refined 
as a pedagogical tool that teaches consumers how to be better citizens within the capitalist 
framework of neoliberal society,” and that the program “highlights not only the role of 
consumerism in the makeover but also the connection between consumerism, processes of 
identity formation and the role of television as go-between” (Kavka, 134).  While this is an apt 
 84 
summary of some of the broader outlines of the interconnections between reality television and 
changes in the landscape of post-industrial capitalism described above, she removes Queer Eye 
from a reality lineage that has specifically deployed queer people (mostly but not exclusively gay 
men) as experts in techniques of fashion and self-fashioning, and does not discuss the way this 
show led to an important innovation: Bravo fashioning itself as a reality-focused, gay(ish) niche 
cable network.  Queer Eye certainly fits into the “transformation” and makeover lineage that 
Kavka supplies, linking it to later shows like Extreme Makeover: Home Edition and Biggest 
Loser - Sender even links it to “television’s first makeover show” Queen for a Day (2006, 132) - 
and as Ouellette and Hay argue, like other makeover programs it “fuses expert diagnoses, video 
surveillance, and hands-on examinations with humor and suspense to present guidelines for 
living,” governing its subjects “through a process of self-objectification in that the trainee is 
forced to step outside his social and cultural ‘habitus’ to examine himself from the vantage point 
of the experts” (Ouellette & Hay, 122). 
But like competition shows centered on the transformative possibilities and economics of 
culture industries - ANTM before it and Project Runway (and, to an extent, Drag Race) after it - 
Queer Eye distinguishes itself by drawing on a queer labor lineage, “because gay men have had 
historical access to the style trades when others were denied them, because that is where they 
could be safely sequestered as inverts among women” (Lisa Henderson quoted in Sender 2007, 
309).  Sender argues that because of this, Queer Eye “makes explicit what has been a common 
assumption for decades: that gay men are uniquely positioned to guide those around them 
through the intricacies of domestic and style matters” (Sender 2007, 309), and thus “capitalizes 
on the development of the gay market since the 1970s [...] in order to court both gay consumers 
and heterosexuals who want to be associated with the positive attributes of the gay market” 
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(Sender 2006, 137).  Gay men are utilized to shore up a “crisis of masculinity” that has been 
“precipitated by new employment conditions” (Sender 2006, 132), but which is framed “not in 
terms of financial, professional, or relational pressures on men, but as a failure to grow up, to see 
the self as others do, and to have positive self-regard,” with queer identities offered as “templates 
of adult, responsible, self-realized subjecthood” (Sender 2006, 144).   
With Queer Eye, Bravo stumbled onto a unique commodification of gay identity 
articulated explicitly to affluent consumption culture, and the show proved so popular that the 
network completely rebranded itself as a home for reality programming featuring gay (or gay-
adjacent) lifestyle mavens and tastemakers.  Hearn cites Bravo as “exemplary of the brand-
extension model,” arguing that “it routinely spins new reality series from the thematic 
components of previous shows,” like Queer Eye leading to a proliferation of some programs 
centered on gay interests (like Manhunt: The Search For America's Most Gorgeous Male 
Model), and others focused on lifestyle and consumption (like Top Chef) (Hearn 2013, 444).  
While cable networks had branded (and rebranded) themselves for decades, Bravo was the first 
to narrow its brand to the intersection of reality programming, gay content, and affluent lifestyle 
consumption culture - the latter providing a key piece of the puzzle, as an economic strategy – 
and was an innovator in its “dualcasting” programming strategy.  Sender quotes Jeff Gaspin, who 
served as president of Bravo during its rebranding in the wake of Queer Eye, who said that while 
the network “had success with gay audiences in the past  [...] the primary audiences for these 
shows will be women,” with the queer elements of its programming serving as a means to attract 
advertisers who “wish to be associated with gay consumers' ‘professional grade’ - read ‘affluent’ 
- reputation, and of the value of that association for product placement on a show that profiles 
gay taste” (Sender 2007, 308).  Once again, practices developed by reality television’s mode of 
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production proliferated more widely throughout the industry, as “using gay content to dualcast to 
two distinct audiences” was not only central in consolidating Bravo’s new brand and shifting 
their demographics, but also became “part of a larger strategy of diversification by [Bravo parent 
company] NBC” (Sender 2007, 314). 
 
The Spreadability of Reality TV 
Queer Eye also brought Bravo to the vanguard of another enormous shift in the 
technological, economic, and industrial landscape of television’s mode of production, as 
broadcast and cable channels had to begin to figure out how to plug themselves into and spread 
themselves onto emerging networked, digital, social media platforms.  Queer Eye demonstrated 
the way reality television’s flexible mode of production and logic of self-improvement 
governmentality lent themselves to experimentation and proliferation on emerging platforms, 
making reality an extremely versatile format that could expand beyond the traditional television 
programming schedule.  As Ouellette and Hay argue, “the television text is only one component 
of the expansive Queer Eye project,” which included expansion into print media in the form of 
self-help manuals, as well as “a website where TV viewers can obtain archived fashion, beauty, 
decorating, and domestic advice as well as episode summaries, video clips, and complete product 
guides.”  Describing this as “the converged Queer Eye experience,” Ouellette and Hay argue that 
“multimedia and mobility” were key in Queer Eye’s innovative expansion, leading the way as 
“reality TV pioneered the fusion of television programming and portable media devices.”  Not 
only did this proliferation of content allow the show to solidify its relationship with viewers 
across the expanding media platforms they were already beginning to use, it also provided the 
makeover genre of reality television itself an opportunity to become more interactive and “bring 
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the viewer/user into the reinvention logic of the makeover game more directly than the viewing 
experience alone,” with the “turn toward portable nuggets of content” fostering an at-home 
implementation of the “self-work inherent to makeover programming” (Ouellette & Hay, 123). 
While American Idol first brought audience participation to reality television (in the 
U.S.), inviting viewers to vote for their favorite contestants and therefore feel they were actually 
part of the production itself, it was makeover and transformation formats like Queer Eye and 
Biggest Loser that would prove most adept at extending their brands and logics into viewers’ 
lives via emerging mobile platforms, with apps and trackers and interactive guides by which you 
could follow the programs’ technologies of self-management at home.  As Andrejevic argues, 
“the reality format aligned itself with the interactive zeitgeist and availed itself of the promise of 
interactivity ushered in by the spread of networked, digital media,” cozying up nicely with “the 
economic logic of the Web” and even anticipating “the Facebook era” by relying on “the 
participation of audience members to create content, promising to ‘democratize’ the process of 
cultural production” (41).  This interactivity between reality television programs and their 
audiences not only intensified the outsourcing of content production to audiences and fans, it 
also initiated the emerging practices of customizable self-surveillance, in which individual users 
of new services on digital platforms could volunteer information about their demographics, 
desires, and tastes.  This was not only a response to newly popular emerging mobile platforms, 
but also a culmination of changing practices in the television and advertising industries that had 
begun in the 1990s with the advent of digital cable and satellite technologies.  In 1997, Turow 
described the dawn of algorithm-assisted advertising targeting and its convergence with 
emerging television practices, noting that ad agencies had begun "using computer models based 
on zip codes and a variety of databases" in order to "tailor materials for small groups, even 
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individuals," sometimes using "forms of interactive television" in order to "send some programs 
and commercials only to neighborhoods, census blocks, and households that advertisers want to 
reach" (1997, 6).  Presciently, he argued that "media firms are working toward a time when 
people will be able to choose the news, information, and entertainment they want when they 
want it," and perhaps one day "be able to offer different product messages [...] to individuals 
based on what they know about them" (1997, 6).   
While our highly mobile era - in which our activities across multiple devices throughout 
the day are tracked and responded to by a number of multinational entertainment, technology, 
and consumer-good corporations - thus clearly represents a refinement of the “narrowcasting” 
advertising practices innovated in the cable era, Van Dijck describes this “connectivity” of 
networked digital media as one of the main characteristics of the “social media logics” that have 
emerged from (and converged with) the “mass media logics” of the 20th century, arguing that 
"connectivity should thus be seen as an advanced strategy of algorithmically connecting users to 
content, users to users, platforms to users, users to advertisers, and platforms to platforms,” 
leading to an era in which “the boundaries between human connections and commercially and 
technologically steered activities are increasingly obfuscated" (van Dijck, 9).  In the heavily-
branded environments crafted by the practices of reality television production, this obfuscation 
and interconnection with digital mobile platforms emerged as an easy extension of its 
governmental logics.  Experts on a program like Queer Eye are part of a legacy of 
“recommendation culture [that] predates the advent of social networks,” but the ability to get 
uniquely-tailored advice, tips, and (most importantly) advertisements via the mobile Queer Eye 
universe demonstrates “what is new in the context of social media networks,” which have 
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immersed us within the now-ubiquitous “mechanisms of deep personalization and networked 
customization" (van Dijck, 9). 
The evolution and refinement of the commercialization of mobile, digital, social media 
platforms over the past two decades has found content-creators, platform developers, and 
advertisers both shaping and chasing the practices and preferences of the audiences who 
consume entertainment, news, and information via a mixture of traditional and “new” platforms.  
While mobile devices were once considered “second screens” onto which advertisers might try 
to follow them as they jumped from the “first screen” of the television, the proliferation of Over-
the-Top services, streaming media platforms, and the refinement of digital and mobile 
technologies to allow for high-definition streams and downloads has led to an era in which the 
“second screen” is now often the primary or only screen used to access audio-visual media.  In 
this new epoch of economic shifts and industrial reshuffling in the converged cultural-
technological industries, network and cable broadcasters are again having to find flexible means 
to adapt to changing conditions and increased competition from upstart producer/distributors like 
Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon Prime.  And perhaps predictably, reality television has again proven 
to be the sort of relatively-cheap, union-busting, flexible means of producing content that can 
allow traditional broadcasters to adapt to this new era. 
When Drag Race moved to VH1 from its sister network Logo in 2017, the narrative 
offered by the executives behind the decision was that the show itself deserved a larger platform.  
Amy Doyle, an executive at MTV Networks (the Viacom subsidiary and parent company of 
MTV, VH1, and Logo) explained that “Logo has only so much distribution, and as soon as we 
had heard that we weren't going to be able to get more distribution from Logo, we were like, 
‘This show deserves the biggest audience possible’” (Newman).  Since its launch in 2005, Logo 
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has struggled to be picked up by cable operators, with many of them claiming to be “uneasy 
about facing complaints from special-interest groups who say that kids could flip to Logo as 
easily as they could to Nickelodeon” (Becker).  Created initially to act not only as “a network 
specifically for the LGBT community” but also “a full-time home for this important and 
influential audience on television,” with a reality-program-heavy schedule that reflected its tight 
budget and difficulty in attracting advertisers, Logo’s programming was retooled in 2012 in an 
attempt to broaden its appeal (Lloyd-Miller).  As Logo vice-president Lisa Sherman explained at 
the time, “gay will always be in our DNA, and it forms our sensibilities and what we do, but just 
as we're being more integrated into more mainstream culture, mainstream culture is much more 
connected to our community" (Umstead).  Drag Race, which since its launch in 2008 had 
consistently been Logo’s biggest hit, had proven to be a crossover hit, precipitating this shift for 
Logo.  But even half a decade after attempting to rebrand itself as only a pseudo-gay network, 
Logo was still not carried by enough cable operators to even reach enough households to qualify 
it for Nielsen ratings.   
So while it was certainly true that Drag Race could - and should - be given a chance to 
reach a wider audience by migrating to VH1, this was not the only (or primary) reason it found 
itself a new home.  As a reality format, Drag Race had excelled at two metrics straddling either 
side of major shifts in “television” consumption in the past decade: it frequently trended (while 
airing live) on social media, and was widely purchased for VOD download via iTunes and 
Amazon by those who did not have cable, or a cable company or package that carried Logo.  
And as a reality brand that had proven itself adaptable to new platforms and appealing to a 
younger demographic, it became an attractive centerpiece for a newly-rebranded VH1 in the 
reshuffling of MTV Networks’ properties in the wake of changing leadership.   
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A press release touting Chris McCarthy’s meteoric ascendence to the presidency of 
MTV, VH1, and Logo in October 2016 - adding MTV to his domain only four months after 
being named President of VH1 and Logo - describes how VH1 “established itself as the fastest 
growing top 25 entertainment network on cable, and delivered its biggest year-over-year ratings 
growth in nearly 15 years” under his leadership, boasting at the time “three out of the top five 
unscripted series on cable.”  This success at VH1 had come after he had proven himself as 
president of Logo in 2014, during which he “transform[ed] the brand into the dominant LGBT 
digital destination and [drove] the channel to ten consecutive quarters of year over year growth 
(MTV Press).  By 2018, McCarthy was boasting at the network upfronts that MTV had achieved 
“its third consecutive quarter of year-over-year prime-time growth among 18- to 34-year-olds for 
the first time in seven years,” with ratings up “double to triple digits on its various digital and 
social platforms” (Lynch 2018b).  McCarthy explained to potential advertisers that the network 
was now eager to “capture the most viewers in the platforms that they’re on,” focusing on a 12-
17 year old demographic “in digital/social,” with “more shows [...] created uniquely for there,” 
which might launch on the “linear” (cable broadcast) MTV network before moving to digital 
platforms like Snapchat Discover (Lynch 2018b).  McCarthy’s focus on social metrics is what 
ultimately led him to make the executive decision to move Drag Race to VH1 in an attempt to 
rebrand the network as “the place where pop culture comes to party,” with a new emphasis on 
unscripted material with hopes of offering “shows that offer some urgency to watch live, 
particularly those that generate a high level of second-screen activity,” with McCarthy seeking 
“50% of viewership of VH1’s original series coming from live rather than time-shifted on-
demand options” (Littleton, 2017b).  The dramatic eliminations of a frothy reality-competition 
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format like Drag Race provide just such an impetus for fans to watch live, making it a 
centerpiece of the new VH1 brand.   
Acting as a tent-pole for a wide network of short-form video content, bi-coastal and bi-
yearly fan conferences, and expansive global tours of live entertainment - which I will describe 
and analyze in detail in Chapter Four - Drag Race is emblematic of the latest shifts in reality 
television’s mode of production, and its alignment with Viacom corporate strategies that have 
come to focus on “short-form content [production]” and “developing live experiences and 
consumer products,” in hopes of creating “valuable new channels for marketing, talent 
development and connecting with audiences” (Littleton 2017a).  In the past two years, Viacom 
has made an “aggressive push into digital content,” developing a new production arm, Viacom 
Digital Studios, “which creates short-form and long-form content for Facebook, Snapchat, 
Instagram, Twitter and YouTube,” while also establishing a direct partnership with Snapchat to 
develop content for Snapchat Discover based on its programming on MTV, Comedy Central, and 
Nickelodeon, and also purchasing WhoSay, a social media “influencer marketing company,” as 
well as “VidCon, the world’s largest conference for YouTube and other online video content 
producers” (Lynch 2018a).  The rise of short-form digital content and “influencer” culture 
reflects the migration/evolution of reality television’s mode of production to a widely circulated 
and distributed form of content production, no longer just in the hands of an exploitative 
television industry, and also demonstrates the circuitous exchange between legacy and “new” 
media formats and the ways in which “the export of social media popularity mechanisms to other 
social or commercial environments [...] proves the efficacy of its logic in challenging existing 
social hierarchies or unsettling discursive orders" (van Dijck, 7).  Green and Jenkins see the 
“spreadable” era as characterized by activities that are not exclusively in the purview of powerful 
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corporate entities, arguing that media scholars frequently “underestimate audience members’ 
active agency in shaping what messages spread, the routes they take, and the communities they 
reach” (Green & Jenkins, 111).  But it also, in Hearn’s formulation, draws together the 
pernicious labor logics of narrowcasting, branding, and reality television production as they 
converge in the spreadable media era, with “the boundaries between working and nonworking 
life erod[ing] due to new communication and computer technologies that make us always 
available to work and always publicly accessible for corporations, governments, and advertisers 
to track, measure, and monetize,” marking the “democratized” wave of user-generated content 
part of a movement in which “human creative capacities and social relationships increasingly are 
conditioned by, and subsumed in, new modes of capitalist accumulation” (Hearn 2013, 445). 
 
Next Time on… This Dissertation 
In this chapter I have attempted to provide a history of the evolving practices that 
comprise reality television production as a means to describe a shifting “mode of production” 
that characterizes major shifts in the political, economic, cultural and technological conditions 
that comprise our personal and social worlds in the current conjuncture.  In addition to providing 
a theoretical context for the chapters that follow, this history also represents an attempt to 
describe the conditions from which Drag Race emerged in 2008 - the history of which will be 
picked up in the next chapter.  In Chapter Three, I will begin to trace the intersections of 
evolving self-branding culture, television as a technology of celebrity-production and self-
formation, and the popularization of fashion and culture industries through emerging cable 
platforms - coming together to create the conditions by which RuPaul’s career was launched to 
mainstream success via MTV in the early 1990s.  By analyzing Ru’s 1995 autobiography, Lettin’ 
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It All Hang Out, I will argue that his self-authored and self-authorizing narrative of achieving 
celebrity success provided the groundwork from which we can begin to decipher the 
philosophies, strategies, and rules that animate and govern RuPaul’s Drag Race - understanding 
it as an extension of Ru’s personal branding platform and infused with the same ambivalent self-
empowerment and self-disclosing instructions and advice that comprise much of the 
autobiography’s substance.  Noting the ways that Ru describes his creative practices as a drag 
queen as a kind of “pop culture sampling” and constructs himself as an expert of television and 
popular culture at large - and recounting his “training” via cable access television, DIY 
wheatpaste postering, and working the New York gay club circuit - I will begin to unfurl the 
question of how he is authorized, or authorizes himself, to reign over the mainstream queendom 
of drag performers as the host and Mother of Drag Race.  By considering the contradictions of 
his advice that we must all follow our own rules and reveal our “uniqueness” to ourselves and 
the world - preferably on television - while also following his advice and purchasing his 
commodities in order to achieve our disillusioned self-discovery, I will start to work toward an 
elaboration of the self-branding, self-loving, self-disclosing set of Ru’s rules that tweak the 
conventions of the reality competition genre in the evaluative metrics of Drag Race’s 
eliminations.  I will conclude the chapter by summarizing Ru’s achievements that occurred in the 
three years following the release of Lettin’ It All Hang Out - the production of his VH1 talk-
show and his WKTU morning radio show - and noting his decade-long absence from mainstream 
popular culture following the cancellation of the VH1 show, re-emerging in 2009 as the host of 
Drag Race. 
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CHAPTER THREE:  THE AUTHORIZED RUPAUL: CELEBRITY SELF-WRITING & 
THE BRANDED SELF 
You better work.  
- RuPaul, “Supermodel (You Better Work)” (1992) 
Previously On This Dissertation… 
 In Chapter Two, I traced a history of reality television programming as a way of 
articulating the evolution of a mode of production that has allowed individuals and studios in the 
creative industries to shift, expand, and adopt new practices to navigate changing political and 
economic conditions in the late 20th and early 21st centuries.  As global economic activity has 
moved increasingly into a post-industrial mode that emphasizes design and aesthetics - relying 
on service-oriented, flexible, and widely distributed immaterial labor to produce commodities, 
feelings, experiences and consumable culture - and as television technologies have converged 
with digital, networked, spreadable social media and seen a rapid expansion of the means to 
produce and distribute television programs, gaining traction as a technological regime via the 
mantra of a “creative economy” that valorizes entrepreneurialism and consumer interactivity and 
self-expressivity, reality television has offered a malleable mode of production to studios and 
networks seeking to circumvent unionized talent (like writers and actors), enlist the labor of 
viewers via interactive participation, and fill out programming blocks with quick, cheap 
programming.  From nearly the very beginning of the emergence of this mode of production, 
queer identities and culture have provided producers and networks with fodder that could be 
explicitly marketed to narrowly targeted youth-oriented and upscale-lifestyle audiences, with the 
liberal authenticity and novelty of queer lives - and the expertise of fashionable queer aesthetes - 
providing novel forms of television entertainment and consolidating the niche brand identities of 
cable channels like MTV, Bravo, and Logo.  I argued that in just the past decade, as mobile 
 96 
devices and streaming/social platforms like YouTube, Snapchat, and Netflix have become 
widely proliferated and increasingly popular, reality television’s flexible mode of production has 
once again aided media corporations and commodity producers in navigating the social, 
technological, and economic shifts of this current era, with Drag Race serving as a premier 
example of an entertainment enterprise that brings traditional broadcast practices together with 
outreach into digital and mobile media, as well as offering content that can not only target (and 
create) new youth-focused markets but also exploit hyper-individualized, tailored, mediated taste 
cultures. 
 In the next two chapters, I will expand upon this argument, detailing the ways in which 
Drag Race has emerged in and capitalized upon changing social, economic, and technological 
conditions that have widely affected cultural and commodity production in the 21st century.  In 
the present chapter, I will address another key element that has both driven and been driven by 
these changing political-economic conditions, and which highlights the ways in which Drag 
Race uniquely deploys technologies of the self and aesthetics of existence in its queer (and 
capitalist) mode of production: the rise of brands and branding culture.  While I briefly addressed 
Allison Hearn’s arguments about reality television’s ability to facilitate increased brand 
placements and its proliferation of self-branding as an individualized, entrepreneurial strategy in 
Chapter Two, in the present chapter I will elaborate upon the larger cultural shifts that have 
accompanied the rise of brand cultures in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, and explore the 
ways in which RuPaul – and later, Drag Race -  has embraced and innovated branding logics 
while wedding them to queer cultural history and queer identity practices of self-fashioning.  As 
Ouellette and Hay have argued, reality television programs have deployed governmental logics 
of self-management and entrepreneurial selfhood for decades, but in Drag Race’s exploitation of 
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preexisting networks of queer entertainers, art forms, and venues - and its expansion of spin-off 
content and one-off events in mobile, broadcast, and material spaces - the practices of self-
formation and self-branding have come together in a novel way, raising a number of questions 
about queer communities, culture, and selfhood in the current conjuncture. 
In the present chapter, I will chart a brief history of RuPaul’s original rise to international 
fame, by means of an analysis of his 1995 autobiography Lettin’ It All Hang Out.  In order to 
understand the ways Drag Race has been able to successfully insert itself into a shifting media 
economy, reflecting and responding to changes in digital technologies and an increased emphasis 
on “creative economies,” it is necessary to analyze how RuPaul himself has consistently 
positioned himself, for over three decades, as a premiere queer entertainer and widely-spread 
spokeswoman for drag by utilizing whatever technological, cultural, and industrial apparatuses 
are available to him.  By following the trajectory of Ru’s career – as he chooses to narrate it – a 
number of converging lines come together that allow us to see how his original successes in the 
1990s laid the groundwork for the recombination of his version of drag into a reality television 
program in 2009: the evolution of branding cultures, the popularization of fashion industries and 
icons via “lifestyle” programming on emerging cable networks dedicated to assembling sellable 
audiences organized around taste cultures, the movement from “culture industries” to “creative 
economies” as the aesthetic labor of late capitalism becomes increasingly dispersed and 
individualized, and shifts in celebrity-production itself all come into focus in the story of Ru.  
Reading Ru also allows me to begin to question the nature of his authority as the queen of drag – 
asking how he authors and authorizes himself via his autobiography, and sells his audiences the 
promise of self-discovery and disillusioned self-disclosure by following his advice and example 
– and to highlight the practices, catchphrases, and personal experiences that he has continued to 
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redeploy in Drag Race.  While the present chapter is largely focused on the trajectory of his 
earlier career as a multi-media entertainer in the 1990s, it lays the groundwork for Chapter Four, 
in which I will continue to chart these converging economic, technological, and cultural shifts as 
they give way to the emergence of Drag Race itself in 2009, in order to explore the widespread 
media empire it has become and to analyze the ways it reflects and influences the larger cultural 
conjuncture that has facilitated its ascendance.   
 
Celebrity, Branding, & Shifts In the Star-Making Industries 
 In order to begin to understand the logics that animate Drag Race - as well as the content 
the show offers every episode, 11 years into its enterprise - we must first grasp the methods and 
tactics that characterize the three-decade-long career of the show’s Mother, host, spiritual guide, 
therapist, philosophical guru, impresario and namesake RuPaul, who has successfully capitalized 
upon (and perhaps helped to innovate) the rise of branding culture and its impact on the changing 
practices of commercial television entertainment by fashioning himself as a malleable brand that 
can flexibly expand into myriad ventures and platforms.  Drag Race functions simultaneously as 
the current extension of RuPaul’s personal brand and as a branding platform for its contestant 
queens; much of the show’s content (and the evaluative logics of its competition) is crafted by 
narrativizing the instructions and advice RuPaul gives his proteges in order to form them into 
flexible laborers who can successfully navigate modern media industries, via technologies of the 
self that emphasize self-empowerment, vulnerability, authenticity, and citational sampling of 
popular culture and fashion at large.  While the show taps into pre-existing circuits of queer labor 
and entertainment that have largely been relegated to the niche markets of gay-focused venues 
and subcultures - gathering talent, identities, language, aesthetics and vernacular forms of 
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expression from drag performance cultures like pageants and balls that have developed in queer 
spaces for decades - Drag Race has fostered a massive new audience and created new virtual and 
“real-world” spaces for queer entertainers to sell themselves as branded commodities and 
perform a wide variety of labor as singers, dancers, models, actors, and comedians.  It is a sort-of 
star-making factory, bringing queer entertainers - most of whom have been laboring, gig-to-gig, 
in gay bar and pageant circuits for years - into a network of media enterprises plugged into an 
expanding fanbase of passionate consumers who are eager for affirmative gay culture and 
commodities that allow them to express their own sense of self: their feelings, desires, personal 
identities, and affective, romantic, kinship and erotic bonds with one another.  Though it has its 
televisual home base on a niche-marketed cable network (originally Logo, now VH1), Drag 
Race has created its own networked niche-as-community, and transformed the social and 
affective bonds of queer community-making practices into a flexible and evolving marketplace 
in which to sell queer performers as approachable, empowering, accessible and authentic 
celebrities. 
 As Sue Collins argues, reality television in general has functioned as a site for producing 
a novel kind of celebrity for nearly thirty years.  Exploring the way that reality programs have 
“democratize[d] celebrity” and “alter[ed] celebrity production within the cultural industries,” 
Collins points to the very first cast of The Real World, who in 1992, following the airing of their 
season, were “greeted by the ‘immediate buzz’ of the celebrity infrastructure” at that time, 
including “talk show guest appearances, profile articles, commercial endorsements, mall 
openings appearances, lectures, and the like” (Collins, 88).  Focusing on the phenomenon of 
“normal” people appearing on reality programs who only briefly enjoy popularity following their 
“fifteen minutes,” Collins argues that “their celebrity currency runs out and they are channeled 
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back into obscurity,” describing this as “D-level reality TV celebrity” and noting that it offers 
“very real benefits for cultural producers, broadcasters, advertisers, and a host of related cottage 
industries borne out of reality TV’s system of production” (Collins, 89).  This aligns with the 
history I outlined in Chapter Two, with this “D-level” celebrity-as-commodity providing yet 
another cheap revenue stream for reality television as a mode of production, and marks a shift 
from previous eras of celebrity- and star-production, which traditionally relied on fostering the 
talents and profiles of actors and actresses who became increasingly expensive to employ.  
Theorizing celebrity as “a capitalist phenomenon coinciding with changes in communication 
technology that enabled new forms of social mobility, the democratization of the consumption of 
cultural goods, and the production of secular notions of popular culture,” Collins characterizes it 
as “the democratization of fame” as well as “fame commodified [...] a symbolic form whose 
transmission and reception within a commercial media system renders it a cultural commodity” 
that relies on audiences to “subjectively participate in the discursive construction and 
maintenance of celebrity through their reception” (Collins, 90).   
Thus celebrity is a major vector in the shifting political and economic structure of the 
past century: it ties the production of cultural goods (and the production of their value) to an 
affective relationship between media personalities - entertainers, politicians, the subjects of viral 
videos, etc. - and the audiences and fans who themselves produce and reproduce the celebrity’s 
fame through their attention, consumption of commodities, and creation of fan communities and 
social media content.  In this way, celebrity functions as a brand.  Sarah Banet-Weiser argues 
that “brands are actually a story told to the consumer” that “surpasses simple identification with 
just a tangible product” to become an affective narrative “that is familiar, intimate, personal.”  
The immateriality and expansive, excessive nature of celebrity functions like other commodity-
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culture brands, which “are visible and often audible, through symbols and logos, through jingles 
and mottoes, through all means of visual and auditory design” but which nonetheless “exceed 
[their] materiality,” as a brand is “more than just [an] object itself,” but also “the perception— 
the series of images, themes, morals, values, feelings, and sense of authenticity conjured by the 
product itself” (Banet-Weiser, 4-5).  Similarly, Collins argues that “stars can be seen as brands 
that act as guarantors of meaning across a variety of texts with which audiences can identify, 
including the capture of a star’s image as a type-set for the purposes of endorsing goods and 
services outside of the entertainment industry” (93), and she historicizes the shifting production 
of celebrity “as a cultural product that is born out of a vast ‘reservoir’ of cultural workers who 
are ready to work without wage retainers in which very few ‘make it’ and whose success is not 
predictable nor necessarily sustainable” (Collins, 92).   
She argues that in the early 20th century, the “‘cultural producers’ of stars were limited to 
film studio heads and their producers and directors,” who oversaw a process of transforming the 
“raw material” of an actor or actress, who was “fashioned into the star by a host of professionals 
who perform labor onto the star (hairdressers, coaches, dieticians, make-up artists, etc.) and by 
the professionals involved in the making of the film as well as the performances of the star,” 
resulting in a “congealed labor” in the form of the “star image,” which could then be “used with 
further labor (scripting, acting, directing, managing, filming, editing) to produce another 
commodity, the film” (Collins, 91).  But this shifted in the “poststudio era,” in which “star 
management and control over access to stars was taken up by a new set of “players” such as 
talent agents and personal managers,” and Collins traces a further shift in this lineage as celebrity 
production has become articulated to “promotional culture,” involving a network of “media 
professionals who make decisions about hiring talent, agents and managers who negotiate with 
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these producers on behalf of their clients, and other intermediaries such as publicists who work 
between producers and agents on the one side, and various media outlets on the other” (Collins, 
91).  While Collins’ analysis offers a fascinating, historically-grounded account of these shifts in 
the “celebrity infrastructure” of cultural industries and the ways in which reality television’s 
mode of production tapped into and transformed them, her account - written in 2008 - leaves off 
just as this infrastructure began to seriously converge with new means of self-fashioned celebrity 
manufacturing fostered by the proliferation of digital, social and mobile media.  And while she is 
careful to distinguish between the sort of reality celebrities produced by the likes of The Real 
World or Survivor and those created by “talent shows such as American Idol and Last Comic 
Standing,” which she describes as “recombinant forms from old pop talent show formats such as 
Star Search” and which “openly mine celebrity from talented contestants,” Collins’ analysis 
cannot fully account for the unique kind of star-making production that is Drag Race, given its 
commodification of queer entertainment and proven ability to engineer its own “celebrity 
infrastructure” (Collins, 89).   
Drag Race extends itself into existing networks for the production and reproduction of 
celebrity in its fashioning of drag queen contestants into branded personalities, while also 
generating its own minor universe of interrelated enterprises through which it endlessly 
references, recycles, reuses and rehires the stable of queens who have appeared on the show in 
the past.  Even in its eleventh season - currently airing, in March 2019 - past queens frequently 
appear in cameo roles, have their catchphrases and vernacular expressions repeated and 
referenced, and serve as citational fodder for a universe of in-jokes and call-backs that provide 
the show a library and history that it recycles and parodies as frequently as it does other popular 
culture texts.  While I will more fully examine the wider Drag Race universe of sprawling media 
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production in Chapter Four, this self-referential and self-recycling nature of the Drag Race brand 
fits the blueprint of RuPaul’s branding philosophy and practice that he has deployed throughout 
his entire career, and which he elaborates quite clearly in his 1995 autobiography,  Lettin’ It All 
Hang Out.  Many of the catch-phrases, spiritual philosophies, and self-branding strategies and 
instructions - which we can think of as technologies of the self and elaborations of an ethical 
(and commercial) aesthetics of existence - that RuPaul deploys on Drag Race today, as a means 
of empowering his contestants and audience and simultaneously selling them himself and their 
own selves, can be found in Lettin’ It All Hang Out, which was written at the height of his first 
wave of mainstream pop culture success. 
 
Self-Writing & the Authenticity of Vulnerability 
 One of Drag Race’s defining features that sets it apart from other reality competition 
programs is its activation and exploitation of existing networks of queer entertainers – nearly 
every queen contestant who appears on the show has performed as a professional gigging drag 
queen in the bar, club, ball and pageant circuits that extend across the U.S.  While other 
competition shows certainly tap into the existing talents of participants who have received 
training in their chosen practice – some of Top Chef’s chefs and Project Runway’s fashion 
designers are well-educated and seasoned professionals – Drag Race stands apart in its particular 
construction of queer celebrity entertainers, largely due to the self-making efforts of its 
contestants, who must have some amount of experience producing media and curating audiences 
in order to make their way onto the show.  Because drag is drawn from and articulated to queer 
culture – and the affective and personal bonds and sense of self that come with its social and 
identity practices – it also provides a unique queer economy of celebrity; gay popular culture 
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outlets and social media communities celebrate, employ, and meme-ify Drag Race contestants in 
a fashion that far outweighs the sort of attention paid to the chefs, designers, models, and 
aspiring singers of other reality competition shows.  And because its queens comprise an eclectic 
mix of entertainers with a wide variety of vocations – there are comedians, singers, dancers, 
models, makeup artists, costumers, performance artists, writers, and on and on – and because gay 
venues throughout the U.S. have long hosted local and touring drag performers, the queens of 
Drag Race exit the show to find an eager and varied market for their live performances and 
media productions. 
Collins’ account predates the rise of whole industries dedicated to training aspiring reality 
show contestants – with casting and development agencies like the Conlin Company offering to 
coach and provide seminars to potential reality personalities – but in Drag Race, the training and 
disciplining of the contestants is distributed among traditional networks of queer subcultural 
entertainment venues and institutions, as well as new social media practices by which drag 
queens can curate fanbases via Instagram posts and YouTube videos.  Some are makeup artists 
or costumers who provide tutorials in their drag makeup and sewing techniques, while others 
have used YouTube to fashion themselves as general media personalities– like Season 11 
contestant Soju, whose YouTube webseries talk-show Shot With Soju featured interviews with 
many former Drag Race contestants, and helped her to get cast on the show itself.  In Chapter 
Four, I will more fully explore the way Drag Race contestants have utilized YouTube as a 
platform before, during, and after their appearance on Drag Race to extend and sustain their self-
branding practices - they have trained, exposed, and authored themselves via YouTube in order 
to get on Drag Race, sustain a personal narrative during it, and to help expand their careers after, 
and World of Wonder has capitalized upon and amplified their post-show productions - but 
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before I do so, I think it is necessary to explore the way RuPaul performed a similar form of self-
formation at the dawn of the emergence of reality television, in the 1980s and 1990s.  According 
to his own narrative of his life and career – and evidenced by the massive amount of amateur and 
commercial media documenting his efforts – Ru has always used whatever means were available 
to him to sample and cite the popular culture he consumed, synthesizing it into his own 
performances in whatever venues and through whatever medium he could gain access to.   
The very existence of Ru’s 1995 autobiography Lettin’ It All Hang Out  itself draws 
together a lineage of technologies of the self with the evolution of self-branding and corporate 
branding culture at the end of the 20th century.  Self-writing has roots in ancient culture, with 
Foucault locating the hupomnēmata as a central technology of the self that developed out of the 
practices of ledger-keeping and accounting.  The hupomnēmata was a technology of self-
knowledge, a “copybook” or “notebook” which was “coming into vogue in Plato’s time for 
personal and administrative use,” and which Foucault claims was “as disrupting as the 
introduction of the computer into private life today.”  He describes these “new instruments” as 
being rapidly adopted for personal use, as a means to constitute “a permanent relationship to 
oneself,” allowing its user to “manage oneself as a governor manages the governed, as a head of 
an enterprise manages his enterprise, a head of household manages his household” (Genealogy of 
Ethics, 272).  He argues that “the point at which the question of the hupomnēmata and the 
culture of the self come together in a remarkable fashion is the point at which the culture of the 
self takes as its goal the perfect government of the self,” fostering an ethical governmentality by 
which “the ancients carried on [a] politics of themselves with these notebooks just as 
governments and those who manage enterprises administered by keeping registers” (Genealogy 
of Ethics, 272).   
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Crucially, in the first iterations that he chronicles, this type of self-writing was explicitly 
not confessional - it was meant to be more of a neutral list of things done in the day, to help the 
writer to reflect on what he had or had not accomplished.  The hupomnēmata were not “intimate 
diaries” or “those accounts of spiritual experience (temptations, struggles, falls, and victories)” 
from later Christian literature, as “the point is not to pursue the indescribable, not to reveal the 
hidden, not to say the nonsaid, but, on the contrary, to collect the already-said, to reassemble that 
which one could hear or read, and this to an end which is nothing less than the constitution of 
oneself.”  This was a powerful new technology “within a culture very affected by traditionality, 
by the recognized value of the already-said” and obsessed with “‘citational’ practice under the 
seal of age and authority,” as “an ethic was developing that was very explicitly oriented to the 
care of oneself, toward definite objectives such as retiring into oneself, reaching oneself, living 
with oneself, being sufficient to oneself, profiting by and enjoying oneself” (Genealogy of 
Ethics, 273-4).  Arguing that one cannot “learn the art of living, the tekhnē tou biou, without an 
askēsis which must be taken as a training of oneself by oneself,” which included “abstinences, 
memorizations, examinations of conscience, meditations, silence, and listening to others,” 
Foucault claims that these notebooks were crucial in constituting “a material memory of things 
read, heard, or thought, thus offering these as an accumulated treasure for rereading and later 
meditation,” and offering “a raw material for the writing of more systematic treatises in which 
were given arguments and means by which to struggle against some defect (such as anger, envy, 
gossip, flattery) or to overcome some difficult circumstance (a mourning, an exile, downfall, 
disgrace)” (Genealogy of Ethics, 273). 
The transformation of this kind of journaling into the confessional self-writing of the 
Christian era marks one of the sites Foucault points to in the evolution of technologies of the 
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self: from an era distinguished by an ethical relationship to the self dedicated to crafting one's 
life creatively into a beautiful, remarkable life (a governmentality revolving around the aesthetics 
of existence) into one in which one's ethical relationship refers to an external moral code, like the 
rationality of the Stoics - who “move[d] slowly from an idea of an aesthetics of existence to the 
idea that we must do such and such things because we are rational beings […] as members of the 
human community, we must do them” - and the divine morality of Christian thinkers (Genealogy 
of Ethics, 264).  In Christian culture, “the writing down of inner movements” became “an arm in 
spiritual combat” with demons, which constituted “a force that deceives and makes one be 
deceived about oneself,” against which writing offered “a test and something like a touchstone,” 
which “brings to light” secret inner “movements of thought” and “dissipates the inner shadow 
where the enemy’s plots are woven.”  In between the practices of the hupomnēmata and later 
descriptions of “nocturnal temptations” by Saint Anthony, there was “a transitional set of 
techniques” to be found in “the description of dreams,” as “one had to have a notebook beside 
one’s bed upon which to write one’s dreams in order either to interpret them oneself the next 
morning or to show them to someone who would interpret them,” and via this practice “an 
important step is taken toward the description of the self” (Genealogy of Ethics, 275).  Foucault 
reminds us that “people have been writing about themselves for two thousand years, but not in 
the same way,” and he argues that perhaps “there is a certain tendency to present the relationship 
between writing and the narrative of the self as a phenomenon particular to European 
modernity,” and while he “would not deny it is modern [...] it was also one of the first uses of 
writing” (Genealogy of Ethics 277).  While there are also some continuities between Christian 
confessional writing and the knowledge-extracting practices of medial and psychological 
institutions in modernity, Foucault's own analysis of the technologies of the self doesn't ever 
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extend itself into the modern era of mass media and the commercial, industrial production of 
culture.  
Foucault’s analysis of the production of subjects and selves is somewhat at odds with 
Marxist writings about the relationships of power between those who own the means of 
production and those who are exploited for their labor, which largely conceive a distinct 
separation between powerful creators of culture and the alienated classes who do not have the 
same ability to produce and distribute their own media.  He is less concerned in larger structural 
conditions of “alienated” or “exploited” laborers and those who own the means of production, as 
he is more interested in the dispersed practices and bodies of knowledge that traverse different 
sites of the production of the self that arise in various institutions that distribute disciplinary 
techniques logics of governmentality by which we internalize self-regulating knowledges and 
practices by which we shape ourselves into students, laborers, citizens, etc…  In The Order of 
Things, he even analyzes “political economy” as a new empirical order of knowledge that is 
shaped much like natural history and linguistics, emerging in the nineteenth century to succeed 
discourses about “wealth” and allow “History” to “progressively […] impose its laws on the 
analysis of production,” contributing to the “birthplace of the empirical” (Order, 237).  
Describing Marxist thought as existing “in nineteenth-century thought like a fish in water,” 
Foucault argues that “both nineteenth-century bourgeois economics and nineteenth-century 
revolutionary economics” share the same preconditions and assumptions, with Marxism relying 
on “History” to “[dispossess] man of his labour, caus[ing] the positive form of his finitude to 
spring into relief – his material truth is finally liberated” (Order, 285).  Thus Foucault’s later 
insistence that there is no true, authentic self to be uncovered or rescued from alienation argues 
against the Marxist understanding of the laboring self; and Foucault insists that while our labors 
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might be enlisted in particular governmental regimes and relations of power - games of truth - 
our internalization and interiorizing of disciplinary apparatuses and norms of behavior, our 
accustomization to the “best practices” preferred by institutions and industries is much more 
interesting to him, providing an analytic of power that is dispersed and networked, providing 
opportunities for tactical interventions and personal ethical practices of freedom.  While 
autonomist Marxist writing has extended the analysis of “production” to immaterial and aesthetic 
forms of labor, by following Foucault’s methods, we can consider how the “economy” of 
“economic production” extends to a wider network of practices, including the production of self 
and identity, which circulate among individuals, personal relationships, and governmental and 
commercial institutions.  Thus his consideration of ancient forms of self-writing, while not 
directly concerned with modern forms of memoir and autobiography, can still help us to analyze 
these literary genres as simultaneously constituting the means by which to produce and author a 
particular kind of self while also serving as commodities and reflections of the commercial and 
governmental logics of the culture they are embedded within. 
While a number of literary authors, politicians, dancers, singers, actors, and filmmakers 
wrote memoirs and autobiographies throughout the 20th century - for a wide variety of political, 
philosophical, personal, profitable and artistic purposes - by the late 1970s, the "celebrity 
memoir" had become a common commodity wedded to celebrity self-branding practices and 
tabloid culture, functioning often as a last-ditch effort by fading stars to cash in on their notoriety 
(Clemons, et al.).  In the 1980s, celebrity autobiographies, memoirs, and instructional books 
became a means to spread personal brands and capitalize on emerging personalities, with 
comedians like Roseanne and Bill Cosby - and tabloid sleazeballs like real estate con artist 
Donald Trump - given publishing contracts by major houses like Harper & Row and Random 
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House.  But the emergence of Lettin’ It All Hang Out is actually owed directly to the expansion 
of media and entertainment corporations into ever-wider ventures at the end of the 20th century, 
converging perfectly with RuPaul’s personal strategies of self-publishing and self-promotion by 
which he had sought to extend his own brand onto any possible platform.  By the early 1990s, 
with multinational entertainment corporations seeking new avenues by which to promote 
performers as entertainment brands across multiple media productions, the celebrity 
autobiography became a means by which film and television studios - which now had in-house 
or corporate-sibling publishing divisions, thanks to the horizontal integration of media 
conglomerates - could secure relationships with talent and expand brands into grocery store mass 
market paperback shelves.   
In 1990, Disney, under the leadership of Michael Eisner, extended its multimedia brand 
into publishing by establishing Hyperion Books, a book-publishing subsidiary that had no 
backlist of titles and thus sought to sign new and unknown authors, and to capitalize on existing 
Disney products, talent, and brands.  This resulted in multi-platform deals like the one that saw 
Hyperion publish Tim Allen’s Don't Stand Too Close to a Naked Man the same year that Walt 
Disney Pictures released the Tim Allen vehicle The Santa Clause, following his success on the 
hit Disney-produced ABC sitcom Home Improvement (Gunther).  Shockingly, given the general 
absence of queer content in Disney products in the 1990s, it was just such a deal that resulted in 
Hyperion offering RuPaul a book deal to write his autobiography, while a nascent gay-focused 
in-house “discretionary fund” at Walt Disney Pictures developed a short film starring RuPaul, 
Electra Lite, produced and directed by his collaborators Randy Barbato and Fenton Bailey, 
which functioned as a pitch for Disney executives to decide whether or not to pursue producing a 
feature film vehicle for RuPaul (Robins).  While Disney ultimately passed on developing feature 
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films with Ru, the Hyperion autobiography provided him the opportunity to extend his brand 
platform and position himself as a philosopher of pop culture, gender, selfhood, branding, and 
spirituality, evolving his persona from the club musician and drag “supermodel of the world” 
into the motherly, contemplative figure who would come to preside over Drag Race a decade 
and a half later.   
Arriving at the height of his first wave of popular success, following a worldwide tour in 
support of his hit single “Supermodel (You Better Work),” a contract to model for M.A.C. 
cosmetics, and cameo roles in The Brady Bunch Movie and the Steven Spielberg-produced 
mainstream drag comedy To Wong Foo, Thanks for Everything, Julie Newmar, Ru’s 
autobiography weaves together a chronological personal narrative of his life and work with 
instructions for doing drag, philosophical musings about popular culture, gender and selfhood, 
histories of the queer entertainment circuits in Atlanta and New York City, and elaborations on a 
number of catch phrases that he continues to deploy in his music, public speaking appearances, 
and on Drag Race to this day.  While Ru writes in the preface to the tome that “[he] wrote this 
book because [he] wanted to reveal [his] soul to the world,” it also provided him the opportunity 
to extend himself into a new medium and further the expansion of his brand by means of a new 
commodity (RuPaul, vii).  This combination of self-revelation and self-promotion is a central 
tenet of Ru’s practice as a media-sprawling entertainer and icon, and reflects the rise of the 
“branding of authenticity” that Banet-Weiser argues has come to characterize not only 
advertising strategies, but also our culture at large.  She warns against easy critiques of this 
branding of authenticity, arguing that “rather than generalize all branding strategies as egregious 
effects of today’s market” that has supplanted “a bygone world that was truly authentic,” we 
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should instead “situate brand cultures in terms of their ambivalence, where both economic 
imperatives and ‘authenticity’ are expressed and experienced simultaneously” (Banet-Weiser, 5).   
This ambivalence certainly characterizes RuPaul’s up-front combination of 
empowerment and authenticity with his own marketing machinations.  Elaborating on his self-
branding philosophy, Ru claims that “even as a little bitty drag queen [he] knew it was all about 
merchandising,” making most of his income as a gigging performer selling postcards, photos, 
and shirts.  He describes “pop culture” as “one big marketplace,” in which “we’re all born to be 
sold,” and proudly touts that one of his best-selling shirts featured the phrase “Everybody Say 
Love” - neatly tying together his spiritual guru and self-branding merchandising philosophies 
into a single commodity (137-8).  The self-revealing self-writing of Lettin’ It All Hang Out thus 
fits neatly within Ru’s branding strategy, and even had a precursor in his DIY-merchandising 
days: in the mid-1980s, among the postcards and shirts he sold at club gigs, he also offered his 
first self-published book, If You Love Me Give It To Me, a xeroxed-and-stapled DIY tome that 
consisted of pictures of himself, “dialogue and anecdotes,” a narrative of his “life story, what 
[he] believed in, [his] favorite things, [his] favorite food” - a very similar commodity and literary 
artifact to Lettin’ It All Hang Out, which features ample photographs from his life and well over 
a dozen lists of favorite films, musicians, artists, and drag tips (RuPaul, 73).  In essence, this 
autobiography can be thought of as a branding culture technology of the self, by which RuPaul 
constitutes himself as a self to be sold, a philosopher-queen subject of popular culture who was 
created by (and for) television. 
Because I seek in this dissertation to decipher how drag - as an open-ended personal, 
social, political and artistic practice, but also in the particular forms proliferated by RuPaul’s 
empire of Drag Race enterprises - might relate to the ancient technologies of the self and 
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aesthetics of existence that Foucault looked to as a possible inspiration for reimagining the 
modern ethical relationship of self to self (and perhaps provide projects of sexual liberation a 
more nuanced ethical and philosophical basis), it is necessary to closely examine RuPaul’s own 
philosophy of drag and selfhood.  And because Ru’s philosophy (and marketing) of drag is tied 
directly to narratives of self-discovery and revelation, we also must consider the ways that truth 
and authenticity have become intertwined with the logics and strategies of branding culture - and 
how the technologies of the self today are fully embedded within spaces created by brands.  As 
Banet-Weiser argues, “building a brand is about building an affective, authentic relationship with 
a consumer,” established like relationships between human beings via “the accumulation of 
memories, emotions, personal narratives, and expectations,” creating “what Raymond Williams 
called a structure of feeling, an ethos of intangible qualities that resonate in different ways with 
varied communities.”  This intangible cluster of evocative feelings foster “affective 
relationships” that are “slippery, mobile, and often ambivalent, which makes them as powerful 
and profitable as they are difficult to predict and discuss.”  Brands are so deeply embedded in our 
relationships and in the practices and technologies of selfhood that “it is through these affective 
relationships that our very selves are created, expressed, and validated,” and Banet-Weiser 
argues that brands are not merely “an economic strategy of capitalism,” but constitute the 
“cultural spaces in which individuals feel safe, secure, relevant, and authentic” (Banet-Weiser, 8-
9).  By describing the way “selves are created” within the cultural spaces of brands, Banet-
Weiser presents the “authenticity” of selfhood as a malleable practice and not a “true” essence, 
aligning with Foucault’s central argument that the self is not to be revealed, disclosed, or 
discovered in its truth, but is instead to be fashioned via the arts, practices, and technologies of 
the self. 
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Because our modes of thinking and our subjectivities can be acted upon by ourselves, 
Foucault implores us to explore the historically contingent habits of thought we have inherited, 
and to discover new techniques by which we might create and invent ourselves anew.  He insists 
that the “main interest in life and work is to become someone else that you were not in the 
beginning,” much like the process of writing a book or beginning a love relationship, in which 
“the game is worthwhile insofar as we don’t know what will be the end” (Truth, Power, Self).  
Against the “normative, self-evident” and “universal” model of humanity that developed through 
the institutional practices of psychology, medicine, penal codes, and pedagogy, Foucault seeks 
“more secrets, more possible freedoms, and more inventions in our future than we can imagine” 
for the constitution and understanding of the human being (Truth, Power, Self).  While the 20th 
century saw a proliferation of discourses related to the self, Foucault argues that ancient 
technologies of the self were “diametrically opposed” to the modern “self-absorption” of the 
“Californian cult of the self” in which “one is supposed to discover one’s true self, to separate it 
from that which might obscure or alienate it, to decipher its truth thanks to psychological or 
psychoanalytic science, which is supposed to be able to tell you what your true self is” 
(Genealogy of Ethics 271).   
 In the practices of drag, then, we might find a path to discover the secrets, freedoms, and 
inventions that Foucault dreams of, as the colorful and critical fashions, erotics, and verbal and 
vernacular expressions that constitute drag certainly evoke the way he describes the aesthetics of 
existence, by which we discover that “the self is not given to us” and thus we must “create 
ourselves as a work of art” (Genealogy of Ethics 262).  By following RuPaul’s example, advice, 
and philosophies, we might very well constitute ourselves as a work of art - but also as a brand.  
Lettin’ It All Hang Out combines Ru’s personal autobiographical narrative with rules, tips, tools 
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and techniques for performing drag, beginning the process, fully achieved in Drag Race, by 
which he authors himself as the premier authority in drag – while constantly reminding us that 
we need to “make our own rules” and find our “uniqueness” by our own means, exposing the 
ambivalence of the particular philosophy he is commodifying.  Like the contestant queens on his 
show, we need to simultaneously follow his expert advice and example, while also following our 
own heart; we should be free to be ourselves, in our own fashion, but we should also buy Ru’s 
books and albums, so that we can practice our freedom in particular ways that he authorizes us to 
perform.   
In examining the success of Drag Race, we might ask if we have in fact entered an era 
that widely celebrates an individualized aesthetics of existence - but one confined to, or 
exclusively expressed in, the cultural spaces created by branding practices.  In Lettin’ It All Hang 
Out, Ru describes drag as a form of labor that is simultaneously a means of self-discovery, 
claiming that “when I go to work [in drag], it’s no different than a businessman wearing his 
three-piece suit [or] a nurse, a fireman, or a cop on the beat - they all wear their uniforms to 
work, and I’m no different” (RuPaul, vii-viii), but also that in drag, “you see an aspect of [your] 
personality that you would not otherwise see [...] for the first time, you can see the whole person, 
the god and the goddess inside of everyone [...] it’s a revelation” (RuPaul, ix).  He also 
introduces his philosophical catchphrase that he would later turn into a pop song in 2015, 
promoted by a music video filmed as part of the finale of the seventh season of Drag Race, when 
he argues in the preface that “whether we are at work or at play we are all wearing masks and 
playing roles all the time,” and thus “you’re born naked and the rest is drag” (RuPaul, viii).  
Central to this philosophy of drag is an understanding of clothing as a technology of the self.  Ru 
argues that “clothes aren’t just things you wear - they bring out the flavor of the person, 
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magnifying hidden areas of your personality that spend most of the time cooped up in the cellar 
of your consciousness,” and by donning the techniques traditionally aligned with femininity, 
drag allows us to “explore [our] feminine side” - something that “came very easily to [Ru], 
because [he] grew up in a house full of women” (RuPaul, ix). 
 Accessing femininity via the technologies of the self provided by the practices of drag – 
at least those which are specifically oriented toward transforming cisgendered male bodies into 
“female illusion” performances, as exemplified by Ru’s “glamazon” persona - allows us to 
follow “feminine role models,” who “[show] their emotions and [wear] them in the same way 
they [wear] their clothes,” an expressive openness and vulnerability that Ru “finds strength in” 
(RuPaul, ix), and opposes to “today’s masculine culture [in which] hiding our emotions and our 
feelings is seen as a sign of strength and power, whereas being loving and giving is seen as a sign 
of weakness,” arguing that “in the presence of the goddess the opposite is true [...] strength is 
being loving and giving” (207).  This access to expressing our feelings - crying when sad, 
laughing when we find something funny, asking questions about things we do not understand - 
forms the basis of the “authenticity” Ru finds in drag, and argues is key to creating affective 
relationships with fans as an entertainer, a paradox he summarizes adroitly: “The reality is that I 
am a man.  The illusion is that I am a woman.  But of the two, the illusion is truer” (RuPaul, x).  
He elaborates on this gendered philosophy of authentic expression by explaining that even as a 
child, “[he] loved being around girls because they were free to express themselves emotionally, 
and [he] always felt that emotions are what being a human is all about,” while boys were “blind 
to their emotions” and “denied their feelings by acting or lying” (RuPaul, 20).  Bodily 
movement, love of music, and the vernacular expression of dance are cited as well, as Ru recalls 
spending time at the age of seven with his teenage twin sisters and their friends, listening to 
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records and “mak[ing] up dance routines [to] teach to other people,” which was when he 
“realized that girls were much more fun than boys” (RuPaul, 43).  This notion that girlhood - 
practiced in dress, in dance, in makeup and hairstyling and bodily movement, as a means of 
expressing affect and interiority - is “more fun” and allows access to a feminine strength-in-
vulnerability provides one of the operating logics of Drag Race, in which adult male-identifying 
contestants are allowed to participate in “girl culture” and occupy the cultural spaces created by 
brands traditionally marketed to girls and young women.  As Season 7 contestant and All Stars 3 
winner Trixie Mattel jokingly puts it: “I always tell my mom that if she would have just bought 
me a Barbie when I was little I would have gone into real estate" (Seyler). 
In Drag Race, Ru frequently coaches the contestants to express vulnerability as a means 
to both discover and reveal truths about themselves, in order to specifically create affective 
relationships with audiences and fans as an entertainer.  He gives this explicit advice in the 
episode “Evil Twins” (S10E11), when counselling the queens regarding a challenge in which 
they are expected to create and perform as an “evil twin” version of their drag personas, in order 
to give voice to their “inner Saboteur” - their fears, doubts, their self-hating inner monologue, 
their insecurities.  Visiting the “Werk Room” set where we see the queens assembling their 
costumes and writing on worksheets that have questions and prompts to aid them in scripting the 
voice of their evil personas, Ru tells them that this challenge offers them the chance to “go 
deeper, to reveal [something] new about [yourself],” which is important because “it's not until 
you go really deep that the audience has a chance to fall in love with you, [not] until you reveal 
something really honest.”  So when Ru counsels the contestant Eureka one-on-one, he is 
delighted to hear Eureka share her realization that “being vulnerable is actually [a form of] 
strength, and being honest is being strong.”  When Ru is later conferring with his panel of judges 
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about the queens’ performances in the challenge, he contrasts Eureka’s performance with that of 
Miz Cracker, whom he admonishes for “taking herself too seriously” and “overly editing” 
herself, and not being vulnerable.  While Eureka "really understood the assignment, [and] went 
embarrassingly deep," Miz Cracker was “too interested in trying to control how we see her.”  Ru 
tells the other judges that he “pushed her to not produce herself, and this challenge was an 
opportunity for Miz Cracker to come out of her box and let us have a taste of that crunch,” and 
that he wanted to tell her to “wake the fuck up, this challenge was built for you, so let it all hang 
out bitch!”  It should not escape notice that he concludes this critique - delivered on Drag Race 
in 2018 - with reference to the (testicle-pun-based) title of the 1995 autobiography, drawing out 
its central theme of self-revelation as a means of connecting with audiences as an entertainer.  
Ru accuses Miz Cracker, in modifying her speech and actions on camera as a means of 
controlling what other people think about her, of attempting to “produce herself” – which is an 
act he repeatedly warns against on the show, on his podcast, and elsewhere.  As he told an 
interviewer for Vogue UK, in anticipation of a new season’s airing, he “suspect[ed] that [the 
contestants] will want to produce themselves, which is always a mistake on reality TV because 
you really need to be yourself” (Newbold).  His podcast co-host and second-in-command on the 
Drag Race judge’s dais, Michelle Visage – a career-long sidekick of Ru’s, who also co-hosted 
his VH1 talk-show and WKTU morning radio show in the 1990s – echoes this Ru rule of reality 
television performance, telling an interviewer that “when you try to produce yourself to be 
something you think you should be for the people, [it’s] never gonna work […] if you just be 
your true self, warts and all, that’s the way you make yourself and get yourself into the hearts of 
the world” (Ward).  In the context of reality television production, Ru and Michelle use the 
phrase “produce yourself” to signify a contestant’s attempt to author their own storyline – to do 
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the job of the show’s titled producers: the “story producers,” “challenge producers,” “creative 
producers,” “line producers,” “talent producers,” and so on, who are granted the proper authority 
to author storylines using the prompted and improvised dialogue generated by the contestants.  It 
is quite telling that this language lends itself to advice about how one presents themselves and 
attempts to narrate and author a self via reality television, highlighting the way the production of 
a television show can also rely on the production of selves.  Befitting a show about queens, Drag 
Race is very actively wrapped up in discourses of authority, and authorship – Ru is presented as 
the ultimate authority and monarch of his drag queendom, who frequently reminds the 
contestants that the decision of who is eliminated from the competition is her own, telling them: 
“I've consulted with the judges, but the final decision is mine to make.”  So while he commands 
that you “be yourself” and “reveal something really honest” from the depths of your soul, he 
stands as the authority who determines whether or not you have truly done so.   
While I will address the ways that Drag Race presents a game of truth about the self 
wedded to an ambivalent set of rules dictated by Ru as an authority figure in Chapter Four, 
questions of authority, authentic selfhood, and rules arise in Lettin’ It All Hang Out as well, with 
Ru decreeing that one should “live your life according to no one else’s rules but your own” (187) 
and arguing that “there is no higher authority on the planet, when it comes to deciding what’s 
best for you, than you,” empowering the reader to “follow [your] heart rather than follow their 
rules” (188).  So we must ask, then, what precisely qualifies Ru’s authority on vulnerability and 
self-disclosure – what does he know about his own and our true selves that we apparently do not 
- and how he is able to tie his discernment of the truth to an evaluative metric by which he can 
determine who is, in fact, the “next drag superstar” on Drag Race.  What authorizes Ru to be the 
ruling queen of drag, and what does he know about you that you don’t, allowing him to sell you 
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your true self via his art and advice?  While Lettin’ It All Hang Out does not appear to have 
much of a cultural legacy as its own commodity – it was printed once in hardback and once in 
paperback in the U.S., and exported to foreign publishers for printings in Canada, the U.K., and 
Australia, but never reprinted, and appears to only have been cited in scholarship about Drag 
Race that has mined it for its historical value – its autobiographical form presents RuPaul with 
the opportunity to author and fashion himself as a particular kind of expert who has been 
authorized by his consumption and production of popular culture, particularly television.  In 
articulating himself to the television he consumed throughout his life and describing the way he 
has synthesized popular culture into his own brand of entertainment – and documenting the many 
years of amateur film, television, and music production and live performances through which he 
came to “discover” the “true illusion” of his drag character which he would sell to the world – 
Ru, as an author, grants himself and his self-narrative authority by relation to the icons he has 
worshipped and emulated.   
Foucault argues in “What is an Author?” that the “status and […]  manner of reception” 
of authored discourse “are regulated by the culture in which it circulates” (Author, 305).  While 
this essay does not address autobiographical writing, in it he is concerned with the ways that “all 
discourse that supports [the] 'author-function' is characterized by [a] plurality of egos” (308), and 
argues that “this 'author-function' is that it is not formed spontaneously through the simple 
attribution of a discourse to an individual,” but instead “results from a complex operation whose 
purpose is to construct the rational entity we call an author” (307).  If, as Foucault argues, there 
is a difference between “the initiators of discursive practice” like Marx and Freud that separate 
them from the authors of scientific texts or novels, because their discourse “cleared a space for 
the introduction of elements other than their own, which, nevertheless, remain within the field of 
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discourse they initiated” (310), can we not ask if RuPaul is just such a figure, making a televisual 
version of drag a discourse which must always refer back to him?  By synthesis of the 
conventions of celebrity autobiographies, expert how-to manuals, and self-help spirituality, Ru 
authors his life as a series of experiences that inevitably and rationally lead to his ascendance to 
stardom, laying the groundwork for his later emergence as the reigning queen of Drag Race.  
And because drag – as a mainstream popular culture phenomenon, though of course not in its 
totality as a diffuse form of personal and artistic expression, in which there are endless 
possibilities and iterations that have nothing to do with the “female impersonation” seen on Drag 
Race – still refers back to RuPaul, and bows before his judge’s dais, can we not consider Lettin’ 
It All Hang Out as the literary foundation of a discourse that has now spread widely as a 
globalized digital media phenomenon?  
 
Television as Technology of the Self 
 In RuPaul’s narrative formulation of his own formation as an entertainer, popular culture 
in general - magazines, records, advertisements - but especially television acted as a technology 
of the self by which he came to understand and fashion himself, from a young age, as a star 
waiting to be born.  His earliest memories are of television, and he “remember[s] the 
commercials from back then more than the actual television shows,” revealing an early aptitude 
for understanding himself as embedded in the cultural spaces created by branded advertising 
(RuPaul, 17).  When recalling his love for Tiparillo cigar commercials - featuring Edie Adams 
saying “Why don’t you come up and see me sometime?” - he claims that he only later realized 
that she had stolen the line from Mae West, but he “loved it all the same,” also foreshadowing 
his own sampling and citational practice as a multimedia performer (RuPaul, 18).  Consuming 
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and miming television programs gave Ru his first experiences as an entertainer as a child, as he 
recalls watching Laugh-In at the age of nine and then “get[ting] up and do[ing] impersonations in 
the living room for [his] mother and [his] sisters,” including bits mimicking “Charo, Cher, Carol 
Burnett, Tina Turner, James Brown, and Elvis” (RuPaul, 29).  His love for and self-recognition 
in women entertainers on television started even earlier according to his account, with the most 
fateful encounter coming at the age of four, when he saw Diana Ross and the Supremes on Ed 
Sullivan.  For Ru, this “was love at first sight,” and he recalls saying to himself: “There, that one 
there, the one in the middle, that’s me!”  He “recognized her energy as [his] energy,” and 
considers this televisual encounter “a landmark” in his life that also connects him with another of 
his idols, whose self-branding of self-empowerment spirituality he has clearly modeled part of 
his own persona on: Oprah.  He claims that “when Oprah saw [Diana Ross on Ed Sullivan], she 
said, ‘Colored girl on television! Colored girl on television!’” giving her a first opportunity to 
think of herself as a potential television personality, and Ru similarly claims that it was “at that 
precise moment” of seeing Diana on TV that he “immediately knew [...] that [he] wanted to be a 
big star” (RuPaul, 41-2). 
 Other forms of pop culture informed his youth - he cites Cybill Shepherd modelling for 
Seventeen magazine as an early inspiration, and says his sisters “would give [him] books about 
Hollywood” and introduced him to the music of Sylvester, his first encounter with a “drag 
queen,” unaware “that they were helping to create a monster” and turning him into “a magazine 
junkie” (RuPaul, 42).  Seeing the film The Rocky Horror Picture Show “just in the nick of time” 
at the age of sixteen let him know that he “had to do something with the dreamer in [him] that 
was screaming for release,” as he responded to “the freedom of it [and] the weird black humor,” 
and provided “the first time [he] really ‘got’ camp and that whole idea of adopting something 
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based on how seriously it takes itself, while being totally whacked out and demented” (RuPaul, 
51-2).  But it was television that provided him a “refuge” and led him to “daydream about 
moving to New York and becoming a star” (RuPaul, 35), and he continued to mimetically 
practice as an entertainer when The Partridge Family inspired him to “put together a band in 
[his] neighborhood” (RuPaul, 44).  And while he would first become enraptured with drag queen 
entertainers in the gay clubs of Atlanta, he would not become inspired to transform himself via 
the technologies of drag until he saw them through the lens and logic of his preferred medium of 
television. 
 In 1978, living with his sister in Atlanta at the age of eighteen, Ru saw his first drag 
performance: Crystal Labajia performing a Donna Summer song at Numbers Disco.  For Ru, 
“the illusion was so incredible [he] was fooled,” unable to believe that Crystal was lip syncing.  
After that, he “saw all the queens performing: Ashley Nicole, Charlie Brown, Lily White, Tina 
Devore, Dina Jacobs, and Yetiva Antoinette, who was the fiercest of them all,” and found that 
there were racialized differences in the practice of drag in Atlanta, as “all the black queens were 
very current [and] did looks that were up to the minute and performed the latest songs, while for 
the most part the white queens were more traditional,” performing “sappy things” and “show 
tunes” (RuPaul, 54).  Though he fell in love with these performers, he did not yet imagine 
himself as a drag performer or live entertainer.  But in the summer of 1981, as Ru “was 
wondering how [his] life was going to unfold, and how [he] was going to become a star,” he 
found the answer “when [he] stumbled upon this weird cable program called The American 
Music Show,” which was a “variety show consisting of skits with a sick sense of humor 
performed by a kooky cast.”  He wrote down the credits, discovering that it was produced by a 
company called Funtone, which consisted of “a bunch of writers and artists who all met up when 
 124 
they were working on the McGovern presidential campaign in ‘72” and then formed a comedy 
troupe and record label.  Thanks to public access regulations, which “meant that by law the cable 
operators had to provide one or two channels to the community for people to make their own 
programs,” The American Music Show had become an Atlanta staple, allowing “a bunch of old 
hippies and drag queens [to seize] the airwaves,” and offering RuPaul his “launch pad” (RuPaul, 
57-8).  And in a similar fashion to the way YouTube and Instagram provide today’s Drag Race 
contestants like Aquaria and Ariel Versace digital platforms to hone their crafts, this cable access 
program - shot on video in a semi-communal house that members of the cast lived in - gave 
RuPaul the opportunity to cut his teeth as a television star, and practice the art of performing for 
a camera.   
 When Ru saw the Funtone troupe on public access, he thought to himself, “that’s where I 
belong,” prompting him to send them a letter and picture of himself asking to get on the show.  
Ru considers his appearance on The American Music Show as his official start of his show 
business career, likening it to “Roseanne’s first appearance on Johnny Carson, or the Beatles’ 
debut on Ed Sullivan,” joking that the audience share wasn’t “of the same magnitude,” but that it 
didn’t matter: “show business is [...] a state of mind,” he argues, and “if you want to be a star, 
you just need to believe that you are one.”  So when he appeared on The American Music Show, 
his “star was born, and it really made no difference whether millions were watching or just a 
handful of cable subscribers” (RuPaul, 59-60).  He argues for the larger cultural relevance of 
public access shows by pointing to how many Saturday Night Live sketches were in fact “less 
interesting” parodies of these local television productions, like “Wayne’s World” and “The 
Church Lady.”  Appearing on The American Music Show was also pivotal for him because “up to 
that point in [his] life [he] was all dressed up with no place to go,” and while he had “felt the 
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creative juices flowing within [him],” he did not know “in which direction to channel them” until 
this cable access channel pointed the way.  He describes himself as “a child of television,” and 
argues that “as someone who had grown up watching as much of it as possible, whenever 
possible, [he] belonged on television,” because he “was never at a loss for things to say, and 
from [his] years of study [he] instinctively knew just how to turn the volume up, how to pitch 
[himself], and how to speak in sound bites” - he knew “how to speak the language of television 
[...] fluently” (RuPaul, 60).  Even this turn of phrase about “sound bites” functions as a sound 
bite that he would redeploy for decades, and become central to the way he has branded himself 
as a pedagogical guru of television and branding culture.  In a 2011 interview with Vulture, Ru 
claims that in Drag Race, the competition is meant to find “someone who can really follow in 
[his] footsteps: someone who can be hired by a company to represent their product, someone 
who can put together a sentence on television and present themselves in the most incredible 
way” (Buchanan).  He elaborates that as a host and mentor off-camera, he “continue[s] to train 
them on how to speak fluent television: how to speak in sound bites, how to think about what to 
say first, how to incorporate the question into the answer, all of those things,” describing the 
queen contestants as his “kids” and “charges,” whom he advises that “after the competition ends, 
the competition doesn’t end [...] you are still being judged” (Buchanan).  He admires the “kids” 
who “understand the medium,” whom World of Wonder is more likely to ask “to continue on 
with other shows that we do here” (Buchanan). 
 
“You Better Work”: The Multiform Aesthetic & Affective Labor of Drag 
   While the technologies of television continue, to this day, to play a large role in the 
formation of RuPaul the self, icon, and brand, his rise to popular culture prominence is due also 
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to his relentless gigging, and willingness to spread himself, his brand messages, and his 
commodities onto any platform he could extend himself onto.  He uses the same language to 
describe consumer electronics - by which he created his own branded media well before landing 
mainstream television gigs on MTV and VH1 - and the practical techniques and apparatuses of 
drag, drawing both together into a self-branding praxis that highlights how media technologies 
and the technologies of gender expression are webbed together in the aesthetic labors that 
constitute the technologies of the self.  He describes “the tools of pop culture - the VCR, 
camcorder, and CD player” as functioning “like crayons in a child’s playroom,” saying that he 
uses “these toys in the same way to color my world and keep myself entertained” (RuPaul, 155).  
He even used consumer media technology as an actual child: at age twelve, Ru’s father gave him 
“a Panasonic cassette recorder,” which he used to “make homemade comedy tapes” (RuPaul, 
156).  Similarly, the actual practices, techniques, and technologies of drag - “the wigs, the shoes, 
the corsets, the gowns, and the sequins” - are all “gorgeous toys” that he has “come to this planet 
earth to play with” (RuPaul, 191).  These “tools” and “toys” allow him to “play,” but also to 
work: his narrative of becoming a self-made star that provides the through-line of Lettin’ It All 
Hang Out includes the frequent repetition of the admonishment - “you better work” - that also 
forms the center of the hit dance single that catapulted him to stardom, “Supermodel (You Better 
Work).”  In describing his combination of DIY self-promotion, constant gigging through the 
many facets of live drag performance (comedy, go-go dancing, lip syncing, music producing, 
independent film production), and networking in the Atlanta and New York City queer arts 
scenes, Ru fashions himself as a model flexible laborer for a shifting economy hungry for 
branding opportunities and immaterial, aesthetic commodities.  And the way he describes this 
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labor in the autobiography - and the self-branding strategies that they accommodate - repeat and 
reverberate on Drag Race to this day. 
 Around the same time that he began appearing in drag on The American Music Show in 
the mid-1980s, Ru “started putting up posters all over Atlanta,” which he claims “made [him] 
famous there ‘cause no one else [...] was doing posters” (RuPaul, 64).  Well before he had 
plugged himself into the mass-marketing apparatus of mainstream commodity popular culture, 
RuPaul still enacted the practices of branding culture on a local level by taking “pictures of 
[himself] and [blowing] them up by Xeroxing them,” doing pre-digital “airbrush” techniques “by 
taking a pencil eraser to shape up the outlines, white out those unsightly marks, and [...] enhance 
the eyes.”  This practice continues on Drag Race, where the main workroom set features wall-to-
wall portraits and statues of Ru, so that nearly every shot of his queen proteges features his 
image literally looming over them in the background.  In his DIY days, he not only Xeroxed his 
own image, but also copied others, adding slogans to his posters that were “borrowed from other 
places” like Donna Summer and David Bowie record advertisements.  In describing this self-
branding practice, he argues that “the point about pop culture is that so much of it is borrowed 
[...] there’s very little that’s brand new,” and claims that “creativity today is a kind of shopping 
process - picking up on and sampling things from the world around you, things you grew up 
with,” claiming this as his “modus operandi” with his “every look, every word, and every move” 
in his performances referencing some other popular culture piece.  He sees himself as “a 
sampling machine,” even breaking down “the supermodel drag queen [he] would later become” 
into “a kind of Frankenstein’s monster - a collage made up of bits and pieces from old television 
shows, copies of Vogue magazine, and advertisements” (RuPaul, 64).  He claims that “at this late 
stage in the twentieth century it’s almost all been done, and everything now is a kind of rehash,” 
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with his life and work “really just a question of filling in the blanks and coloring by numbers” 
(65).  If drag itself has always been in some sense a referential and citational practice - embodied 
in the lip sync, in which the performer channels a female pop diva as a means of expressing their 
own affect - RuPaul expanded its pop-culture-collage logics to incorporate the branding 
strategies of late capitalist consumer culture.  Drag Race also functions by this logic, frequently 
challenging its queens to produce parodies of popular films, music, and theater productions. 
 Ru’s narrative of his relentless, multiform labors through the rest of the 1980s 
encapsulates the flexible and precarious gigging economy that drag queens are still subjected to 
today, especially if they have not yet been granted the platform provided by Drag Race.  
Following his recurring stints on The American Music Show, frequently performing musical 
numbers as the lead singer of RuPaul and the U-Hauls, Ru started “working the Midtown 
[Atlanta] club scene” as a live musical performer, eventually forming the new genderfuck drag 
punk band Wee Wee Pole.  He began making short films with friends using consumer 
camcorders, started selling postcards of himself at club gigs, and wrote his first self-published 
book, If You Love Me Give It To Me (RuPaul, 73).  While gigging at clubs in Atlanta, Ru and 
fellow drag queen The Lady Bunny - herself still a staple of the New York scene and touring 
queen who occasionally pops up on Drag Race - lived a homeless vagabond existence in 
Midtown, a mecca of hippie and gay counterculture in that era.  Shortly after that, Ru and Lady 
Bunny moved to New York City, where Ru plugged himself into the gay club circuit, working 
gigs as a go-go dancer both in and out of drag.  Networking himself into a flourishing gay arts 
scene in New York, Ru began his career as a recording artist, fatefully collaborating with a group 
called The Pop Tarts, comprised of Randy Barbato and Fenton Bailey, who would become Ru’s 
lifelong collaborators and founders of World of Wonder, the production and talent-management 
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company that helped launch Ru’s career and currently produces Drag Race.  Around the same 
time, he began to star in a number of ultra-low-budget exploitation-style films shot on video, 
featuring lots of gratuitous nudity and simulated gay sex.  His willingness to star in unsavory fare 
was central to his self-made-star ethos, as he argues that “you don’t think about waiting for 
Hollywood to come calling unless you’re Meryl Streep,” offering a “message to all the kids out 
there [to] do it now, and then, if you want, you can have a whole lifetime in which to regret it.” 
He describes himself as “living proof that the do-it-yourself concept works for just about 
anything [...] it worked for me, and baby it can work for you too” (RuPaul, 95).  Given that his 
later popular, televisual version of himself really only ever refers to gay sex and sexuality via 
innuendo, it is fascinating that he presents these more explicit amateur productions as something 
he does not regret, but does feel he needs to contextualize and explain.  As I will discuss more 
fully in Chapter Five, Ru’s mainstreaming of queer culture as a commodity suited for popular 
consumption via television (and beyond) has relied on a cheeky avoidance of explicit reference 
to gay sex, which Muñoz characterizes as “corporate-sponsored drag” and “sanitized corporate 
drag” (1997, 85-6), and which largely divorces the queer art form from the erotic context of the 
gay bars and balls from which it emerged. 
 Nonetheless, Ru presents the gay club context as integral to his development as an 
entertainer, even if much of its sticky-floor residue would be scrubbed from his television-ready 
drag persona once he made his way to MTV.  He cites the New York gay club circuit as the 
place where he “really got to develop [his] host skills, and learned how to be deliberate” by 
watching “tapes of [his] performance, and [seeing] the places where [he] needed to take more 
time,” developing performance techniques to “punch up a situation” by slowly “spell[ing] out 
each word” (95-6).  By January 1989, he “started working it in a big way, really doing it right” 
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by “learn[ing] how to lip sync - not just approximately, but with laser precision,” by “buying 
wigs” and “sewing clothes, wearing tits, and shaving [his] legs [...] instead of fright drag, [he] 
was going to look hot and sexy as a drag queen” (108-9).  While he had performed in drag on 
public access television and in clubs for nearly a decade, this was his first foray into glamorous 
“female illusion” drag, rather than the rough-hewn and caustic punk aesthetics of genderfuck and 
“fright” drag - the birth of his “glamazon” persona.  He explains that the secret to a strong lip 
syncing number is to “live the song, every breath and every beat,” emphasizing that “it doesn’t 
really matter if you know the words or not” because the audience isn’t “looking at your mouth to 
check you’ve got the words right, they’re drinking in the whole picture - the gestures, the moves, 
the attitude,” so it’s “really all about Method acting” in order to “connect” with the song and the 
audience by “exaggerating your face and body movements, where your every gesture tells a 
story” (113). 
 In this double emphasis on “connecting” with the emotion of the song and “connecting” 
with the audience - and the necessity of vernacular bodily expression and attitude for achieving 
this connection - Ru stumbles upon a central insight into the affective power of drag, and its 
aptitude for providing the kind of “structure of feeling” desired by branding culture in the current 
conjuncture.  Banet-Weiser argues that “within brand culture, consumers produce identity, 
community, emotional attachments, affective practices, and relationships both with the brand and 
with each other,” and that in response to this, brand cultures and their commodities provide “an 
infrastructure for this kind of social and political behavior” (Banet-Weiser, 46).  Drag performs 
this kind of identity-forming, community-consolidating affective labor supremely well, 
especially in the context of lip syncing performance in gay clubs.  The lip sync serves to channel 
the vulnerability and deep emotional expression of the pop diva, the strength-in-revelation that 
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Ru argues is key to the femininity one can access via the technologies of drag.  This is why every 
episode of Drag Race ends with two contestants “lip syncing for their lives,” which - in the logic 
of RuPaul’s drag philosophy - allows him to see which queen is able to offer their audience more 
self-expression, more vulnerability, more openness, and thus deserves to remain in his 
competition.  In Lettin’ It All Hang Out, he also describes the work of pop singers and the drag 
queens that lip sync their songs as a form of affective and erotic labor that is related to sex work, 
claiming that that “pop stars” are in fact “hookers,” because a star has to “sell [their] body and 
soul [...] to sell [their] ass in every way possible - in print, on video, on television, on radio - 
whore [themselves] out for the sake of the record” (130).  He says that sex workers “[do] the 
same thing” as pop stars, “except that it [is] much more direct, much more honest,” and argues 
that “hookers - transsexual or otherwise - really are the unsung heroes of our society,” and that 
even though “they are spurned and treated like trash, they have tremendous power” (131). 
While his craft-honing work around the New York club scene had gathered him a large 
local fanbase and gotten him the title of “Queen of Manhattan,” by 1990 Ru struggled to see his 
career taking off as a drag queen, because he thought “that beyond an underground downtown 
audience, drag simply wouldn’t translate,” and had “no idea that what worked at the Pyramid 
would work just as well in a massive stadium, or in a Hollywood movie.”  Citing Divine and 
Sylvester as exceptions who managed some mainstream success in drag, he claims that he had 
“never thought of presenting [himself] as the premier drag queen for mass consumption, for the 
MTV kids who go to the mall,” because it seemed implausible.  But he claims that “suddenly it 
clicked” for him that “every celebrity is a drag queen” who “put on glamourous personas and 
masks for their audience,” so “why not just take it over the top completely?” (129).  It was then 
that he decided to “pump glamour to the hundredth degree” and reinvent himself as the world’s 
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first “supermodel” drag queen, beginning his collaboration with World of Wonder, who were 
“sending out [his] demo tapes and producing a late night series called ‘Manhattan Cable’ for 
British TV” - a program that mixed real local cable access programs with original produced bits, 
including segments featuring RuPaul in “transvestite hooker” drag interviewing local sex 
workers (130).  This was one of many innovative reality television formats produced by World 
of Wonder for BBC2 and Channel 4 in the early 1990s, in which they compiled public access 
programs from around the U.S. into half-hour programs for British consumption, with cheeky 
titled like Made In the USA and United States of Television.  It should be noted that Manhattan’s 
actual public access network – the Manhattan Neighborhood Network – would provide a less-
famous but equally notable drag queen, Sabrina “Brini” Maxwell, with a local cable platform for 
The Brini Maxwell Show in the late 1990s, which would later be developed into a pilot for Bravo 
and has been reconfigured in recent years into a suite of webseries published on YouTube. 
Ru finally transcended his relentless gigging and self-merchandising with the hit dance 
single “Supermodel (You Better Work)” - the first song he recorded for Tommy Boy records, an 
independent-label-turned-Warner subsidiary that had exclusively signed hip-hop artists before 
label president Monica Lynch listened to Ru’s demo tape that had been circulated by World of 
Wonder and decided to sign him immediately.  He argues that the song and music video - which 
features him in full glamazon drag as the “supermodel of the world” - “tapped into the Zeitgeist” 
of the early 1990s, when “Naomi [Campbell], Linda [Evangelista], Christie [Brinkley], and Co. 
were being worshipped as superstars with the adoration normally reserved for rock gods,” a 
popular fascination he believes was fostered by “the death of the great stars of the silver screen,” 
which left a “void for drop-dead, impossible, over-the-top glamour” (139).  He connects the 
labor of models with the labor of drag, claiming that “the drag queen and the supermodel are [...] 
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one and the same,” pointing out that his drag contemporaries like Billy Beyond, Connie Girl, and 
Lypsinka were walking in prominent fashion shows for Todd Oldham, Thierry Mugler, and 
Gaultier.  Arguing that drag queens aren’t “a parody of women” but can in fact “hold their own 
in a roomful of supermodels any day,” with the only difference being that drag queens are 
“working girls” who will “get out of bed for a lot less than ten thousand dollars,” he 
characterizes the figure of “the new queen” as a laborer who “sings, dances, does her own 
makeup, her own hair, and styles herself [...] she makes her own clothes, she dresses up-to-date, 
and keeps up with the trends [...] they work hard for the money” (140).  In short, the drag queen 
is not just a supermodel - she is a model flexible aesthetic laborer for culture industries in 
transition, collapsing the work of above- and below-the-line professionals into a single 
glamorous package. 
While the music video for “Supermodel” portrayed Ru, in drag, as a world-famous 
fashion model - riffing on the iconography of his favorite film, the Diana Ross vehicle 
Mahogany - in reality he had not yet booked a single modelling gig.  Because Tommy Boy 
Records had an established relationship with MTV, which had circulated videos by artists on the 
label like Queen Latifa and Naughty By Nature, the label was able to convince the cable network 
to include the “Supermodel” video in its lineup, and it quickly became a staple, airing multiple 
times a day - a rare queer product in a sea of female pop singers and masculine grunge and hip-
hop acts.  Ru’s self-branding strategy paid off - shortly after “Supermodel” became a charting 
dance hit and MTV sensation, he signed a modeling contract with M.A.C. cosmetics, becoming 
the world’s first drag queen spokesmodel and bringing his own fictional supermodel narrative to 
life.  “Supermodel” is also notable for bringing another of Ru’s catchphrases into pop 
consciousness that later became integrated into Drag Race - the refrain of “shantay, shantay” - 
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which he admits to “sampling” from one of the ball scenes in Paris Is Burning.  That his music 
video launched him to worldwide stardom via circulation on MTV is quite telling; as I recounted 
in Chapter Two, MTV was a pioneer in “narrowcasting” as a niche-focused cable outlet.  Its 
specific combination of commodified, youth-targeted taste and lifestyle cultures blended together 
music, attitude, aesthetics, fashion, and brand-platforming – along with the first zeitgeist-
gripping reality program in The Real World – functioning as a corporate Viacom-subsidiary by 
which an endless stream of commodities, personalities, and celebrities could be sold to young 
audiences, who were in turn being sold to those who wanted their attention.  It thus shows Ru’s 
canniness and ability to synthesize commercially-viable trends that he brought together queer, 
black urban culture with the language and attitudes of popularized fashion industries in his hit 
single and music video that made such a splash on MTV.   
It is worth noting, too, that the movement of fashion industries into mainstream popular 
culture – and the economic shifts in the industry that followed, in which high-fashion labels 
began tailoring off-the-rack versions of their designs for widespread, semi-affordable 
consumption and in which designers like Karl Lagerfeld and Giani Versace became well-known 
media personalities – was largely fostered by the expansion of cable television.  It was CNN, 
hungry for content to fill its innovative 24-hour cable-news format, that produced and broadcast 
Style With Elsa Klensch, which Deidra Arrington argues was the inventor of “fashion television” 
and an important influence in the movement of fashion industries and culture into the everyday 
vernacular of popular media like television and tabloid magazines (Arrington, 2017).  While Ru 
cites the “death of the great stars” of the film industry as providing the conditions by which 
Naomi and Christie and Linda were able to become worldwide celebrities via the labor of 
modeling, it is this larger shift in the branding and distribution of fashion as a flexible 
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commodity and object of popular media interest that facilitated their ascendance – and thus 
paved the way for Ru to fashion himself into a semi-parodic drag version of the “Supermodel of 
the World” and actually achieve the celebrity he aspired to.   
Following the runaway success of “Supermodel,” Ru established another template that 
the queen contestants of Drag Race emulate to this day after their appearance on the show: 
taking the show on the road and relentlessly touring.  While this is obviously a long-established 
part of the live-entertainment economy, especially for musicians, it was not a lucrative 
opportunity for drag acts before RuPaul.  Drag queens had certainly toured before in self-made 
circuits of gay-focused venues, establishing their own networks of support and promotion for 
decades.  But with RuPaul’s Supermodel tour, a drag artist was booking gigs at major venues that 
were simultaneously featuring mainstream musicians like Martha Wash, Marky Mark, and CeCe 
Peniston (RuPaul, 151).  After concluding a tour of the U.S. and continental Europe, Ru “set 
[his] sights on Hollywood,” eager to get “some couch time on national TV” and finding it in an 
offer to appear on the Arsenio Hall Show, which he cites as “a major turning point” in his career, 
after which “people in Peoria were talking about this seven-foot black blond drag queen who 
came from nowhere” (175).  He characterizes this talk show appearance as a success because he 
was able to clearly communicate his brand: “people got to understand my platform, which is 
about loving yourself, understanding who you are, and bringing your uniqueness to the party” 
(177).  This uniqueness - one of the criteria of Drag Race’s outrageous pun-based evaluative 
metric (charisma, uniqueness, nerve & talent) - is elaborated as an ethical principle later in the 
book, when Ru argues that he believes it “important [...] to live your life according to no one 
else’s rules but your own” (187).  Asking why we have inherited rules about how “boys should 
be boys, and girls should be girls,” Ru argues that “there is no higher authority on the planet, 
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when it comes to deciding what’s best for you, than you,” empowering his readers to “follow 
[your] heart rather than follow their rules” (188).  He also elaborates on this self-love philosophy 
in language that he continues to use in coaching queens on Drag Race, arguing that you can’t 
“give in to the temptation of not loving yourself” by focusing on “what other people may think 
or say about you,” because “what other people may have to say about you is simply their opinion 
[and] not reality [...] reality is what is inside of you” (189).  His advice that “you can’t control 
what others have to say about you” in Lettin’ It All Hang Out has been offered verbatim to a 
number of queens on Drag Race, for example to Miz Cracker in the “Evil Twins” episode 
discussed earlier in this chapter. 
 This ethic of individualized self-empowerment via self-love forms the crux of RuPaul’s 
brand to this day, encapsulated by yet another catchphrase that he first delivered on television via 
an appearance on Geraldo and which ends every episode of Drag Race: “If you can’t love 
yourself, how in the hell you gonna love somebody else, can I get an A-men in here?”  His 
insistence that we discover our own “uniqueness” and love ourselves is, on one hand, fairly 
generic self-empowerment rhetoric of the sort you can find in any number of spiritual and 
psychological expert guides for self-improvement, but on the other hand, through the prism of 
drag and queer culture at large it takes on a significant ethical connotation that resonates with 
Foucault’s aesthetics of existence as a means of practicing freedom.  While I have argued in this 
chapter that drag, especially in RuPaul’s empire, is a kind of flexible labor and boon to the 
affective and immaterial branding cultures that have proliferated in late capitalism, it also still 
represents a powerful technology of the self that has the power to challenge the rigidity of 
identity.  “Be whatever you want to be,” Ru says, “and feel free to use whatever you want to 
reinvent yourself as whatever you want” (RuPaul, 189).  He argues that “the problem is that 
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sometimes we take things too seriously and get stuck on the details,” and implores us to not 
worry about “who you are” but to instead ask “what can you contribute, create, invent” (RuPaul, 
190).  Ru frequently warns against “taking life too seriously” and claims that drag is about 
“making fun of identity,” which resonates with his warning in Lettin’ It All Hang Out to avoid 
the security of identity, claiming that “cliques are all about people trying to find security in 
groups,” but this “sense of security that they feel is just an illusion,” which is “why [he has] 
always felt secure in [his] insecurity” (RuPaul, 60).  If drag helps us to destabilize our secure 
sense of ourselves, this means that, as an aesthetics of existence, it opens us up to the possibility 
of making new ethical choices, of practicing our freedom without recourse to the safety of 
predetermined morals and guidelines provided by the safety of identities, and communities 
organized around them. 
 But it is also crucial to understand the ambivalence of RuPaul’s self-love philosophy, 
which seeks to empower his audience in order to create a branded space in which they can feel 
actualized, acknowledged, and validated through their participation in his DragCon conferences, 
and by consuming the many productions and commodities that comprise the Drag Race universe.  
In RuPaul, we find a perfectly ambivalent encapsulation of branding culture as described by 
Banet-Weiser, in which branding is itself a spiritual process of self-fashioning.  This is manifest 
in his dual claims that he “define[s] [himself] as RuPaul,” which is “an extension of the power 
that created this universe” and a “manifestation of its love,” which means that “RuPaul can do 
everything, RuPaul is a boundless energy that can pour itself into whatever shape it wants” 
(191), but also that “a part of [his] fame has nothing to do with [him],” because he is “not the 
sole and exclusive author” of his drag persona and the success it has achieved, and that thus he 
“see[s] RuPaul as a product” and an “experience” (201).  While claiming that we need not worry 
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about how others see us, he also tells us that the first time he saw a RuPaul poster “up on the 
street, a poster that [he] had not put up there [himself],” he was so overwhelmed that he “had to 
run inside, grab [his] video camera, and tape it” (202).  This mediated feedback loop belies the 
ambivalence of his relationship with being a star and “becoming public domain” - he 
simultaneously claims to have always known he was “a superstar in exile” waiting for ‘the rest of 
the world to catch up with [him],” who manifested his own success by faith and belief, but who 
also is astonished and validated once he actually sees that this has come true.  His inner reality 
was camera-ready, but once his image was actually captured and distributed by the networks of 
consumer capitalism, he had to grab his own camera and record it to prove that this external 
reality was true.  This is perhaps perfectly encapsulated in the juxtaposition of his claim that “the 
truth is that success is something between you and your own butthole” printed directly next to a 
picture of him posing with Linda Evangelista (205).  Nonetheless, RuPaul has cannily crafted a 
“cultural space” via his expanding brand - incorporating drag aesthetics, queer politics, self-
empowerment spirituality, and an affective message of feminine love and vulnerable self-
acceptance conquering a cold masculine capitalist world - that has retained and redeployed the 
same sound bites and messaging for three decades. 
 Ru concludes his autobiographical narrative of his career, fittingly, by embedding himself 
in a plethora of references to television and the icons he seeks to articulate himself to, in order to 
authorize himself as a particular kind of expert authority as drag’s premier television emissary.  
His chronological account leaves off with his triumphant appearance on The Arsenio Hall Show 
– his nationally syndicated talk-show debut as an established entertainer - as Lettin’ It All Hang 
Out was published just before he filmed his cameos in The Brady Bunch Movie and To Wong 
Foo, Thanks for Everything, Julie Newmar, which were released, like the autobiography, in 
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1995.  But before he concludes the tome, Ru offers a few brief chapters by which he seeks to 
solidify his celebrity status by narrating his approval by and integration with established pop 
icons – that is to say, he attaches his brand to theirs.  He portrays himself as “the luckiest drag 
queen alive” when he learns that Elton John wants to record a duet with him, produced by 
Giorgio Moroder, describing Elton and Giorgio as “two icons, two legends whose careers [he] 
knew inside and out,” establishing his deep knowledge of popular culture as an essential part of 
his integration into it (192).  Telling us that Elton “invited [him] to his boyfriend’s for a family 
picnic, where he presented [Ru] with a portrait of [him] he had bought at an art gallery in 
Atlanta,” Ru insists that he “felt [he] had made a new friend” (193).  This kinship with a gay icon 
of popular music lets us know that Ru’s own rising star is no fluke; he has been anointed by “the 
pinball wizard” himself.  But Ru saves his most fateful encounter for the very final pages of the 
book, in an Afterward in which he describes meeting, in an airport waiting to board the 
Concorde, the idol whose Ed Sullivan appearance marked Ru’s first incitement to become a star 
himself, and whose film Mahogany Ru parodied in his first hit music video: Diana Ross.  As he 
narrates it, when he nervously approaches Diana to introduce himself, she exclaims that she 
“thought [he] looked familiar” and invites him to sit down with her, and they “immediately […] 
started chatting like girlfriends” (224).  After describing an amiable chat in which he 
demonstrates a thorough knowledge of her career and family life, he attempts to excuse himself 
to watch Style with Elsa Klensch on CNN, which was playing on the airport terminal television, 
but she reassures him that “it’s okay, you don’t have to leave” (225).  Eventually they part ways, 
but not before Diana tells Ru that “not only are you gorgeous but you are very talented too.”  
After arriving in New York, they say farewell to each other at baggage claim, and Ru tellingly 
says that as he left, “walking on air, [he] headed straight to the set” (227).  He doesn’t tell us 
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which set, or for what project, but the implication is clear – like his idol Diana, he is a 
professional entertainer who does not need to head home after his intercontinental flight, as he is 
needed on set immediately. 
 Ru’s television career would pick up right after the publication of Lettin’ It All Hang Out 
- in the next two years he would launch The RuPaul Show, a talk-show on VH1, and a morning 
radio show on New York’s WKTU.  While The RuPaul Show would air exactly 100 episodes in 
its two-year run, it was cancelled in 1998, and afterwards RuPaul disappeared from mainstream 
popular media for an entire decade.  In a 2009 interview with Entertainment Weekly that 
accompanied the debut of the first season of RuPaul’s Drag Race on Logo, Ru of course quotes a 
television show to describe his decade-long absence, referencing HBO’s The Comeback when he 
says that you shouldn’t “call it a comeback,” but instead tell others that "you've stepped away 
from the canvas, as my good friend Valerie Cherish says" (Stransky).  His time between the 
cancellation of The RuPaul Show and the debut of Drag Race is summed up by the release of 
“two poorly received albums and an under-the-radar supermodel action flick called Starrbooty” – 
an ultra-low-budget affair that is shockingly amateur, and he ascribes his reemergence to a 
changing political climate, with the election of Barack Obama signaling that "it's the perfect time 
to reemerge" (Stransky).  This of course glosses over the changing mode of reality television 
production which also allowed for Drag Race’s arrival, though the interviewer, Tanner Stansky, 
does note that “there are supposed to be glaring shades of Top Model and Project Runway 
reflected in” the show.  While he describes Ru’s Werk Room look as channeling Project 
Runway’s Tim Gunn, and Ru’s drag persona as “a heightened version of Tyra Banks for the 
elimination portion of the competition,” Ru responds with an answer that echoes his 
autobiography, arguing that "all drag is a sampling of pop culture,” and breaking down his 
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“whole image” into “one part Dolly Parton, one part Cher, three parts Diana, and one part David 
Bowie” (Stransky).  Feistily, he asserts his proper place in the lineage of popular culture, saying 
that “if you've seen pictures of Tyra, you'd think she was sampling me" (Stransky). 
 
Next Time on This Dissertation… 
In the decade-long hiatus in Ru's career, the evolution of reality television's mode of 
production coincided with the transformation of the “culture industries” that provided his initial 
ascendance, which have given way to a widely distributed "creative economy" that is deeply 
entangled with the proliferation of branding culture in our current conjuncture.  In Chapter Four, 
I will argue that RuPaul’s Drag Race exemplifies the changing media landscape in the era of the 
creative economy, operating as a site of convergence between reality television’s mode of 
production and social, digital media.  Highlighting the fact that RuPaul’s 20th century strategies 
for crafting a warm and inviting television persona have been widely proliferated as tactics for 
securing parasocial relationships with audiences by YouTubers and other self-fashioned social 
media celebrities and “influencers,” I will argue that the illusion of intimacy, the performance of 
authenticity, and the promise of interactivity are central means by which the Drag Race media 
enterprise creates “communities” of consumers and commodifies a simulation of queer 
kinship.  I will discuss the way Drag Race contestants epitomize the worker of the digital, 
creative economy of our era, as their participation in the production of the television show 
represents only one high-profile gig in a career that demands nearly never-ending immaterial and 
affective labor in order to cultivate and maintain an “audience” or “community” of fans to whom 
they can sell tickets, merchandise, and digital media.  I will further argue that the blurring of 
work and life - which for drag queens includes the blurring of drag persona and “real” self - and 
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the labor inherent to existing in a social and commercial world networked by digital media 
requires not only creative workers, but nearly all of us who work, to be constantly cheerful and 
“on,” promoting ourselves in order to secure gigs and find new opportunities in a precarious, 
pernicious economy built on inequality and wealth extraction by an ever-narrowing minority of 
billionaires.   
Additionally, I will describe the way that World of Wonder has tapped into and exploited 
the immaterial and affective labor of Drag Race queens not only to increase ratings and tweak 
the dramatic narratives of the show itself, but also to cheaply produce digital media to distribute 
via YouTube and their own “over the top” streaming service, WOW Presents Plus.  By evolving 
the production strategies of their Drag Race “behind the scenes” spinoff Untucked and 
experimenting with short-form video content featuring popular contestants from the show, World 
of Wonder has built a small empire of digital content that taps into the monetization strategies 
built into YouTube’s platform, aggregating unique “audiences” of individual viewers whose 
attention and data can be sold, individually, to diverse advertisers - while also simultaneously 
luring them behind the paywall of their subscription streaming service.  I will explore in Chapter 
Four the way World of Wonder has also spun their short-form digital video content back into 
traditional television formats, in The Trixie & Katya Show and Dancing Queen, starring Alyssa 
Edwards.  I will argue that Alyssa and her show embody the self-branding entrepreneurial logics 
and legacy of RuPaul’s empire, chosen by Ru and his co-producers at World of Wonder for 
continued collaborations due to her performance of an “authentic” and “warm” version of herself 
on camera, and her outspoken articulation of a work ethic built around the belief in a meritocratic 
hard-won version of success in the entertainment industry. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE NEVERENDING GIG: AFFECTIVE DRAG LABOR IN THE 
DRAG RACE UNIVERSE 
Formally, female impersonators are all professional performers. They receive a regular salary 
for their specialized service: entertaining audiences. Formally, they are like many other types of 
professional (paid) performers such as movie, television, and stage actors, musicians, dancers, 
circus clowns, strippers, and chorus girls. These occupations and many others make up the 
professional entertainment industry, or what is colloquially called “show business.”  
- Esther Newton, Mother Camp (1979, 4) 
 
I need, I need, I need, I need, I need to get up in this All Stars gig. 
- Alyssa Edwards, Drag Race All Stars 2 (2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Previously On… This Dissertation 
 In Chapter Three, I began to trace the intersections of evolving self-branding culture, 
television as a technology of celebrity-production and self-formation, and the popularization of 
fashion and culture industries through emerging cable platforms - coming together to create the 
conditions by which RuPaul’s career was launched to mainstream success via MTV in the early 
1990s.  By analyzing Ru’s 1995 autobiography, Lettin’ It All Hang Out, I argued that his self-
authored and self-authorizing narrative of achieving celebrity success provided the groundwork 
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from which we can begin to decipher the philosophies, strategies, and rules that animate and 
govern RuPaul’s Drag Race - understanding it as an extension of Ru’s personal branding 
platform and infused with the same ambivalent self-empowerment and self-disclosing 
instructions and advice that comprise much of the autobiography’s substance.  Noting the ways 
that Ru describes his creative practices as a drag queen as a kind of “pop culture sampling” and 
constructs himself as an expert of television and popular culture at large - and recounting his 
“training” via cable access television, DIY wheatpaste postering, and working the New York gay 
club circuit - I began to unfurl the question of how he is authorized, or authorizes himself, to 
reign over the mainstream queendom of drag performers as the host and Mother of Drag Race.  
By considering the contradictions of his advice that we must all follow our own rules and reveal 
our “uniqueness” to ourselves and the world - preferably on television - while also following his 
advice and purchasing his commodities in order to achieve our disillusioned self-discovery, I 
started to work toward an elaboration of the self-branding, self-loving, self-disclosing set of Ru’s 
rules that tweak the conventions of the reality competition genre in the evaluative metrics of 
Drag Race’s eliminations.  I concluded the chapter by summarizing Ru’s achievements that 
occurred in the three years following the release of Lettin’ It All Hang Out - the production of his 
VH1 talk-show and his WKTU morning radio show - and noting his decade-long absence from 
mainstream popular culture following the cancellation of the VH1 show, re-emerging in 2009 as 
the host of Drag Race. 
 While I recounted in Chapter Three much of Ru’s career history and trajectory leading up 
to the breakthrough success of his hit single and music video, “Supermodel (You Better Work),” 
and argued that his labors and philosophies aligned with the logics of branding culture that 
suffused the converging culture industries and popular media of the late 20th century - 
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emphasizing the creation of branded spaces in which consumers can foster narrativized, affective 
relationships built around the consumption of commodities - the conclusion of Chapter Three 
leaves off just as Ru achieved the gig that best characterizes his ambitions and current role as a 
show business personality: the host.  Though the video for “Supermodel (You Better Work)” 
arrived at exactly the right time to launch him to international fame - combining the MTV-ready 
trends of accessible queer culture, house music, ironic humor, and supermodel-obsessed fashion 
- RuPaul is not known today for his music productions.  He produces albums and singles to this 
day, weaving them into the fabric of Drag Race and frequently reminding his audience of their 
availability on iTunes, but Ru’s nebulous media-sprawling efforts as an entertainer have, since 
his VH1 talk-show days, been focused through his self-presentation as a host and personality.  
Thus in the present chapter, I begin a larger analysis of Drag Race and its many spinoffs and 
sprawling web of media enterprises by offering another lens through which to view RuPaul’s 
career as a host and professional personality, which will help to articulate the rules of the game 
(of truth) that animate the reality competition show, and to explain how it has evolved to better 
synthesize and capitalize upon the convergence of affective branding cultures, precarious 
creative economies, the proliferation and popularity of digital and mobile media technologies, 
and an ever-mutating mode of reality television production.  While I explored in Chapter Two 
the way reality television’s mode of production has evolved to flexibly accommodate new 
technologies and consumer practices, and began to pick apart RuPaul’s own navigation of 
branding culture and the shifting television and wider media economy of the late 20th century, 
this present chapter brings these threads together to examine how these lineages converge in 
Drag Race, which is animated both by the economic and technological demands of our current 
era and by RuPaul’s own strategies for crafting branded personas.  I will thus argue for the 
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relevance of Drag Race as both an exemplary reality television text of our current era – in which 
a broadcast cable show is really just a central hub in a wide network of productions, events, and 
commodities – and also, queerly, unique in its expressions and commodification of gay culture 
and its ability to cobble together a heterogenous audience via its content and strategies for 
distribution and audience engagement.  In a digital economy that prizes authenticity, affective 
resonance, and aesthetic novelty, drag queens – via the mainstream success of Drag Race – have 
suddenly become a minable resource for the production of celebrity brands, with their personas 
and personal lives serving as fodder for commodities and online communities alike. 
 
The Parasocial Persona 
In Chapter Three, I argued that RuPaul attempts to establish his expertise and authority in 
his 1995 autobiography by constructing himself as a televisual subject who was formed by 
consuming the technology he adored, exemplified by his claim that he was “a child of 
television,” and “as someone who had grown up watching as much of it as possible, whenever 
possible, [he] belonged on television,” because he “was never at a loss for things to say, and 
from [his] years of study, he knew “how to speak the language of television [...] fluently” 
(RuPaul, 60).  While his narrative of his life and career highlights the many different forms of 
media production and live entertainment that he practiced en route to achieving celebrity via the 
“Supermodel” music video, all of his varied efforts are synthesized by his desire to appear on 
television in whatever form was available - he aspired to become a television personality.  
Achieving his first post-Supermodel success on television as the host of his own talk-show on 
VH1 was a culmination of an aspiration he articulates in the autobiography, in which he 
frequently describes his admiration of - and desire to emulate - Oprah Winfrey.  Elaborating on 
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the “power of Oprah,” Ru argues that “she has a quality that can’t be learned or knocked off” but 
is “totally her own,” and that “people love her because she is totally Oprah; she’s herself, she’s 
warm and wears her personality like an old worn coat” (104-5).  He also says he hopes that by 
“taking [his] cue from Oprah,” his aim is “to open up more, and show more of [himself] - show 
[his] depth,” and while he doesn’t wish to “be an imitation of Oprah,” he wants to emulate “the 
way that Oprah is herself - undiluted, unadulterated” (210).  Connecting Oprah’s “warmth” and 
authentic self-revelation to the “love” she receives from fans, Ru describes her success as a 
television host in language that resonates directly with Donald Horton and R. Richard Wohl’s 
landmark 1956 article “Mass Communication and Para-social Interaction: Observations on 
Intimacy at a Distance,” an analysis of mid-century radio and television culture that has an 
astounding relevance in describing media today, and which sheds light on RuPaul’s longevity 
and Drag Race’s success in evolving to incorporate newer media platforms into its network of 
productions. 
Promoting the sixth season of Drag Race in a 2014 interview for the web edition of 
Entrepreneur magazine, RuPaul told journalist Geoff Weiss that his career longevity was due to 
the fact that “above all, [he] think[s] there’s a warmth to [his] persona,” claiming that he has 
“been able to articulate [himself] in a way that’s accessible to people,” who can therefore 
“understand that [he’s] coming from a place of love” (Weiss).  He tells Weiss that “today, 
consumers want a lifestyle, an aesthetic, a philosophy,” and love and warmth are central to the 
philosophy and aesthetic of the RuPaul brand, embodied in the catchphrases “if you can’t love 
yourself, how in the hell you gonna love somebody else?” and “everybody say love,” the latter of 
which has travelled from his live performances (and t-shirts) in the early 1990s to become a 25-
foot-long sculpture outside the Los Angeles Convention Center, welcoming attendees to 
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RuPaul’s DragCon LA in 2018.  The very first sentence of Lettin’ It All Hang Out promises that 
Ru has written the book “because [he] wanted to reveal [his] soul to the world” (RuPaul, vii); in 
his capacity as a mentor and expert on Drag Race, he assures the queen contestants that “it’s not 
until you go really deep that the audience has a chance to fall in love with you, [not] until you 
reveal something really honest” (S10E11).   This emphasis on cultivating “love” relationships 
and the articulation of lifestyle and aesthetics to commodity production clearly resonates with 
Banet-Weiser’s arguments about the way branding culture has contributed to the reconfiguration 
of “the relationship between labor, products, and capitalism,” making “affect, attention, and 
culture itself [...] available as part of capitalist exchange” (Banet-Weiser, 72).  But it also reveals 
that RuPaul’s playbook for success as a television entertainer is built around fashioning a 
“persona,” in Horton & Wohl’s terminology, that can foster “parasocial relationships” with mass 
audiences via media technologies. 
Horton & Wohl’s seminal 1956 article introduced the notion of the parasocial 
relationship in order to describe the “seeming face-to-face relationship between spectator and 
performer” of radio and television, which creates the “illusion of face-to-face relationship with 
the performer” in such a way that “the most remote and illustrious men are met as if they were in 
the circle of one’s peers” (215).  They mark a distinction between fictional programs and the 
“new type of performer” who has been “created” by radio and television media, including 
“quizmasters, announcers, ‘interviewers’ in a new ‘show-business’ world,” which they 
summarize as “a special category of ‘personalities’ whose existence is a function of the media 
themselves” (216).  They name this “new” figure the “persona,” providing a long series of 
characteristics and details that define the persona’s particular power, and differentiate personae’s 
appeal and relationships with their audiences from the kinds that can be fostered by fictional 
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programs or theater productions.  Their articulation of the persona presciently describes the 
practices of audience cultivation deployed by television personalities throughout the rest of the 
20th century - perfectly persona-fied in a figure like RuPaul, who can variously host a cable or 
radio talk-show, a live club gig, or a reality competition program - and their analysis provides a 
means by which to understand how reality television as a mode of production created a new 
economy for the curation of parasocial relationships which has since merged with the 
proliferation of social and self-publishing media platforms in the 21st century.  In Horton & 
Wohl’s analysis, the persona represents “the typical and indigenous figure of the social scene 
presented by radio and television,” emphasizing the power of the new kinds of parasocial 
relationships made possible by mid-century broadcast media productions by claiming that “to say 
that he is familiar and intimate is to use pale and feeble language for the pervasiveness and 
closeness with which multitudes feel his presence” (216).  They marvel at the fact that personae 
can “claim and achieve an intimacy with what are literally crowds of strangers,” and argue that 
even though this intimacy “is an imitation and a shadow of what is ordinarily meant by that 
word,” it is still “extremely influential with, and satisfying for, the great numbers who willingly 
receive it and share in it,” who feel that they “‘know’ such a persona in somewhat the same way 
they know their chosen friends” (216). 
One of the key elements of a successful persona that allows them to nurture parasocial 
relationships with their audiences, according to Horton & Wohl in 1956, is exactly what RuPaul 
identifies as his own primary attributes, gleaned from his study of other television icons like 
Oprah: warmth and sincerity.  Horton & Wohl claim that “the jargon of show business teems 
with special terms for the mysterious ingredients” for creating rapport with an audience that can 
lead to parasocial attachments, arguing that “ideally, a performer should have ‘heart,’ should be 
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‘sincere’; his performance should be ‘real’ and ‘warm’” (220).  They note that the performers of 
their era were marketed via campaigns that “continually emphasize the sympathetic image 
which, it is hoped, the audience is perceiving and developing,” requiring fans of the persona to 
“contribute to the illusion by believing in it,” thus “rewarding the persona’s ‘sincerity’ with 
‘loyalty’” and assuming “a sense of personal obligation to the performer, to help him in his 
struggle for ‘success,’” and additionally argue that success in show business itself was “a theme 
which is prominently exploited in this kind of propaganda” (220).  Reading Lettin’ It All Hang 
Out as a narrative of striving for and achieving hard-won show biz success - and Drag Race as a 
dramatizing of the competition for fame and success, with each season offering a stable of a 
dozen-or-so varied personalities for different audience groups to root for - it becomes clear that 
this is a distinct strategy, gleaned from the marketing and branding strategies of 20th century 
broadcast media production, for crafting a “sympathetic image,” fortified by sincere and 
authentic self-disclosure, that is rewarded with loyalty and affection via parasocial relationships.  
Horton & Wohl note their study’s indebtedness to Robert K. Merton’s Mass Persuasion, in 
which he analyzes the affective attachments of listeners to singer Kate Smith’s war bond drive 
on the radio during World War Two, whose “folksy” and “ordinary” charms crafted her as the 
kind of persona Horton & Wohl identify as an emerging phenomenon in their time (Simonson, 
272).  In Merton’s study, sincerity and authenticity come to the fore as key characteristics that 
construct Smith’s appeal.  He juxtaposes “the American gospel of sincerity, benevolence, and, 
above all, patriotism” (quoted in Simonson, 278) with a wider culture that is “focused on capital 
and the market [and] tends to instrumentalize human relationships” (quoted in Simonson, 280), 
and quotes one of her fans, who claims that “If she were a fake, I’d feel terrible [...] I trust her” 
(quoted in Simonson, 277).  Thus we can see that while Banet-Weiser is accurate in describing 
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the 21st century as “an age that hungers for anything that feels authentic, just as we lament more 
and more that it is a world of inauthenticity, that we are governed by superficiality,” these 
concerns - and the personality-driven branding strategies crafted to commodify sincerity - were 
fully animating U.S. culture in the immediate post-war period of the 20th century (Banet-Weiser, 
3).  And while all manner of public figures, from pop singers to politicians, have exploited media 
technologies to offer an “authentic” persona with whom admirers can form parasocial 
relationships, the opportunities for performing a “sincere” and real persona on television were 
innovated by the expansion and evolution of the reality television mode of production, which has 
in turn led to a proliferation of these tactics in new forms of digital media production and 
distribution, epitomized by the YouTuber phenomenon.   
In Richard Dyer’s work on the cultural production of stars and the economy of celebrity 
that characterized film culture – and captivated gay male subculture – in the middle of the 20th 
century, he argues that a central strategy for crafting star personas was the deployment of “a 
rhetoric of sincerity or authenticity, two qualities greatly prized in stars because they guarantee, 
respectively, that the star really means what he or she says, and that the star really is what she or 
he appears to be” (Dyer 1986, 11).  Drawing together the actual image of the star “in the 
unmediated moment of the close-up,” their life narrative as “uncovered by the biographer’s 
display of ruthless uncovering,” and the “indubitable sincerity and authenticity” that the star 
presents in public appearances, Dyer argues that this combination of tactics offers “a privileged 
reality to hang on to, the reality of the star’s private self,” which is “represented through a set of 
oppositions that stem from the division of the world into private and public spaces, a way of 
organising space that in turn relates to the idea of the separability of the individual and society” 
(Dyer 1986, 11).  These arguments highlight the centrality of control in the manufacturing of 
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authentic personas, as authenticity only ever exists in the perception of an audience who can be 
managed via the technological and economic structure of mediated image-making.  While Dyer’s 
analysis is concerned with cinema mostly dating to the 1930s through the 1950s – with a star 
system heavily controlled, as I described in Chapter Three, by traditional industry gatekeepers 
like studio heads and official marketing campaigns – his description of the way celebrity private 
selves are organized via the division of public and private space give us a productive means to 
analyze the current regime of star formation.  Reality television and digital media have given rise 
to “self-formed” and “DIY” celebrities who wield the tools of social media to mete out access to 
their “private” selves selectively, strategically, and across a wide variety of platforms and 
contexts. 
  
Reality Television as “Personality Program” 
As I argued in Chapter Two, reality television’s mode of production has fostered the 
proliferation and innovation of forms of self-branding, especially in its convergence with digital, 
mobile, and social media technologies.  Hearn argues that reality television’s mode of production 
has come to collapse “distinctions between life, selfhood, and labor” while “actively producing 
new forms of immaterial labor,” allowing for a never-ending performance of “yourself” on TV 
(Hearn 2011, 316) and creating a model for “the monetization of ‘being’ and the production of 
subjectivity” (315).  While Hearn, Oullette, Collins and other scholars correctly identify the ways 
that reality television exploits precarious economic arrangements that emphasize self-branding, 
self-promotion, and entrepreneurial logics of governmentality - Hearn argues that “individuals 
[...] turn to the promotional pedagogy and aesthetic codes of commercial media, technology, and 
social networks in order to reassure themselves that they exist and are worth something,” with 
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reality television’s “branded content, formats, products, services, and monetized self-brands” 
acting as paradigms “of these new processes of capitalist valorization and accumulation” - we are 
left to ask what, precisely, reality television offers to its participants that other modes of 
television production do not (Hearn 2013, 451).  If reality television facilitates the production of 
selves-as-brands in a unique way that fictional programs do not, it is surely due to the particular 
kind of “authenticity” that the mode of production offers.  And while the huge spectrum of 
reality productions has allowed for a huge variety of self-brands to proliferate – from 
Kardashians to duck hunters to obese children – the particular focus on personas and authentic 
selfhood in queer identity practices and the art of drag make Drag Race an exemplary platform 
for this sort of image construction.  Horton & Wohl argued that the “personality program” - in 
their era, quiz and interview formats on radio and television - was distinct from “the theatrical 
drama” because it does not “demand or even permit the [a]esthetic illusion - that loss of 
situational reference and self-consciousness in which the audience not only accepts the symbol 
as reality, but fully assimilates the symbolic role.”  While the listener or viewer of a fictional 
drama or comedy may identify with a story’s characters, they do so by entering the world created 
by the fiction, and thus do not form the illusory but real-seeming parasocial bonds created by 
“personality programs.”  In these formats - typified and innovated by turn-of-the-century reality 
television production - the “persona and his staff maintain the para-social relationship” by 
including the viewer or listener via direct forms of interaction, “continually referring to and 
addressing the home audience as a third party to the program” in order to “remind the spectator 
of his own independent identity” (218-9).   
Horton & Wohl highlight forms of call-and-response interactions utilized by mass media 
personas in their era, including television personalities directly addressing the camera in order to 
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solicit “answers” from home audiences, arguing that in these kinds of one-way exchanges “the 
spectator retains control over the content of his participation rather than surrendering control 
through identification with others, as he does when absorbed in watching a drama or movie” 
(219).  Thus a central factor in allowing for affective attachments to media personalities is access 
to an imagined reality of their existence; it is not just that they are warm and authentic, but live in 
the same world that you do, and even directly address and appeal to you as somebody who might 
understand and have sympathy for their own situation.  So while Collins argues that “ordinary 
people in reality television, ironically, are not ‘real’ actors with accumulated intertextual capital” 
from performing in fictional texts, and thus do not have “access to wider circulation by which to 
accrue sustained symbolic and economic value,” her assessment that the value they earn in the 
form of “dispensable celebrity that pleases audiences for its novelty and self-reflexivity” fails to 
consider that it is precisely because some reality participants are “ordinary” that they are able to 
forge sympathetic, parasocial bonds with audiences who come to believe that they “know” the 
“real” person they consume via television (Collins, 95).  Ordinariness may also be an especially 
important consideration in the construction of a queer celebrity, as well.  In Dyer’s analysis of 
Judy Garland’s specific appeal to gay male audiences, he argued that this partially pivoted 
around her “ordinary” appeal, because “a sense of difference below or within ordinariness 
resembles essentialist conceptions of homosexuality as a trait inborn or inbred,” and that “view 
of an essential difference within the framework of being brought up ordinary” for gay audiences 
leads to the demand for “a star whose image insists on her or his authenticity, since the 
‘difference’ must be embodied as true and natural” (Dyer 1986, 160).  Collins’ account also 
predates the rise of social media and the kinds of fan-focused interaction it allows, which 
complicate her claims that reality television celebrities don’t have “access to wider circulation” – 
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the combination of being seemingly less manufactured or removed from “ordinary” life than 
traditional pop icons and the possibility of direct interaction via social media channels is 
precisely what has allowed the gay-famous (that is, famous to queer audiences) drag queens of 
Drag Race to fashion lucrative careers out of their appearances on the show. 
 Part of the economic logic of the reality competition subgenre is that by offering a variety 
of personalities who can appeal to different audience segments - and cultivating drama, suspense, 
and increased sympathy via the weekly threat of elimination from the program - a wider variety 
of viewers and fans will engage with the show, allowing for more opportunities to sell these 
viewers to advertisers and sponsors.  This is most clearly demonstrated by a format like 
American Idol, which makes interactive fan participation and enthusiasm the central feature of 
the show, requiring its contestants and producers to construct sympathetic personas in order to 
court votes in order to win.  While reality competition shows built around the creative economy, 
like Project Runway and America’s Next Top Model, do not directly appeal to fans via interactive 
participation, their combination of industry-labor-focused challenges and behind-the-scenes 
workroom drama - organized around the interaction of the personalities cast for the season - are 
still structured in a way to offer their participants as budding media personae whom audiences 
can come to root for and sympathize with, and follow on social media.  But in Drag Race, this 
intrinsic element of reality competition formats is a central feature and obsession of the 
production itself; as guided by RuPaul’s own practice and philosophy as an expert television 
persona, the main labor and activity of Drag Race queens is the fostering of fan bases and 
establishment of parasocial relationships with the show’s viewers.  Social media engagement 
numbers have been key to Drag Race getting continued support from MTV Networks, including 
its profile-raising move to VH1 from Logo, which was part of an effort by incoming president 
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Chris McCarthy for VH1 to put “a premium on shows that offer some urgency to watch live, 
particularly those that generate a high level of second-screen activity,” with McCarthy seeking “ 
at least 50% of viewership of VH1’s original series coming from live rather than time-shifted on-
demand options” (Littleton).  As Karin van Es argues in her analysis of The Voice, “for networks 
in search of higher ratings, social TV promises to keep audiences watching live television 
(providing reliably measurable viewership numbers), and to lure back those viewers who tend 
increasingly to watch programs on their own schedules” (van Es, 111).  Not only does live 
viewership generate higher advertising revenues for the network, but higher social media activity 
during a live airing shows the network that a program is “an experience our audience wants to 
share in,” according to McCarthy, who says that if there isn’t a large amount of social 
engagement “then we’re just making shows, and we don’t want to do that, we want to make a 
brand” (quoted in Littleton). 
 Drag Race’s strategies for generating social media engagement generally fall into the 
“reactive” form of audience participation as outlined by van Es, as opposed to the “active” or 
“interactive” solicitations offered by other reality formats.  Because there are no live elements to 
its broadcast – a season is typically filmed a few months before airing, save for a “live” finale 
that is shot a few weeks before airing – and because the production of storylines hinges on 
producer control over the proceedings, Drag Race has historically allowed for very few forms of 
social media engagement that would qualify as interactive, or cede any control to viewers.  The 
notable exception to this has been online voting to determine each season’s “Miss Congeniality,” 
which led to a fight between cast members during the season 9 reunion episode, when Aja reads 
newly crowned Miss Congeniality Valentina for being “fan favorite” and not actually congenial.  
And in season 10, the online voting system was hacked by an undetermined outside agent, 
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leading the show to recalibrate the Miss Congeniality award by having the contestants 
themselves vote instead.  Van Es describes the way that The Voice modified its social media 
engagement strategies over the years, shifting from an initial emphasis on live polling and direct 
influence over the proceedings a la American Idol to a more “reactive” approach in later seasons, 
owing to the fact that “producers must offer compelling television in the form of tightly 
structured narratives, but certain types of audience participation threaten their control over the 
program” (van Es, 109).  Drag Race falls in line with the more reactive approach that van Es 
describes as “relatively superficial types of interaction that claim ostensibly to blur the line 
between producers and viewers - and by extension, to shift power to the audience - but in fact 
keep their roles distinct,” with nearly all of its direct solicitation of fan participation relegated to 
the announcement of a hashtag in each episode, after Ru introduces the main challenge (van Es, 
109).  In earlier seasons, each “maxi challenge” would receive a unique hashtag – for instance, a 
Shakespeare-themed challenge gets the hashtag #ShakesQueer (S7E3, “ShakesQueer”) – but 
starting with season 9 through the presently-airing season 11, Ru simply says “hashtag 
DragRace” during the challenge introductions, likely owing to an attempt to corral social 
engagement numbers under a single tag.  Van Es even draws parallels between these social 
media practices and the parasocial strategies outlined by Horton & Wohl, directly citing their 
research while arguing that “social media are […] being used to nurture and deepen the 
emotional investment of viewers” in an attempt to address “increasing audience fragmentation 
and autonomy” via the “revaluing [of] fan loyalty and participation,” with shows like The Voice 
offering audiences access “to the performers, coaches, and host through Twitter, [making] the 
frame separating [fans] from the show […] to seem permeable, implying something of the 
intimacy of a face-to-face relationship” (van Es, 118).   
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 On the surface, Drag Race resembles other reality competition formats.  On any given 
season, twelve to fourteen drag queens are invited to compete for a crown, a cash prize of 
$100,000, a “sickening” supply of cosmetics, and the title of “America’s next drag superstar.”  
Airing once a week over the course of a three month season, each episode of the show is 
structured around a “maxi challenge” that can take on a variety of forms - acting in scripted 
sketches, lip syncing or live singing in musical productions, designing branded products or 
concepts for nightclubs, performing stand-up and improv comedy, and so on - as well as a 
themed runway show, in which each queen showcases a drag look in front of RuPaul and his 
panel of judges.  The “tops” and “bottoms” of the week - a play on gay male sexual positions, in 
one of the show’s barely-sexual nods to innuendo, used here to describe the three best- and 
worst-performing contestants of the week’s challenge - are asked to remain on the runway stage, 
while the rest of the queens are “safe” from being eliminated in the episode, and are dismissed to 
“untuck” backstage while the other performers are given critiques by the judges.  After each of 
the top and bottom queens receive praise or constructive critique from the panel of judges in 
brief back-and-forth exchanges, they too are dismissed to the backstage area, and RuPaul 
deliberates with his judges, quickly discussing each of the queens who are in the running to win 
the week’s challenge, or possibly be eliminated.  All of the queens are brought back out to the 
stage, with the “safe” queens standing silently, as witnesses, near the back of the runway area, 
while the tops and bottoms line up again on stage, in front of the judges.  In dramatic fashion, the 
winner of the week is revealed, while the other top queens are dismissed as safe for the week, 
and then the bottom three queens are whittled down to a bottom two, who are officially “up for 
elimination.”  These bottom two must then engage in the show’s signature performance, drawn 
from gay club drag culture, in which they “lip sync for their lives” - both queens have to lip sync 
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the same song, on stage at the same time, allowing Ru to determine who has performed most 
passionately and thus deserves to remain in the competition for the crown.  At the conclusion of 
the lip sync, RuPaul tells the queen who will remain that “shantay you stay,” while the losing 
contestant is given a brief affectionate send-off from Ru, and then asked to “sashay away.”  The 
losing contestant is given a very brief on-camera exit interview while holding a small statue of 
RuPaul that acts as a consolation prize, and then writes a message to the remaining queens on 
one of the Werk Room mirrors, using pink lipstick. 
 This unwavering formula is deployed to create a familiar pattern for viewers, and in that 
way resembles the programs it was stitched together to resemble, like Project Runway and 
America’s Next Top Model.  But because it is engaged with queer identity and cultural practice, 
and draws on the camp heritage of queer media production - and also because it exploits the 
possibilities of the reality mode of production to foster affective parasocial relationships - Drag 
Race has become a much larger and more complex phenomenon than these similar shows, 
mutating into a queer network of interrelated media productions.  The combination of RuPaul’s 
television-honed strategies for crafting successful personae that can foster the “illusion of 
intimacy” with the opportunities for playing with “authenticity” allowed by reality production 
and the rise of YouTube and podcasting networks as a new site for parasocial interaction has 
allowed Drag Race to fashion queer cultural practice into mainstream prominence, while 
exploiting and commodifying the vulnerability and affective needs of the queer individuals and 
communities from which it draws its legacy and to whom it sells its material and immaterial 
wares.  The offering of intimate parasocial relationships with queer artists to queer individuals - 
who, in the U.S., may be isolated from real-life queer communities if they do not have access to 
the material spaces that have traditionally harbored queer culture, especially vulnerable young 
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queers in smaller communities - evokes Banet-Weiser argument that “the marketization of the 
self, and indeed of social life in general, indicates that economic practices have been retooled to 
reach not just a generic audience but ever-more-individualized communities, utilizing key 
strategies of emotional engagement, authenticity, and affect” (Banet-Weiser, 72).   
And important to the particular (and queer) magic of Drag Race versus similar 
personality-driven reality programs is that not only are drag queens selling their drag personas 
and “real” selves to audiences as a self-brand, they are also – following Ru’s footsteps – selling 
audiences their own selves as well.  That is to say, in the affirmative self-love/self-
discovery/self-revelation discourse that animates Drag Race, the very notion of a stable (but also 
malleable) self – that can be accessed and expressed by interacting with and consuming your 
favorite drag queen – is reiterated and reified, with frequent assertions from Ru and the 
contestants that queer sexual desires and gender non-conformity are to be celebrated as essential 
parts of the self.  This falls in line with Dyer’s arguments that 20th century movie stars helped to 
solidify the notion of stable selfhood, that while “the notion of the individual is assailed on all 
sides” from artistic, psychoanalytical, and philosophical knowledges that assert our instability 
and multiplicity as selves, the individual remains “a necessary fiction for the reproduction of the 
kind of society we live in” and thus demands movie stars “articulate […] ideas of personhood, in 
large measure shoring up the notion of the individual but also at times registering the doubts and 
anxieties attendant on it” (Dyer 1986, 10).  If broadcasting strategies gave way to narrowcasting 
in the cable era, today’s media landscape has seen a further narrowing of marketing and media 
production tailored to individual tastes by utilizing the proliferation of individualized mobile 
digital media - which has also allowed for the selling of individual tastes and consumption 
patterns to advertisers in the form of browsing, purchasing, and demographic data.  Drag Race 
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has evolved over the course of its eleven years of production to increasingly incorporate a wide 
variety of platforms for attracting and exploiting highly-individualized tastes and interests via 
social media and digital video productions – and stumbled into the lucrative realization that drag 
queens appeal to a heterogenous audience, including a wide spectrum of queer people hungry for 
gay pop culture, as well as young girls and boys who enjoy the edgy-adjacent take on feminine-
focused commodity culture - but even before it began to do so, its format and content paved the 
way for creating the kinds of parasocial relationships which have flourished in the new(er) media 
economy. 
 While approximately three-quarters of the length of any given episode of Drag Race - 
which were about 42-minutes long from seasons one through seven, before expanding to a full 
hour (aired in a 90-minute block on broadcast television) from season eight to the present - are 
given over to the introduction of the episode’s challenge, scenes in the “Werk Room” in which 
the contestants prepare or rehearse for the challenge, the production of the challenge itself, and 
the evaluation-and-elimination drama of the runway, every episode also reserves a significant 
portion of its runtime for another signature staple of the show, in which we watch the contestants 
apply the inordinate amount of makeup required for their craft in front of two-way mirrors as 
they prepare to walk the runway.  The basic premise of these sequences - a “behind the scenes” 
glimpse at the art of transformation and illusion - lends itself to a discourse of “authenticity” that 
draws attention to drag’s power for questioning the construction of gender, character, persona 
and personality, allowing viewers to see the thought, labor, and talent that goes into crafting the 
(mostly) polished drag looks that sashay down the runway.  This evokes Dyer’s analysis of the 
ways stars present a coherent sense of self that is the same in both public and private, acting 
always as “’themselves’ – no matter how different their roles, they bear witness to the 
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continuousness of their own selves,” with a “coherent continuousness within becom[ing] what 
the star ‘really is’” (Dyer 1986, 11).  He points to the way close-up cinematography and celebrity 
biography writing were key to the construction of the star image, as they are strategies for 
“showing us the star as he or she really is,” assuring us that “we are being taken ‘behind the 
scenes’, ‘beneath the surface’, ‘beyond the image’, there where the truth resides” (Dyer 1986, 
11). 
Promising the same sort of disclosure of the drag stars’ hidden depths and inner truths, 
these “mirror time” scenes also consistently provide the show’s most direct displays of 
confessional disclosure, vulnerable and empathetic exchange, and queer personal storytelling that 
highlight the affective bonds between the contestants while fostering parasocial relationships 
with viewers.  All manner of traumas and trials arise in these sequences; some are common to 
much human experience, like the loss of friends or parents to illnesses and accidents, or growing 
up poor and struggling to survive the precarious social order of the contemporary U.S..  But the 
majority of the conversations from makeup mirror scenes selected by producers to be included in 
the show are specific to queer experience: tales of coming out, being shunned and disowned by 
families, revelations of HIV positive statuses, sharing of difficulties with eating disorders, being 
beaten and bullied through childhood, navigating the precarities of living as trans women who 
are also drag queens, losing loved ones to the HIV/AIDS crisis of the 1980s and harboring 
survivor’s guilt, negotiating the split mental and social terrain of having both “boy” and “girl” 
identities, and so on.  Frequently, when queens open up to their competitor-sisters, other queens 
speak up to share similar experiences, like when season ten’s Dusty Ray Bottoms opens up about 
being forced into gay conversion therapy by his evangelical parents, and Blair St. Clair is able to 
reassure and comfort her by offering her own challenges growing up in a conservative Christian 
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household (S10E03).  Or when season nine’s Valentina opens up about her struggles with her 
eating disorder, and is shocked and relieved to hear Shea Coulee and Sasha Velour reveal their 
own.  “I never thought I would be able to talk openly to other drag queens about these issues,” 
Sasha says.  Shea is “surprised about how many girls have struggled with this,” and says “there’s 
power in being able to confide in your sisters, and have them support you” (S9E05).  These 
exchanges and revelations provide the “vulnerability” and “authenticity” that Ru prompts his 
queens to express, and also continues the tradition of gay male culture diva worship that lies 
behind much of drag’s traditions, including the lip sync.  In Dyer’s exploration of gay male 
attachment to Judy Garland – who still looms large enough in gay pop consciousness to have an 
entire episode of Drag Race All Stars 4 dedicated to her in early 2019 – he argues that “the kind 
of emotion Garland expressed is somewhat differently described in […] gay writings, but on two 
points all agree – that it is always strong emotion, and that it is really felt by the star herself and 
shared with the audience,” and while he concedes “these are qualities that might be attributed to 
many stars,” in Garland there is a “particular register of intense, authentic feeling that is 
important,” the very specific “combination of strength and suffering, and precisely the one in the 
face of the other” (Dyer 1986, 149).  The tenacity of queer femmes surviving their suffering, and 
demonstrating strength – and the retreat from normative toxic masculinity – by vocalizing fears 
and struggles and weaknesses inherits and redeploys the gay male worship of icons like Garland. 
 These displays of community and friendship in a reality television show may feel 
prompted or staged, especially given how frequently they occur during the makeup mirror 
sequences included in every episode of the show.  But - as I will discuss in more detail in 
Chapter Five - Drag Race’s sisterhood is perhaps more real than one would expect from a reality 
competition show, owed to the fact that many of the queens have professional relationships 
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before arriving on the show, and nearly every contestant goes on to tour together and work an 
interconnected, international drag circuit of live performance venues following the show.  
Regardless, though, of the “reality” of these relationships, what is important is that they conjure 
and perform friendship and camaraderie in a way that invites the viewer to feel that they are 
witness to, and included in, the intimate relationships of the contestants.  Horton & Wohl argued 
that personality programs are “especially designed to provide occasion for good-natured joking 
and teasing, praising and admiring, gossiping and telling anecdotes, in which the values of 
friendship and intimacy are stressed,” in order to heighten the parasocial feeling that the viewer 
is being welcomed into the “authentic” social reality of the performers, privy to personal and 
insider knowledge that only another member of the family would be allowed to partake in (223).  
For those of us who identify as queer but find ourselves isolated from others whose sexuality or 
gender identities marginalize them from mainstream culture, the allure of an intimate, queer 
sisterhood - even on a cable television show - is powerful.  Even in 1956, Horton & Wohl saw 
the potential for media to “present opportunities for the playing of roles to which the spectator 
has - or feels he has - a legitimate claim, but for which he finds no opportunity in his social 
environment,” describing this function of parasocial relationships as “compensatory, inasmuch as 
it provides the socially and psychologically isolated with a chance to enjoy the elixir of 
sociability” (222).  Their argument that personality programs are “peculiarly favorable to the 
formation of compensatory attachments by the socially isolated, the socially inept, the aged and 
invalid, the timid and rejected” is an apt way to describe the ways queer media can function as a 
compensatory lifeline for isolated queer folks, and helps to further elaborate RuPaul’s success as 
a self-styled mentor and Mother to queer communities, making himself “readily available as an 
object of love,” which Horton & Wohl claim as a central appeal of the successful persona (223). 
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 The incitement of the show’s contestants to craft lovable personas who can “create an 
illusion of intimacy” is not only woven into the show’s production strategy via the construction 
of authenticity by means of self-revelation and “behind the scenes” camaraderie, but also 
functions as one of the primary metrics by which RuPaul evaluates and judges the queens 
(Horton & Wohl, 217).  As I discussed in Chapter Three, RuPaul fashions his own authority by 
means of his knowledge of popular culture, but he also presents himself as an expert in the art of 
crafting the warm and lovable persona - demonstrating these techniques by example, and directly 
advising the contestants to follow suit.  Even the way he interacts with the contestants bears the 
hallmarks of the personality program, in which the persona is expected to “blur the line which 
divides him and his show, as a formal performance, from the audience both in the studio and at 
home,” a goal which can be achieved, according to Horton & Wohl, by “treat[ing] his supporting 
cast as a group of close intimates,” with cast members “addressed by their first names, or by 
special nicknames, to emphasize intimacy” (Horton & Wohl, 217).  Ru frequently deploys this 
very technique in establishing on-screen rapport with his contestants, crafting specific nicknames 
- season eleven contestant Silky Nutmeg Ganache has become “Dr. Ganache” after she told Ru 
she was pursuing a PhD - and recurring forms of joking address, like when he repeatedly asks 
season six contestant Jiggly Calliente, “May I call you Jiggly?”  These kinds of intimate appeals 
allow for the queens to “very quickly develop, or have imputed to them, stylized character traits” 
by which the viewer “accumulates an historical picture of ‘the kinds of people they really are,’” 
and thus begins “to believe that this fellowship includes him by extension” (217).   
This parasocial relationship is further developed as fans watch the show over multiple 
seasons, with accumulating call-backs, inside-jokes, and references to former contestants and 
past episodes deepening a sense of intimacy.  As Horton & Wohl describe this kind of 
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relationship with a media persona, the “continued association with [the persona] acquires a 
history, and the accumulation of shared past experiences gives additional meaning to the present 
performance,” with the parasocial bond “symbolized by allusions that lack meaning for the 
casual observer and appear occult to the outsider,” so that over time, “the devotee - the ‘fan’ - 
comes to believe that [s]he ‘knows’ the persona more intimately and profoundly than others do,” 
and that she “‘understands’ his character and appreciates his values and motives” (216).  By 
presenting himself as a kind and nurturing friend and mentor to the contestants, sharing his 
knowledge and self-love catch-phrases with them and with the viewer, Ru extends his persona-
brand as a warm, inviting, expert philosopher.  He typifies Horton & Wohl’s persona figure, who 
“may be considered by his audience as a friend, counselor, comforter, and model,” and who has 
an advantage over “real” associates in a viewer’s life, as “he has the peculiar virtue of being 
standardized according to the ‘formula’ for his character and performance which he and his 
managers have worked out and embodied in an appropriate ‘production format,’” providing him 
a “character and pattern of action [that] remain basically unchanged in a world of otherwise 
disturbing change” (217).  The audience is therefore invited to “benefit by his wisdom, reflect on 
his advice, sympathize with him in his difficulties, forgive his mistakes, [and] buy the products 
that he recommends” - a laundry list of activities that are all directly incited by RuPaul in the 
myriad media by which he has spread himself as a brand, from Lettin’ It All Hang Out to Drag 
Race today (Horton & Wohl, 219).  In describing the persona’s role as mentor and expert, 
Horton & Wohl even gesture toward the way television and radio can function as technologies of 
the self, arguing that “the function of the mass media, and of the programs we have been 
discussing, is also the exemplification of the patterns of conduct one needs to understand and 
cope with in others as well as of those patterns which one must apply to one’s self” (222).  While 
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RuPaul therefore exemplifies the media persona as described by these mid-century media 
scholars - and while he remains the center of the Drag Race universe - what is especially 
fascinating about the show’s embeddedness in the current cultural, economic, and technological 
conjuncture has been its ability to flexibly accommodate new forms of media production into a 
wide network of interrelated media using proliferating digital media platforms.  This is perhaps 
due, at least partially, to the fact that these 21st century forms of media production and 
distribution still rely - and maybe more than 20th century media did - on the techniques of 
creating the “illusion of intimacy” via discourses of authenticity and personas-as-brands in order 
to create parasocial bonds with audiences. 
 
The Parasocial Network 
From its very inception, Drag Race has extended itself beyond the parameters of 
traditional broadcast television.  The first season of the show was accompanied by a web series 
hosted on Logo’s website, Under the Hood of Rupaul’s Drag Race, which offered an edited 
compilation of scenes from the Drag Race green room, showing the contestants interacting 
“backstage” during the judges’ deliberations that we see in the broadcast series.  For the second 
season of Drag Race, Logo reformatted this “behind the scenes” series into RuPaul’s Drag 
Race: Untucked, which offered the same basic content - observing the queens while they 
“untuck” (their genitals) backstage during the judges’ deliberations - but moved the action to 
fully-furnished and brand-sponsored sets, the “Interior Illusions Lounge” and the “Absolut 
Vodka Gold Bar,” and began broadcasting this companion series on Logo itself, immediately 
following each episode of Drag Race.  While Under the Hood was an edited production that 
constructed brief narratives, condensing a few hours of footage to a twenty-minute webisode, the 
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retooled Untucked became a much more elaborately produced affair.  The basic logic and appeal 
remained, offering an “authentic” backstage glimpse at the simmering dramas between 
contestants who have just received critiques from the show’s judges, but the producers’ 
machinations became more heavy-handed and obvious than they appear on Drag Race proper - 
the contestants would be separated into two groups and shuffled between the two branded rooms, 
parlor games and drama-inciting prompts would appear from a “fuzzy pink box” in the middle of 
the room, and messages from contestants’ family and friends were played on television screens 
in the lounges, all in an effort to prompt drama and elicit emotional performance. 
During the seventh season of Drag Race in 2015, however, Untucked migrated to 
YouTube and underwent a major aesthetic overhaul, at the same time that Logo began to cross-
host another short-form web series - Whatcha Packin’, featuring RuPaul’s second-in-command 
judge Michelle Visage interviewing the week’s eliminated queen in their hotel room as they 
packed up their belongings and prepared to head home in 5-10 minute-long segments - on both 
YouTube and the Logo website.  Untucked’s backstage action was no longer confined to the 
crowded, branded lounges of the previous four seasons - which had been designed and decorated 
to resemble nightclub VIP lounges - but now unfolded in the actual backstage area of the 
soundstage where the runway sequences are filmed, minimally decorated so as to appear more 
authentic.  The camerawork, sound design, editing and pacing of Untucked were also overhauled 
to make the show more appear more conventionally like a fly-on-the-wall documentary, with 
handheld cinematography and long-distance observational shots peppered in among the more-
obviously-manipulated sequences that focus on interpersonal drama, conflict, and self-revelation.  
Though Untucked would migrate back to cable again in 2018 for season 10, airing on VH1 
immediately after Drag Race, its initial move to YouTube and simultaneous aesthetic overhaul 
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signal a key shift in the Drag Race enterprise’s strategies and methods for expanding its 
networks of production, locating YouTube as a crucial outlet in establishing relationships with 
younger audiences and building fan communities built on perceived and real interactions with its 
stable of drag queen stars. 
Two years before Logo migrated Untucked to YouTube, World of Wonder had already 
begun to offer short-form Drag Race-related content on the platform, beginning a modest 
supplemental video output which has evolved today into a suite of over a dozen web series 
featuring drag queen alumni from Drag Race, some of which are exclusively available to stream 
on World of Wonder’s app/over-the-top service, WOWPresents Plus, which can be accessed on 
mobile devices and digital media players like Apple TV and Roku.  In moving the behind-the-
scenes program Untucked to YouTube, Logo and World of Wonder clearly understood that this 
platform - along with Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and Snapchat - was the emerging dominant 
terrain on which the Drag Race queens were meant to labor.  World of Wonder had stumbled 
upon a hit YouTube web series with their first production featuring an alum of the show, 
Alyssa’s Secret, which showcased fan-favorite Alyssa Edwards directly addressing a camera, 
sitting in front of a green-screen in the basement of the World of Wonder executive office in Los 
Angeles.  With an ever-increasing stable of vibrant personalities with a variety of talents and fan-
bases fostered by their appearances on Drag Race at the ready, World of Wonder’s executives 
quickly began to expand their production, tapping into an expanding market for content that 
could be cheaply produced, and taking advantage of the omnipresent immaterial labor their drag 
queens were already performing in their cultivation of and interaction with active fan 
communities online. 
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YouTube is an industry unto itself which has been generating revenue for its shareholders 
and content producers for over a decade now, with its serious monetization beginning with “the 
acquisition of YouTube by Google in 2006,” and which now sees “more than 2.5 million 
YouTube creators globally receiving some level of remuneration from their uploaded content and 
more than 2000 YouTube professionalising-amateur channels with at least a million subscribers” 
(Cunningham, 72).  Quoting Burgess & Green (2013), Banet-Weiser calls YouTube a 
“particularly unstable object of study” that features the “double function as both a ‘top-down’ 
platform for the distribution of popular culture and a ‘bottom-up’ platform for vernacular 
creativity,” and she argues that this ambivalent “double-function” nature of the platform “offers 
an opportunity to think critically about how YouTube helps with the creation of the self-brand” 
(Banet-Weiser, 64).  In the massive amounts of social media interaction and amateur and 
professional (and in-between) media output from Drag Race alumni - especially in their use of 
YouTube - this “double-function” of the platform is pronounced, as queens partake in corporate 
commercial media and upload their own productions, with intermediaries like World of Wonder 
and the Viacom-owned Logo and VH1 hosting and promoting and producing this mixture of 
content on their YouTube channels.  But with YouTube, as with other media-hosting platforms 
like Instagram, Snapchat, and Facebook, the content itself is only part of the product being 
offered, as the combination of comments sections, user channels, and “community” forums on 
these platforms require the personalities seeking an audience to offer their selves - their attention, 
their comments, their feedback - in order to cultivate and maintain a lucrative fanbase, or fan 
“community.” 
This makes YouTube exemplary as a site for the production of immaterial goods.  As 
Banet-Weiser argues, “the product has not disappeared from this affective, experiential 
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landscape but has expanded to encompass a range of new phenomena that are characteristic of 
the contemporary US political economy [like] affect, emotion, [and] the self,” with the modern 
“digital economy” promoting and privileging “forms of labor that are not generally recognized as 
labor by a more conventional capitalist exchange system, such as affective relationships, 
emotion, and brand experiences.”  This labor relies on digital technologies and flexibility, and 
involves a “series of activities that are not normally recognized as ‘work’” such as those that are 
“involved in defining and fixing cultural and artistic standards, fashions, tastes, consumer norms, 
and more strategically, public opinion” (Banet-Weiser, 72).  For the queens of Drag Race, the 
production and maintenance of their self-brands is not isolated to their appearance on the show.  
Before ever arriving to the Hollywood studio for three-to-twelve weeks of filming the reality 
competition, many of the contestants have already spent years cultivating fan communities on 
Instagram and YouTube.  Season ten contestant Aquaria had begun fashioning herself into an 
Instagram drag personality from the age of fourteen, amassing over 200,000 Instagram followers 
before being announced as a cast member.  Season six’s Adore Delano was a popular YouTube 
vlogger before appearing on the show, using the platform to leverage and maintain her popularity 
after first competing - out of drag, using his given name of Danny Noriega - on American Idol 
when he was seventeen years old.   
The queens also work incessantly to maintain online interactions with fans from the 
moment each season’s cast is announced, offering constant output on every available platform 
before and during the broadcast of their actual television performance.  Some queens, like Katya 
from season seven and Monét X Change from season ten, produced weekly response videos 
while their seasons aired, uploading them to their own YouTube channels immediately after the 
airing of each week’s episode, offering their fans a personal account of their experience that 
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week and discussing the ways the show’s presentation of their efforts differed from what they 
recalled.  Katya’s videos, titled “RuGRETS,” were distinctly on-brand, as they functioned 
partially as satire and partially as philosophical treatises on the fallibility of memory, selfhood, 
and reality; as a drag queen known for her intelligence, sense of humor, and struggles with 
mental illness and drug addiction, her YouTube productions have consistently taken the piss out 
of the self-branding efforts expected of creative laborers, while simultaneously functioning as 
perfectly self-branded commodities.  In recent years, it has become a near-standard expectation 
that Drag Race contestants prepare music videos to release on the day the episode airs in which 
they get eliminated, capitalizing on the culmination of their televised story arc.  And nearly every 
queen continues producing their own media - in addition to collaborating with World of Wonder 
and other corporate and independent media production companies - and maintaining their 
presence and production on every available platform.  As new technologies emerge that allow for 
informal “direct address” interaction with fans - like Periscope and Instagram Live - the queens 
adapt and offer more and more access to their daily lives, micro-vlogging and responding to 
comments and tweeting and retweeting and commenting ad nauseum.   
This never-ending production of videos, photos, comments, and streams requires us to 
consider “the relationship of immaterial labor to self-branding,” which Banet-Weiser argues, 
citing Alison Hearn, involves “an understanding of the self as a kind of product, as flexible, 
fragmented, and saleable,” ultimately making the branded self “not simply a function and effect 
of economic structures but also a result of changing cultural outlooks” that ultimately “privilege 
individual entrepreneurialism” (Banet-Weiser, 72).  It is tempting to consider these 
“democratized” media platforms of our current era as technologies of the self, given that 
producing sellable selfhood in the form of commodified personalities is one of the central 
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practices offered by this new digital technology regime - even for those of us who are not 
aspiring entertainers or artists, who have to navigate social and work worlds that are intricately 
woven into digital, mobile media interaction.  But if the technologies of the self, in the 
Foucaultian sense of ancient practices by which we learn to care for and cultivate our selves, are 
primarily meant to be directed inward, this conception is at odds with the kind of self-work 
involved in the immaterial practices of self-branding.  As Banet-Weiser argues, “this self-work 
relies [...] on explaining oneself to the users - audiences, viewers, peers - who view and evaluate 
the self-brand, so that self-presentation is a dynamic between production and consumption, 
between the individual and the culture at large” (Banet-Weiser, 73).  This notion that selfhood 
itself is deeply intertwined in economic and technological networks of visibility and feedback 
and never-ending labor is echoed and reinforced by Angela McRobbie’s description of “the 
contemporary scene of creative economy,” in which an “entrepreneurial spirit is to become so 
enmeshed in everyday life that the lines between work and life will be dissolved.”  McRobbie 
argues that “the ethos of ‘passionate work’, which envelops the identity of the cultural 
entrepreneur” has become the governmental logic of our current conjuncture, in which “passion 
becomes a normative requirement, indeed a cliché, in the outlook and presentation of self,” 
leading to a “narrowing” of “the range of individual styles and modes of conduct that are deemed 
appropriate.”  Embodied and modeled in the form of the creative worker, the normative person is 
now expected to become “the cheerful, upbeat, passionate, entrepreneurial person who is 
constantly vigilant in regard to opportunities for projects or contracts,” and they “must display a 
persona that mobilizes the need to be at all times one’s own press and publicity agent” 
(McRobbie, 74). 
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In raising the specter of the “persona,” McRobbie’s arguments highlights the way this 
creative economy redeploys the techniques of fostering intimacy via parasocial relationships 
with one’s audience - though in the omnipresent immaterial labor of today’s creative workers, 
embodied spectacularly by the drag queen contestants of Drag Race, the “audience” has been 
reconfigured into “communities” of fans who expect some form of interaction to reiterate the 
reality of the parasocial relationships they form with the artists and personalities whose media 
they consume.  As Theresa M. Senft describes it, the immaterial labor of this creative economy 
“blends audiences and communities,” which were once distinct in the sense that “audiences 
desire someone to speak at them [while] communities desire someone to speak with them” 
(Senft, 350).  An enormous amount of scholarship from a wide variety of disciplines has 
attempted to articulate the ways musicians, vloggers, podcasters, and other figures who cultivate 
audience communities via digital media platforms are expected to offer intimate and “authentic” 
interactive content in order to maintain their popularity and commodify their cultural 
productions.  Nancy Baym quotes an MTV survey of music listeners between the ages of 15-29, 
which found that “artists are expected to be constantly accessible, especially on social media, 
offering unique and intimate moments to their fans” (Baym, 14).  She argues that this kind of 
audience-connecting labor is “expected, but it is rarely directly compensated,” instead considered 
as a sort of “investment toward building and maintaining an audience that will sustain a career,” 
which “exemplifies contemporary demands to engage in unpaid social labor to have any hope at 
professional success” (Baym, 14).  Her analysis resonates with McRobbie’s conception of the 
creative economy, arguing that “culture workers are seen as models for a future of fulfilled 
creative laborers and cities” who exemplify the “insecurity, informality, discontinuous 
employment, bearing of individual risk” of the new “precariat” (Baym, 15).   
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Baym also echoes scholarship that focuses on the parasocial nature of this immaterial and 
affective work performed by aspiring and professional entertainers, describing it as “relational 
labor,” meaning the “regular, ongoing communication with audiences over time to build social 
relationships that foster paid work” (Baym, 16).  But it is not only artists, vloggers, personalities 
and entertainers who perform this work; while they may exemplify and exhaust the demands of 
the current conjuncture, we are all potentially engaged in such relational labor so long as we use 
any sort of social media.  Marwick & boyd offer the term “micro-celebrity” to argue that “all 
individuals have an audience that they can strategically maintain through ongoing 
communication and interaction,” pointing to the way Twitter is used by “marketers, 
technologists, and individuals seeking wide attention” in order to “establish a presence online,” 
while “traditional celebrities and public officials embrace the techniques of micro-celebrity” to 
interact with their audiences and communities (Marwick & boyd 2010, 121).  While they also 
claim that interactions between celebrities and fans on Twitter “de-pathologizes the parasocial 
and recontextualizes it within a medium that the follower may use to talk to real-life 
acquaintances,” I argue that the occasional interaction between a popular online personality and 
one of their thousands or millions of fans in fact offers an insidious re-doubling of the parasocial 
illusion of intimacy, as it encourages the conception of a relationship and personal knowledge of 
one another that remains illusory (Marwick and boyd 2011, 148). 
Some scholars have noted the interconnections between the practices of new media 
production and the ever-evolving mode of reality television production, highlighting the common 
ways that both internet and reality personalities rely on the deployment of techniques for forming 
parasocial relationships - especially by evoking an illusion of intimacy and authenticity.  As a 
video-based platform with extensive infrastructure provided to users for cultivating and 
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monetizing legions of “subscribers,” YouTube has especially become a new site for the 
development and evolution of reality television’s mode of production, extending traditional 
broadcast media techniques for crafting personalities to a digital space where established media 
personalities can extend their brand, alongside self-fashioned “DIY” celebrities who are “native” 
to online arenas.  Jessica Johnston describes “DIY” celebrity as “the practice of Internet users 
becoming famous by personally broadcasting content on a media platform like YouTube,” citing 
the popular YouTubers Grace Helbig, Tyler Oakley, and Hannah Hart, who “have found success 
in creating personal and comedic videos that have garnered large online followings, accumulated 
high earnings from ad revenues, and in some cases, allowed them to obtain television, film, and 
book deals” (Johnston, 77).  Oakley is notable for parlaying his YouTube success into a wide 
variety of mainstream media ventures, including appearances on reality television.  He competed 
on The Amazing Race, and was one of six “social media influencers” who were given drag 
makeovers on Drag Race in the season ten episode “Social Media Kings Into Queens,” which 
also featured another popular YouTube personality, Kingsley, who had previously been 
employed by Logo to host an official Drag Race recap talk show, The Pit Stop, on YouTube.  
The popularity of this new class of celebrities is made evident not only in these sorts of 
mainstream media crossovers, but also in the emergence of “conventions offering fans the 
opportunity to physically interact with YouTube stars through autograph and panel sessions, and 
companies that specialize in managing YouTube channels,” with brand-new media industries 
coming into existence such as the “multi-channel networks” like Maker Studios, which was 
purchased by Disney, that “have arisen to offer YouTube producers assistance in areas such as 
product, programming, funding, cross-promotion, partner management, digital rights 
management, monetization/sales, and/or audience development” (Ferchaud, et al., 88).  YouTube 
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itself offers courses and training to its users who seek professionalization through the “YouTube 
Creator Academy,” with tutorials and boot camps and networking sessions geared toward 
disciplining “creators” in the ways of monetizing their video productions and creating content 
that can foster affective connections with fan “communities.” 
The intersections and convergences between digital social media and traditional 
broadcast reality television have not only allowed online personalities to cross over to television, 
either, but also provided established reality television personalities with techniques for extending 
their brands, as the commingling of platforms and self-branding strategies is not arranged in any 
sort of simple hierarchy.  As Berryman & Kavka argue in their analysis of Kim Kardashian’s 
widespread social media empire, social media fan cultivation combined with reality television 
production has offered Kardashian a hybrid platform for the “triangulation of celebrity, 
commodification and intimacy,” with the techniques of her approach “borrowed from the young 
YouTubers who are melding influence and intimacy into a new source of money and fame.”  
They claim that there is a “difference between the Kardashians and these YouTubers,” though, 
arguing that “the former are exploiting their celebrity to launch video channels, whereas the 
latter are using video channels to become celebrities” (Berryman & Kavka, 308).  The deep 
interconnection between broadcast reality television and online digital media production as 
exemplified by Drag Race shows that these are not two discrete avenues nor the only 
relationships made possible between celebrity and social media, as the circularity and circuitous 
movement of Drag Race queens from YouTube to television and back again – all while also 
engaging fans on every other popular social platform – demonstrate how non-linear and 
nonhierarchical the new media economy truly is. 
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In his work on new forms of audio-visual digital media, Stuart Cunningham attempts to 
discern between “the screen content delivered by global platforms such as YouTube, and 
increasingly Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat and Twitter,” which he refers to as “social media 
entertainment,” and traditional forms of “professional content.”  He describes “social media 
entertainment” as “an emerging proto-industry based on previously amateur creators 
professionalising and engaging in content innovation and media entrepreneurship across multiple 
social media platforms to aggregate global fan communities and incubate their own media 
brands,” distinguishing this kind of media from the “professional content distributed, and in 
some cases increasingly produced, by the major ‘Internet-distributed television’ portals [...] such 
as Hulu, Netflix, Amazon Video and Apple’s iTunes” (Cunningham, 71-2).  While he is certainly 
correct in his assessment that “social media platforms offer scale, technological affordance and 
[...] remuneration and up-skilling to previously amateur creators,” his firm distinction between 
YouTube and “Internet-distributed television portals” collapses the complexities of YouTube’s 
content, which comprises a mixture of professional, commercial, and amateur productions 
alongside personal and vernacular videos - not to mention unclassifiable and bizarre computer 
generated creations made by semi-autonomous AIs (Cunningham, 72).  Cunningham’s claim that 
“the modes of address of native-to-online [social media entertainment] content types” such as 
vlogging and makeup tutorials “differ sharply from established film and television” because of 
their “intrinsically interactive audience-centricity and appeals to authenticity and community in a 
commercialising space” ignores the recent history of reality television’s mode of production, 
which has made the confessional self-surveillance of vlogging and the expert-makeover genres - 
not to mention explicit forms of audienced-focused interaction, like American Idol’s voting or 
Biggest Loser’s play-along-at-home trackers and apps - part of the normative vernacular of 
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popular culture for nearly three decades.  Still, his assessment of the qualities that characterize 
“social media entertainment” is compelling, and his claim that much of it is “governed by quite 
strict norms that put the highest value on authenticity and community,” with the “governing 
‘rules of the game’” rapidly shaping and disciplining both content creators and their “commercial 
environment” brings together the traditional characteristics of the media “persona” with the 
governmental and disciplining logics of the creative economy’s demands on immaterial laborers 
(Cunningham, 72).  Berryman & Kavka see more continuity between traditional television and 
YouTube content, and specifically highlight the emphasis placed on intimacy in the relationship 
between YouTubers and their audiences, again evoking one of the key characteristics of Horton 
& Wohl’s persona.  They argue that “the celebrification of [...] vloggers is contingent upon 
viewers’ positive responses not only to video content, but even more so to the YouTubers’ ability 
to combine ‘natural’ self-promotion with digital technologies of intimacy,” and thus they offer a 
conceptualization of YouTube videos “as a logical extension of televisual ‘technologies of 
intimacy,’” which facilitate the “formation of affective relationships between audiences and the 
content – and, in this case, the individuals – they view on-screen” (Berryman & Kavka, 309).  
YouTube is certainly not the only modern platform that extends the techniques of creating 
parasocial relationships with audiences - in addition to the other popular online platforms like 
Snapchat, Instagram, and Facebook, the exploding market of podcast networks has brought the 
parasocial potential of radio to new digital media production as well - but is has certainly been 
the most consequential means by which Drag Race has been able to establish a massive 
parasocial network of content that draws a varied audience into the illusion of intimacy with its 
drag queen stars. 
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World of Wonder and the NeverEnding Gig 
In offering approachable, vulnerable, witty, colorful, multi-talented queer artists who are 
already well-versed and practiced in at least some of the arts of self-branding and social media 
audience curation, Drag Race has turned itself into a social-media-celebrity manufacturing 
industry, with World of Wonder, RuPaul, and Viacom monetizing the immaterial and affective 
labor of its drag queens to stoke ratings and extend their brands into every nook and cranny of 
the creative economy.  While World of Wonder is a much smaller company than the global 
behemoth Viacom that licenses its productions for distribution in the U.S., in its modest scale it 
has proven to be a flexible and cunning competitor in the shifting terrain of digital, mobile, 
streaming media production and distribution.  It continues to follow the conventional practices of 
the broadcast reality television mode of production - in addition to Drag Race, World of Wonder 
produces Bravo’s Million Dollar Listing franchise as well as the docuseries Big Freedia: Queen 
of Bounce, following the life and career of queer artist Big Freedia, and they have also liscensed 
“glocalized” versions of Drag Race to production companies in Chile and Thailand.  But the 
company has also seized on the opportunities provided by the digital media economy.  Unlike 
cable television networks, which must still cultivate and create audiences of affluent viewers to 
sell to advertisers, YouTube offers a model of monetizing content that is able to sell individual 
consumers in highly-individualized ways, with multiple brands flexibly underwriting the same 
videos for the different users who view them.  When World of Wonder entered the YouTube 
fray, they were also able to capitalize on the immense immaterial labor of its stable of Drag Race 
queens, for whom the gig never ends.  In order to ensure continued live engagements and new 
opportunities for media appearances, Drag Race cast members have to maintain their fan 
communities by interacting with them in digital and real-life spaces nearly every day, collapsing 
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their working and personal lives into a constant stream of plane rides, Instagram posts, Facebook 
Live streams, bus rides, studio productions, club appearances, and so on and so on.  By inviting 
these queens to their digital production studio - a modest green screen set-up located in the 
basement of their executive office in L.A. - World of Wonder is able to gather the disparate 
audiences that come along with each queen, selling their consumption to digital advertisers via 
YouTube’s monetization infrastructure. 
Though it has used YouTube extensively in establishing a wide library of short-form 
streaming content featuring its Drag Race alumni, World of Wonder has also parlayed their 
success on the platform into other media ventures, both traditional and novel.  While still 
offering much of their content on their YouTube channel - which despite a wide range of topics, 
from pop culture commentary to drag makeup and costuming tutorials, tends to follow slight 
modifications on the “standardised YouTuber/ vlog aesthetic,” characterized by the “now 
familiar rapid-fire speech, jumpy and stylised editing, ‘insider’ jokes, community shout-outs and 
collaborations” (Cunningham, 79) - World of Wonder has formed its own subscription streaming 
service, WOW Presents Plus, featuring exclusive content which users must pay a monthly fee in 
order to access via web browser or digital media player.  This “over the top” service also hosts 
some of World of Wonder’s film and television productions from their 30 year history, as well as 
offering new episodes of Drag Race and Untucked for viewers outside of the U.S. and other 
countries where television networks have purchased distributions rights.  The combination of 
WOW Presents Plus and their continued use of YouTube allows World of Wonder to doubly 
monetize the same content - generating ad revenue on YouTube while luring subscribers who 
choose to get behind the paywall.  While this novel venture has seen the production company 
essentially forming their own “channel” and offering a gay niche - an analog, perhaps, to a gay 
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cable channel like Logo, but for the streaming-platform era - World of Wonder has also used 
their YouTube productions as a pilot incubator for creating more standard television fare for 
cable networks and other streaming platforms.  Their two most popular YouTube web series - 
Alyssa’s Secret and UNHhhh - were spun off respectively into Dancing Queen, which was 
purchased and distributed by Netflix, and The Trixie & Katya Show, which aired for a single 
season on Viceland, the relatively-recently established cable extension of the expanding Vice 
Media brand.  Both web series were similar in their execution: drag queens sitting in front of a 
green screen, directly addressing the camera in an inviting and intimate way while riffing losely 
on prompted topics, with the results edited into snappy rhythms and embellished with graphic-
design-based visual gags and sound effects.  UNHhhh features a duo of fan-favorite weirdo 
queens who both appeared on season seven of Drag Race, whose chemistry and banter on 
weekly themed topics ventures into intellectual and artistic and sophomoric realms all at once. 
The cable television adaptation of UNHhhh would turn out to be an ill-fated endeavor.  
The Trixie & Katya Show attempted to repurpose the same basic format of the web series - of 
which a standard episode runs ten-to-twelve minutes - into a more formalized, half-hour 
television show, which proved an uneasy combination of aesthetics and rhythms.  But beyond the 
disruption of the pleasures of UNHhhh itself, the stresses of the production of the television show 
contributed to the personal and mental breakdown of Katya, whose appeal as an entertainer has 
come partially from her openness about her lifelong struggles with drug addiction and mental 
health.  She has since recovered - and created one of the most substantive and interesting 
productions of any Drag Race alum in the podcast Whimsically Volatile, which is supported by 
both advertisements and Patreon patrons - but the cable show did not.  But proving the flexibility 
of selves and media productions in the digital creative economy, UNHhhh has resumed 
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production and returned to YouTube, as if its cable-adaptation experiment had never even 
occurred. 
In Dancing Queen, World of Wonder concocted a much more conventional reality 
program - which also perfectly embodies the “personality program” tradition as defined by 
Horton & Wohl, and which champions and normalizes the entrepreneurial self demanded of the 
creative economy that spawned it - and while Netflix has yet to announce whether it will order a 
second season of the show, there is little doubt that its star, Alyssa Edwards, will continue to 
labor endlessly to find her next gig, and the next.  After first appearing on Season 5 of Drag 
Race - and despite the fact that she placed 6th, fairly far from the top in the competition - Alyssa 
became a GIF sensation and meme-queen among the Drag Race fandom.  Her uniquely gawky 
overbite and her sincere combination of naive and fierce affective responses to many situations 
made for a library of indelible, expressive images.   
 
Figure 2 
Her popularity online led World of Wonder to hire Alyssa to make their very first drag queen-
focused YouTube series, Alyssa’s Secret, tapping into the daffy pleasures of letting Alyssa sit 
alone and riff in front of a stationary camera.  This led to her participating in the second season 
of Drag Race All Stars - a spinoff series - before working with World of Wonder to develop and 
sell Dancing Queen to Netflix.  Dancing Queen, which debuted on Netflix in October 2018, is a 
docu-style reality show that follows Alyssa out of drag - as Justin - running a dance studio in his 
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hometown of Mesquite, TX, travelling with two dance squads to competitions, performing in 
drag as Alyssa, and living a social life amongst friends and family.  When Alyssa appeared on 
RuPaul’s podcast, What’s the Tee, to promote Dancing Queen, she perfectly articulated the way 
this show embodies the entrepreneurial and self-branding logics of RuPaul’s drag empire - 
highlighting the parasocial demands for intimacy and authenticity via self-disclosure - and 
demonstrated why Ru and his World of Wonder cohort have chosen Alyssa as one of his 
anointed successors.   
Alyssa tells Ru that on Dancing Queen, the audience will see that “underneath all of this 
[drag] is an entrepreneur, is a man that’s had to work extremely hard to get to where I am today 
[...] Dancing Queen is a triumphant story.”  When Ru asks her “why do you think people love 
you?” Alyssa answers, “I am myself, and unapologetically - I think that I’m relatable.”  Ru 
insists that she’s also beloved because she’s “a character,” and “[has] to know that about 
[herself],” giving Alyssa the opportunity to elaborate on the way that watching herself on Drag 
Race helped her - as a televisual technology of the self - to transform herself into a self-loving 
entrepreneurial persona: 
“When I went on TV [...] I was being myself - I did not know, I had no idea [what others’ 
saw] but I think, after watching me on Drag Race, and being able to look in the mirror 
and love the reflection that I seen, which took a lot of years to do, Ru, I’ve just embraced 
who I am, you know?” (What’s the Tee, Ep. 173) 
 
Her ability to know and to embrace the “authentic” version of herself, and to thus learn how to 
perform this authenticity for her fans, was only accessible through the experience of watching a 
produced, edited version of this self on television.  She tells Ru a piece of advice she gives to her 
dance students: “It’s better to be a first-rate version of yourself than a second-rate version of 
someone else, so be authentic.”  But in explaining how she was only able to access her own 
authenticity by seeing herself being seen by others, Alyssa reveals the pernicious logic of our age 
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in which we all live for our audiences, even if they are only our friends or coworkers.  As Banet-
Weiser argues, the modern reliance on attention in the form of “feedback [is] a normative 
mechanism in the creation (intentional or not) of a self-brand,” elaborating that if “self-branding 
is part of a ‘project of the self,’ then the conceptual crux of this project is feedback.”  Whether in 
the form of social media likes or fanmail or comments under your YouTube upload or data from 
your marketing firm, feedback “reproduces normative identities and relations,” because the logic 
of self-branding “only works if you enable other people to rank your product, which in this case 
is yourself.”  By embedding our very selves in “a layered process of judging, assessment, and 
valuation taking place in a media economy of visibility,” we risk living only by and for the 
approval of others, reducing our selves to the most marketable, desirable, accessible facsimile of 
our actual experienced, complicated reality (Banet-Weiser, 87).  While the widespread 
distribution of queer artists’ work in the form of Drag Race’s many spinoffs and interrelated 
media productions provides more visibility and attention to queer culture than it has ever 
received from a globally dispersed audience, it also has required these queer artists to endlessly 
labor and reduce their selves and personas to normatively acceptable forms.  As RuPaul told an 
interviewer in 2014, Drag Race aspires “to take sex out of the equation completely,” because 
“people are inherently threatened by sexuality,” so the show “emphasize[s] color, texture and 
showmanship[, and] the contestants are presented almost like caricatures, or Disney characters” 
(Weiss).  Which begs the question: is queer art without queer sex really queer at all? 
 
Next time on… This Dissertation 
 In the final chapter of this dissertation, I will seek to explain how Drag Race attempts to 
attach itself to a legacy of queer culture, most especially in its frequent evocation of Paris Is 
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Burning, asking how its combination of evaluation, competition and kinship commodifies and 
de-eroticizes the history of the Harlem ball scene.  Who are its judges and what is the criteria by 
which it evaluates and judges the performances of its drag queen competitors, and what is the 
purpose of such evaluation compared to kind made infamous by Paris Is Burning? And how 
does its explicit evocation of queer families, houses, legacies - embodied in the ball scene in the 
Mothers and legendary children of the House of Xtravaganza and House of LaBeija - play out in 
the a reality television context that focuses explicitly on the extension of self-branding and 
commercial success? 
I will also attend to the question of the value and importance of visibility and 
“representation” of queer people and people of color; while Drag Race offers an unprecedented 
platform for showcasing the lives and art of queers of color, I will explore how the literature of 
queer of color critique can help to theorize the ambivalence and depoliticization of its 
commercial appropriation and commoditization of queer and black aesthetic and vernacular 
expression.  Drag Race feigns at providing insight into the history of gay culture, and gives lip 
service to the idea of worshipping goddesses, women, and divas, but in its articulation to 
nationalist rhetorics, the U.S. military, centrist political personalities like Nancy Pelosi, and 
narrow focus on Ru's personal pop cultural obsessions, who does it leave out? 
As a conclusion, I will contrast the brand-focused aesthetics of existence of Drag Race - 
trapped, aesthetically, in a shallow depth of field confined to a few studio sets and relatively 
static camerawork - with the fictional-factual hybrid drama Pose, which truly lives the fantasy 
promised by the world of Paris Is Burning while also grounding itself in some of that world's 
realities. I will also argue for the efficacy of drama and poetry, of actors and writers creating 
spaces in which we can live and empathize and contemplate, and praise Pose’s dynamic 
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cinematography and editing that are deployed to resurrect and explore the real-life spaces where 
trans women of color fashioned themselves, lived their lives, and birthed the culture that Drag 
Race has appropriated for its reality television production.  Pose revisits and reimagines the most 
difficult period of modern queer history, setting its vibrant hopeful drama in the midst of the 
HIV/AIDS crisis and telling stories about the trans women and gay men of color who have been 
overlooked and ignored in other popular culture narratives about this pivotal era.  In short, I will 
argue that Pose provides the possibility of a queer aesthetics of existence that lives not for the 
fan or the audience, for the lucrative YouTube “community,” but for a legacy of compassion and 
kinship and political solidarity among queer people organized around self-fashioning - a true 
resistance that can imagine the self and the world anew. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MOTHERS, SISTERS, & LEGENDARY CHILDREN: TELEVISION 
AS SITE OF QUEER KINSHIP, COMMUNITY, & HISTORICAL ARCHIVE 
 
“Come on now, it is a known fact that a woman do carry an evening bag at dinner time.” 
- Junior LeBejia, Paris Is Burning (1990) 
 
“It is a known fact that a lady do carry a bag to dinner.” 
- Bob the Drag Queen, RuPaul’s Drag Race (Season 8, Episode 1, 2016) 
 
“It’s a known fact that an evening bag is due to a lady carrying it -- is that how it goes?” 
- Scarlet Envy, RuPaul’s Drag Race (Season 11, Episode 1, 2019) 
 
 
Previously on … This Dissertation 
 In Chapter Four, I argued that RuPaul’s Drag Race exemplifies the changing media 
landscape in the era of the creative economy, operating as a site of convergence between reality 
television’s mode of production and social, digital media.  Highlighting the fact that RuPaul’s 
20th century strategies for crafting a warm and inviting television persona have been widely 
proliferated as tactics for securing parasocial relationships with audiences by YouTubers and 
other self-fashioned social media celebrities and “influencers,” I argued that the illusion of 
intimacy, the performance of authenticity, and the promise of interactivity were central means by 
which the Drag Race media enterprise creates “communities” of consumers and commodifies a 
simulation of queer kinship.  I discussed the way Drag Race contestants epitomize the worker of 
the digital, creative economy of our era, as their participation in the production of the television 
show represents only one high-profile gig in a career that demands nearly never-ending 
immaterial and affective labor in order to cultivate and maintain an “audience” or “community” 
of fans to whom they can sell tickets, merchandise, and digital media.  I argued that the blurring 
of work and life - which for drag queens includes the blurring of drag persona and “real” self - 
and the labor inherent to existing in a social and commercial world networked by digital media 
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requires not only creative workers, but nearly all of us who work, to be constantly cheerful and 
“on,” promoting ourselves in order to secure gigs and find new opportunities in a precarious, 
pernicious economy built on inequality and wealth extraction by an ever-narrowing minority of 
billionaires.   
 Additionally, I described the way that World of Wonder has tapped into and exploited the 
immaterial and affective labor of Drag Race queens not only to increase ratings and tweak the 
dramatic narratives of the show itself, but also to cheaply produce digital media to distribute via 
YouTube and their own “over the top” streaming service, WOW Presents Plus.  By evolving the 
production strategies of their Drag Race “behind the scenes” spinoff Untucked and 
experimenting with short-form video content featuring popular contestants from the show, World 
of Wonder has built a small empire of digital content that taps into the monetization strategies 
built into YouTube’s platform, aggregating unique “audiences” of individual viewers whose 
attention and data can be sold, individually, to diverse advertisers - while also simultaneously 
luring them behind the paywall of their subscription streaming service.  I concluded Chapter 
Four by chronicling the way World of Wonder has also spun their short-form digital video 
content back into traditional television formats, in The Trixie & Katya Show and Dancing Queen, 
starring Alyssa Edwards.  I argued that Alyssa and her show embody the self-branding 
entrepreneurial logics and legacy of RuPaul’s empire, chosen by Ru and his co-producers at 
World of Wonder for continued collaborations due to her performance of an “authentic” and 
“warm” version of herself on camera, and her outspoken articulation of a work ethic built around 
the belief in a meritocratic hard-won version of success in the entertainment industry. 
The bulk of this dissertation has concerned my attempt to situate Drag Race in a larger 
economic, technological, and cultural context, in order to emphasize the ways that it exemplifies 
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and reflects the changes in modes of production and the convergence of traditional and digital 
media economies that characterize our era of catastrophic capitalism.  Along the way, I have also 
asked how the self-fashioning technologies of drag - proliferated by the technologies of 
television and digital social media - might be thought of as “technologies of the self” and 
embrace the possibilities of an “aesthetics of existence” as defined by Foucault, arguing that the 
audience-focused crafting of drag personas fostered by Drag Race might not resemble the 
ancient practices examined by Foucault, as they have less to do with an ethical concern with 
freedom and more to do with the disciplinary, governmental logics of commodification and 
branding.  Throughout the three chapters in which I explored the commercial brand cultures of 
RuPaul’s career and Drag Race’s network of enterprises, I have only occasionally taken up 
questions of the show’s relationship to (and mainstream commodification of) queer culture, 
history, and the political possibilities of queer identity practices and kinship formations.  In this 
final chapter, I will finally take on the queer cultural legacy of Drag Race, by examining its 
explicit references to Paris Is Burning, questioning its selective inclusion of trans* contestants 
and discourses, and contrasting it with the historical-fictional television drama Pose, which 
offers a markedly different approach to canonizing Paris Is Burning and a vision of queer 
kinship - organized around multifaceted gender performance - which might offer an aesthetics of 
existence that more fully embodies Foucault’s conception of a radical political and ethical 
relationship of self to self, and self to others.   
 
Category Is: Competition & Kinship 
 While Drag Race emerged at a moment in the progression of reality television’s mode of 
production that had merged the talent competition format of shows like American Idol with the 
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labor of the culture industries and creative economy, and while its formal composition in many 
ways cribs from the structure and pacing of Project Runway and America’s Next Top Model - 
with a combination of “Werk Room” scenes and “maxi challenges” leading to a ritualized 
elimination - the lineages of drag performance have involved evaluation, competition, and 
crownings for decades.  As Niall Brennan argues, “we must consider [Drag Race’s] competition 
in the historical context of drag culture [...] and in anticipation of reality television,” as the 
traditions that inform drag and provide its lexicon of verbal, visual and vernacular expression 
were organized around competitive rituals well before the advent of reality television (Brennan, 
34).  In pageants like Miss Continental or Miss All-America Camp Beauty Contest - which was 
documented in 1968’s groundbreaking documentary The Queen, a film that has has received 
much less scholarly and popular attention than Paris Is Burning, despite following Crystal 
LaBeija, drag mother of Paris’s Pepper LaBeija, and being referenced by young Drag Race 
contestants like Aja, who have been able to screen low-fidelity uploads of the film via YouTube 
- as well as in the ball culture immortalized in Paris Is Burning, drag and other forms of trans* 
gender performance have long provided queer subcultures with fodder for contest and 
competition.  Even in the gay bar tradition of drag performance chronicled in Esther Newton’s 
Mother Camp, away from the formalized fight for crowns and titles, “cut-throat motives of gain 
and competition were allowed free play and even encouraged in a very loosely structured 
situation whose only certainties were uncertainties” (Newton, 115).  Sisterhood and queer 
kinships built upon drag houses - with lineages and legacies passed from mothers to daughters, 
and survival amongst marginalized queers of color depending upon affection and familial 
belonging - have always resided alongside celebratory and competitive contests and conflicts that 
ritualize and reify the glory and glamor of gender-as-performance.  How could there be queens 
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without structures for establishing and challenging sovereignty and rule?  And much like the 
ancient kings with which Foucault concerned himself, who were obligated to act morally because 
they were the king, the queen lives a form of the beautiful life that is “both aesthetic and 
political, which were directly linked” in the ancient world because the sovereign had to “have a 
kind of glory which will survive [him], and this glory cannot be dissociated from aesthetic 
value,” and thus “political power, glory, immortality, and beauty are all linked at a certain 
moment” (Genealogy of Ethics 264-5).  For the houses of the legendary ball children chronicled 
in Paris Is Burning and fictionally reimagined in Pose, glory and immortal beauty - forged and 
honed in friendly battle on the ball floor - are central to a form of sovereign queer being that was 
historically pushed out of the economic and political spaces of U.S. culture, and violently policed 
by armed agents of the state and normative masculine aggression. 
 Thus it is not inherently abhorrent or irreverent for Drag Race to commodify queer art 
and identity practices in the form of a competition for a crown; much of the show’s language and 
logics - and many of RuPaul’s repeated turns of phrase - are in fact lifted directly from Paris Is 
Burning and the ball culture it fashioned into a surprisingly commercially successful 
documentary in 1990.  As Anna Antonia Ferrante argues, “Paris Is Burning is not simply an 
inspiration for the reality show, it is a repository of expressions to borrow from and transform in 
order to carry drag culture’s originating traditions out of counter-culture and into popular 
culture,” but while she asserts that “many of those expressions would have been lost if [Drag 
Race] had not adapted the setting of those traditions - the ballroom - to the television studio,” it 
is not obvious or necessary, given Paris’s continued relevance and popularity as a streaming title 
on Netflix and as the inspiration for the FX drama Pose, that Drag Race has the sole claim to 
continuing its legacy, nor that Drag Race in fact honors or properly pays its inspiration its dues 
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(Ferrante, 155).  By more closely analyzing the logics of competition and visions of queer 
kinship offered by Drag Race and the ball culture of Paris Is Burning, I argue that Drag Race 
displaces the critical racial and economic discourses that animate the lives and resistances of 
Paris’s subjects, and appropriates the language and culture of black and latina trans women in a 
competition that prioritizes white and wealthy cisgender gay men while marginalizing and 
denigrating the participation of its trans contestants.  The contradictions and ambivalences and 
inconsistencies in Ru’s rules of the game - the evaluative logics of Drag Race - also expose the 
ill-fitting parts that comprise the bricolage of Ru’s philosophy by which he deigns himself 
authority and sovereign of drag and self-help expertise, which function as a synecdoche for the 
confusions and precarious conditions of catastrophic capitalism itself.  
 This dissertation has been formed around Foucault’s late writing on the technologies of 
the self in part because his interest in ancient regimes of the care of the self was an explicit 
answer to the political projects of gay liberation that were gaining visibility in Western Europe 
and the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s.  By historicizing the practices of freedom, Foucault 
challenged any project of liberation to consider what kind of ethical relationship one might form 
with themselves and others if they were to liberate themselves from the repressive or oppressive 
disciplinary regimes that we internalize about how we are to understand and use our bodies for 
pleasure, and how we are to relate to one another in relationships imbued with dynamics of 
power.  He asked, “does the expression ‘let us liberate our sexuality’ have a meaning?” and 
claimed that “the problem [was] rather to try to decide the practices of freedom through which 
we could determine what is sexual pleasure and what are our erotic, loving, passionate 
relationships with others,” arguing that the “ethical problem of the definition of practices of 
freedom” was a more important concern than the “repititious” affirmation “that sexuality or 
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desire must be set free” (Practice of Freedom 114).  Ultimately, the technologies of the self, the 
care of the self, and the aesthetics of existence were a means by which Foucault sought 
possibilities in historical practices for taking charge of disciplinary power - in the arts (technes) 
of ascetics-as-practical-exercise, or askēsis - to forge ourselves as new kinds of ethical subjects.  
If modernity saw the spread of sovereign power to a network of institutions that created new 
means of creating, storing, and circulating knowledges about the world and the self in rational 
disciplines, it created a form of “political thought of the nineteenth century [in which] the 
political subject [was] thought essentially as subject to law, either in naturalist terms or in terms 
of positive law,” which removed, for Foucault, the possibility of an “ethical subject” having “a 
place in contemporary political thought” (Practice of Freedom 125).   
But by returning to ancient regimes of technologies of the self, Foucault was indicating 
how the distribution of disciplinary knowledges also created the opportunity for a resurrection of 
an ethical practice of self-formation that might allow us to take charge of ascetic arts and 
exercises to fashion new kinds of subjectivity and networks of relationships by which we could 
ethically wield power and influence in the name of beauty and pleasure.  Queer counterculture 
has held the promise of offering an ethics that resemble those of ancient Greeks, for whom the 
“ethical substance” was the aphrodisia, “which are at the same time acts, desire, and pleasure.”  
Offering a “mode of subjectivation” that asserted that we should “build our existence as a 
beautiful existence” - an “aesthetic mode” in which “nobody is obliged” to act a certain way - 
these Greek regimes model a means by which we can choose “to have a beautiful existence, if 
[we] want to have a good reputation, if [we] want to be able to rule others.”  They “accept[ed] 
those obligations in a conscious way for the beauty or glory of existence” as “a personal choice” 
that is both aesthetic and political (Genealogy of Ethics 266).  Drag, as it has historically been 
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practiced, has offered the possibility of doing this kind of work, reconfiguring the disciplinary 
and normative regimes of gender - and its deployment by commercial and political governmental 
logics that place racialized gender performance in powerful contexts, shaping the social world to 
privilege white masculinity in an unequal distribution of influence and value - to allow queer 
culture to craft new communities in which marginalized people can survive, take care of 
themselves and each other, and challenge institutions that use violent and lethal means to oppress 
the expression of queer erotics, kinships, and identities.   
Drag historically has been performed in order to wield personal power - for the ball 
children of Paris Is Burning, it provided a disciplinary and competitive means by which one 
could be pushed to create the most glamorous fantasy vision of who they wanted to be; for 
radical queer activism and everyday gay bar counterculture, it provided a means by which to 
visibly and outlandishly transgress normative regimes of gender in order to upset the social 
scaffolding of power afforded to masculinity.  As Muñoz argues, drag offers “modalities of 
performing the self, disidentification and passing” which are also “often strategies of survival” 
that also allow for “subjects [to] fully come into subjectivity in ways that are both ennobling and 
fierce” (1997, 92).  But Drag Race’s evaluative logics and ambivalent rules of competition are 
concerned primarily with shaping contestants who can hone their performative selves to gain 
fans and admiration via the promise of parasocial affection, an outward-focused crafting of a 
persona and brand by which one can successfully commodify their queer sexual and gender 
identities.  The technologies of the self were an answer to queer politics of liberation that 
Foucault felt lacked an ethical consideration of how to practice one's freedom - but for the 
liberated queers of Drag Race, what precisely are the ethics of their relationship to themselves 
and to one another, and to the queer communities that celebrate and consume their productions?  
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The ethics of drag on Drag Race are not about fashioning community and kinship for survival, 
and they are not concerned with transgressing or upsetting catastrophic capitalism; ultimately, 
the show presents drag as a means to assimilate queer life more fully into commodity culture by 
embodying the labor practices of an exploitative creative economy that allows for the extraction 
of wealth, in the form of commodified personal expression and counterculture, and contributes to 
its continued concentration in the careless hands of a toxically masculine global elite. 
Before detailing the interconnections and contradictions between the competitive and 
evaluative logics of Drag Race and the balls of Paris Is Burning, I think it is important to 
describe just how much of Drag Race’s library of expressions has been cribbed from the 
legendary children of the 1990 documentary - especially given the film’s formal framing as a 
lexicon of the ball world’s language and vernacular, and given that scholarly conversations 
around the film have asked questions about its relationship to authorship and authority.  As I 
noted in Chapter Three, RuPaul’s career-launching hit song “Supermodel (You Better Work)” 
pivots around the refrain of “Shantay, shantay,” which was repurposed into Drag Race’s 
signature lines, delivered to the winner and loser of each episode’s Lip Sync For Your Life: 
“shantay, you stay” and “sashay away.”  This refrain was taken from Paris Is Burning, in which 
Paris Dupree rhythmically chants “shantay” while encouraging one of the legendary children 
walking the ball, and even the phrase “you better work” is an expression yelled at ball walkers by 
the interactive crowd of shouting onlookers.  While Ru does tuck a near-citation into Lettin’ It 
All Hang Out - in a list of “RuPaul’s Favorite Drag Queen Movies” he places Paris at #2, with 
the brief description “The film that inspired ‘Supermodel (You Better Work)’” - it represents just 
one of many elements that are central to Ru’s brand that he has lifted without acknowledgement 
from the film, and the fact that this refrain helped build his career and is still uttered in every 
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episode of Drag Race demonstrates just how stable his “sampled” brand messaging has remained 
for nearly three decades, and how much it leans upon the world of the ball children that he never 
participated in himself.  Every episode of Drag Race features a runway presentation from its 
contestants, introduced with Ru voice-over announcing “Category Is: [the theme for the 
runway],” an expression and ritual taken from Paris’s ball world.  Specific phrases are lifted out 
of the context of the movie and deployed at random in Drag Race, like Ru’s ritualized 
introduction of former judge (and Project Runway alumnus) Santino Rice - “shake the dice and 
steal the rice” - or his frequent use of the phrase “my between me down there” to coyly refer to 
genitalia.  This latter phrase feels especially discordant as a stolen expression redeployed cutely 
in a commercial television context, given that it originates in Paris as the way that Venus 
Xtravaganza describes her private relationship with her own body and identity, and that Venus 
was murdered before the completion of the film in a likely transphobic attack by a man who 
picked her up as an escort.  Drag Race also features a “Reading” challenge each season, in which 
the contestants attempt to “read” and “throw shade” at each other in a pale imitation of the 
vibrant loving-insult practice showcased in Paris; while Ru began citing Paris Is Burning in his 
introductions to this challenge starting in Season 4 of Drag Race, the show has never offered any 
information or context about the film to its viewers beyond saying that this challenge is “in the 
grand tradition of Paris Is Burning.”  So many pieces of Drag Race’s general lexicon come from 
the world of the balls that it is nearly impossible to account for all of them; “work,” “fierce,” 
“gagging,” “shade,” and “kiki” are thrown around as a second language, incorporated into drag 
culture at large that the show taps into.  I chose to begin this chapter with a triptych epigraph that 
captures the quintessence of Drag Race’s relationship with its main source of inspiration, with 
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queens on the show attempting and failing to quote lines from the film in a progressively 
devolving fashion as time marches on. 
 
Realness, Ru-Appropriated 
Perhaps the most important and egregious cooptation of the language of the ball children 
is in Ru’s boosting of “realness” - not only as a frequent casual reference in the show, but also in 
the titular song for his album Realness, released in tandem with and woven into the eighth season 
of Drag Race.  In Ru’s pop dance song, “realness” provides a threadbare backbone for a repeated 
refrain of “what you feel is real, feelings aren’t real, put your money down, place your bet and 
spin the wheel,” giving a perfect glimpse into the strange combination of faux-zen spiritual 
truisms, pop psychology, and materialism that comprises his self-love philosophies.  But in the 
world of the ball children, realness is a complex and complicated discourse, offering an 
evaluative logic for ball competitions that also functions as a means of personal identification 
and survival strategy.  In Paris Is Burning, extraordinary drag queen Dorian Corey offers her 
take on realness: “To be able to blend, that’s what realness is. If you pass the untrained eye - or 
even the trained eye - and not give away the fact that you’re gay, that’s when it’s realness [...] 
It’s not a take-off or a satire. No. It’s actually being able to be it. It’s really a case of going back 
into the closet.”  Lucas Hilderbrand historicizes the interplay of gender and identity in drag 
realness, arguing that “historically, ‘realness’ - more commonly known as ‘passing’ - and the 
incredulity it provoked were central to drag performers’ appeal for audiences who marveled at 
men who seemed shockingly like real women,” citing the fact that “cross-dressing” was so 
central to drag in some contexts “that adherence to original biological sex was enforced for some 
drag performers,” with New York’s 82 Club, in the 1960s, “fir[ing] Harlem-based black 
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performer Angie Stardust for taking female hormones because the management didn’t want 
actual women performing,” insisting that drag required “the wonder of men performing” as 
women.  He provides this anecdote in the context of describing realness as it functions in the 
world of the ball children, though, and describes how it has evolved as a personal and 
performative practice, given that “a spectrum of gender-identifying participants compete in 
balls” (Hilderbrand, 49).   
The logics of “naturalized” and normative gender performance are not straightforward in 
the plethora of “realness” categories documented in the ball competitions in Paris.  While plenty 
of categories demand and reward a performance of normative femininity - Hilderbrand cites “the 
recurrence of High Fashion and similar categories [which] may appear to skew toward social 
roles that are out of reach” for the ball walkers - others like Butch Queen First Time in Drags at a 
Ball and Bangee Boy/Girl Realness offer a more complex relationship to reality, perception, 
aspiration, and the ways clothing and bodily comportment communicate and reflect our 
experiences of our selves as they are embedded in commercial, social worlds.  As Hilderbrand 
argues, the Butch Queen and Banjee categories do not “emulate (arguably white-coded) 
privilege,” but instead “winkingly reflect upon black and Latino cultures” and offer an image of 
“an intentional failure to pass” as a “real” woman, thus “send[ing] up the entire proceedings,” 
suggesting that the balls have a keen “sense of self-awareness and humor” and “provid[ing] a 
crucial interruption to the focus on the constructed naturalism of ‘realness’ in the other 
categories” (Hilderbrand, 51-2).  These categories also offer a parallel to some of the 
disidentificatory performances of Dr. Vaginal Creme Davis described by José Esteban Muñoz, 
such as her “militiaman” character Clarence, a "disidentification [that] works as an interiorized 
passing,” or a “tactical misrecognition of self” in which “aspects of the self that are toxic to the 
 200 
militiaman - blackness, gayness, and transvestism - are grafted on this particularly militaristic 
script of masculinity” (1997, 90).  The intersections of race, class, and gender - and the 
performative nature that undergirds the hard social realities that are visited upon classed, 
racialized bodies - are articulated and parodied by some of the ball categories.  Hilderbrand 
points to the way that “the Bangee categories skewer the stereotypes that correlate youth of color 
with criminality and drug addiction” and thus create “counterpoints to categories that emulate 
privilege, thus undoing any simplistic understanding of ‘realness’ as aspirational” (Hilderbrand, 
54-55). 
For some trans individuals today, “realness” continues to be a touchstone and discourse 
by which identities are negotiated and communicated to heteronormative cisgender culture.  
Janet Mock - a trailblazing trans woman and multimedia personality who is one of the producers, 
writers, and directors of Pose - wrote a memoir titled Redefining Realness, in which she 
describes how she was complimented as a teenager for “looking fish,” explaining that “to be fish 
meant I could ‘pass’ as any other girl, specifically a cis woman, mirroring the concept of 
‘realness,’ which was a major theme in Paris Is Burning.”  She refers to Dorian Corey’s 
definition of realness from Paris quoted above, describing Corey as “the sage of the film, 
offering some of the most astute social commentary on the lived experiences of low-income 
LGBT people of color,” and offers a similar definition of her own: “simply, ‘realness’ is the 
ability to be seen as heteronormative, to assimilate, to not be read as other or deviate from the 
norm [...] ‘realness’ means you are extraordinary in your embodiment of what society deems 
normative” (Mock, 116).  Mock emphasizes that realness is not only a competitive criteria and 
evaluative logic for the ball, arguing that “to embody ‘realness,’ rather than performing and 
competing ‘realness,’ enables trans women to enter spaces with a lower risk of being rebutted or 
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questioned, policed or attacked,” and thus ultimately serves as “a pathway to survival” (Mock, 
116).  Hilderbrand echoes Mock’s insistence on the material stakes at play in the everyday 
negotiation of realness, arguing that “realness is not theoretical for the ball children,” but is in 
fact “about creating the identities and spaces they need to live.”  Quoting one of Junior Labeija’s 
voice-over monologues from Paris, in which he explains that “when you’re gay, you monitor 
everything you do [...] you monitor how you look, how you dress, how you talk, how you act,” 
Hilderbrand insists that “in reality - in contrast to the fantasy of ‘realness’ - queer people often 
do not feel safe expressing themselves or displaying affection for each other in public,” and 
describes “the ballroom and selected sites in the West Village (Washington Square Park, the 
Christopher Street Piers)” as “safe spaces, protected either through enclosure [...] or through 
distance from the subjects’ homes” (Hilderbrand, 58).  The absence of safety from violent 
retribution for difference - for performing gender non-normatively - is summarized adroitly by 
Dorian Corey in another elaboration on realness in Paris: “When they’re undetectable. When 
they can walk out of that ballroom into the sunlight and onto the subway and get home and still 
have all their clothes and no blood running off their bodies. Those are the Femme Realness 
queens.”  
As Dorian describes it, realness bridges and blurs the lines between fantasy and reality 
for the ball children living in New York in the late 1980s.  By conjuring the image of walking 
out of the ballroom and “into the sunlight and onto the subway,” she pinpoints the lack of firm 
parameters around gender presentation as a competitive performance and as an everyday, lived 
sense of self, and highlights how realness-as-passing was a necessity for survival, allowing us to 
read the ball competitions in part as a pedagogical or disciplinary apparatus by which a 
supportive community of queers helped one another to condition and prepare themselves to 
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survive in the world outside of their safe “fantasy” space.  But in Drag Race, which adapts the 
ballroom competition to its flashy-but-flat studio television space, much of this emphasis on 
kinship and survival is lost, primarily because of its formal insistence on firmly separating the 
boundaries between its contestants’ dual personas in and out of drag, which has also led the show 
- and its host - to try and keep firm boundaries between gay and trans identities as well.  Like 
other reality programs reaching back to at least The Real World, Drag Race adopts the 
documentary-style practice of interspersing confessional interview clips of its contestants with 
the main action of each episode’s challenges, providing a Greek chorus of narration, 
commentary, and color on the proceedings.  But in Drag Race, the confessional interview 
segments also function to establish the “out of drag” - or “boy look” - persona of its contestants, 
who are either in drag or getting into drag during most of the runtime of each episode.  Niall 
Brennan argues that the dichotomy created by the confessional segments are essential to the 
show’s insistence on the performance of authenticity, acting “in parallel to the authenticity of the 
contestants in drag - the basis of the competition” and offering “moments in which we come to 
know the contestants out of drag and how their identities as people conform to, or contrast with, 
those of their drag personas.”  While Brennan argues that these “dual portraits” of the contestants 
“fit with the role-playing nature of drag performance itself,” the near-total exclusion of trans 
women who have transitioned and who live and present as women out of drag from the 
competition belies the fact that the show is invested in limiting the roles its contestants can play 
(Brennan, 31).   
While a number of trans women have competed on Drag Race - and despite the fact that 
trans women originated the arts of drag alongside their cis gay male sisters - all of them were 
cast on the show before publicly identifying as trans, and none have appeared on a regular season 
 203 
of the show after transitioning.  The first trans queen to appear in confessional segments out-of-
drag but presenting as a woman is Season 5 contestant Gia Gunn - but this was only upon 
returning for 2019’s season of the spin-off series RuPaul’s Drag Race All Stars, and she has 
discussed her inclusion as a tokenizing gesture made in an attempt to rehabilitate Ru and the 
show’s image in the fallout over his comments on trans contestants that I discussed in the preface 
to this dissertation (MacNeil & Zamolodchikova).  Gia’s uneasiness with her portrayal on All 
Stars 4 also highlights the fact that queens who appear on the show are not the authors of their 
own storylines, even as the show relies on them to generate situations and improvised dialogue 
from which producers can craft dramatic narratives.  The difference between the now-standard 
reality television practice of assembling “frankenbites” - piecing together statements from words 
and fragments taken out of context to compose an ideal sound bite for the producer’s preferred 
storylines - and the “cinéma vérité” approach of Paris Is Burning, in which “the ball children’s 
statements during interviews [...] serve as the only explicit narration and primary source for 
context” to create a thematic, rather than narrative, document of the world it seeks to capture, is 
that Paris’s subjects’ statements remain whole, even as they are selectively assembled and 
juxtaposed with imagery chosen by Livingston and her editor Jonathan Oppenheim (Hilderbrand, 
38).  For queers of color in general - and certainly for trans women of color - the opportunity to 
author yourself and articulate your experience via popular media productions has historically 
been a rare opportunity, which is one of the reasons why Paris Is Burning has maintained such a 
lasting legacy.  While it was wonderful to see Gia Gunn offered an opportunity to appear on a 
second season of Drag Race after sharing her experience of transitioning, it was disheartening to 
see her appearance edited into a tidy narrative that was meant to rehabilitate the show’s 
reputation for discluding trans contestants.  But like so many other Drag Race alums navigating 
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the queer creative economy, Gia has not relied on U.S. cable television to tell her story; when she 
underwent a series of surgeries and began a new regime of hormones as part of her transition in 
2018, she created a YouTube series, #30DaysInTransition, chronicling a pivotal 30-day stretch 
of the process in 30 daily uploads.  That same year, she also competed in the second season of 
Chile’s “glocalized” adaptation of Drag Race, The Switch Drag Race, representing Japan as a 
Japanese American from Chicago in an international cast of drag queens. 
As I argued in Chapter One, there are an endless number of personal experiences and 
expressions of gender variance that are often neatly collapsed under the term “transgender,” and 
the association between drag queens and trans women who were assigned male at birth has 
muddied popular perceptions of trans experiences further, by both asserting the performative and 
non-essential “nature” of gender as something to play with, and by frequently reinforcing 
normative femininity as an ideal that trans women are imagined to aspire to.  Mock describes the 
way that “the lines continue to be blurred due to the umbrella term transgender, which bundles 
together diverse people (transsexual, intersex, genderqueer, drag performers, crossdressers, and 
gender-nonconforming folks) living with gender variance” (Mock, 113), and Viviane Namaste 
warns that despite the fact that “the field known as queer theory has witnessed a veritable 
explosion of essays, presentations, and books on the subject of drag, gender, performance, and 
transsexuality,” most of this scholarship has “shown very little concern for the individuals who 
live, work, and identify themselves as drag queens, transsexuals, or transgenderists” (2000, 9; 
quoted in Hilderbrand, 57).  While disciplinary and popular knowledges about gender frequently 
want tidy and discrete boundaries by which to categorize and understand the identities and 
experiences of non-conforming folks, the lived reality of the ball children and today’s trans drag 
performers - including the wide variety of drag kings and genderfuck performers who are never 
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glimpsed in the parameters of Drag Race’s enterprises - attest to the multiplicity and slipperiness 
between “performance” as an artistic or entertainment practice and the everyday ways by which 
we all perform a negotiation of gender. 
This is perhaps why it is so confounding that RuPaul himself insists that there is a firm 
demarcation between drag performance and trans identity practices, especially given that he 
frequently demands “authenticity” from his queens and implores his audience to “live your life 
according to no one else’s rules but your own” (RuPaul, 187).  When Ru insists that “drag is 
really making fun of identity” but that “transgender [people] take identity very, very seriously” 
because “their identity is who they are” - and that unlike them, he will “do whatever [he] want[s] 
to do at anytime and change and whatever” - he not only elides the history of the trans queens 
from Paris Is Burning whose language and vernacular he has co-opted and commodified as part 
of his own brand, but also reveals his ignorance of the enormous variety of trans experiences and 
breadth of histories of non-conforming people, whose imaginative negotiations, inventions, and 
interventions into language and style through the recombination of gender conventions have 
given birth to much of the drag world that Ru has centered himself within (Nichols).  This 
insistence that he is a “shapeshifter” who can do what he wants and change at any time is also at 
odds with the evaluative criteria of his show, which he has described explicitly as revolving 
around an essential self that can be revealed (on camera), telling a reporter for Entertainment 
Tonight that the show’s producers are “looking for [the contestants’] authenticity,” and explains 
that when he goes on his own auditions, “I'm just myself [...] I'm going to let the person on the 
other side of the desk decide if my energy is what they're looking for,” because if it’s not, “that's 
fine, I’m what I am.”  As he has frequently repeated on Drag Race, he insists that this advice is 
widely applicable beyond his competition show, saying that “it's important for, not just our drag 
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queens, but for everybody listening, [to] find your authentic self,” quoting the better-known half 
of the Delphic oracle’s precept from which Foucault draws his focus on the care of the self when 
he says that we all must “know thyself and deliver that at all times, that is when the party begins” 
(Sander).  Caught between the popular psychological notion (and brand-culture market demand) 
that we have an authentic self that can be revealed - which is directly at odds with Foucault’s 
arguments regarding the subject and the care of the self, which insist that we have no a priori 
essence to disentangle from our culturally-entangled subjectivities - and his new age spiritual 
insistence that identity and selfhood are illusions, Ru’s rules for living and performing are 
inherently contradictory and ambivalent.  Which, as one might imagine, makes for a frequently-
confounding and illogical set of constantly shifting evaluative criteria on the talent competition 
show he rules over. 
 
Category Is: Ru’s Ambivalent Rules 
I am inclined to read Ru’s insistence on Drag Race’s search for “authenticity” as a 
simplified, self-branding reality television take on realness, though it is important to note that 
many of his judgments regarding the demand for self-revelation from his contestants pivot 
around his appraisal of how much of their “emotional vulnerability” they expose in their 
performances, and not around the presentation of an “authentic” female illusion.  Because his 
rules and judgment - and the basis of his authority and expertise - are confusing and often 
contradictory, the show itself is structured as a “game of truth” that has no consistent discourse 
of truth-claims by which to offer pedagogical instruction.  Foucault insists that one “cannot care 
for self without knowledge” and that “the care for self is of course knowledge of self,” but such 
knowledge needs to take the form of arts or technologies - as “rules of conduct or of principles 
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which are at the same time truths and regulations” - so that to care for the self is to “fit one’s self 
out with these truths,” which is “where ethics is linked to the game of truth” (Practice of 
Freedom 116).  While there is no “evil” for Foucault “in the practice of someone who, in a given 
game of truth, knowing more than another, tells him what he must do, teaches him, transmits 
knowledge to him, communicates skills to him,” he does warn against the possibility of 
reinforcing “the effects of domination which will make a child subject to the arbitrary and 
useless authority of a teacher” who does not seek to instruct, but only wishes to enjoy “the power 
of an abusively authoritarian professor” (Practice of Freedom 129).  Ru’s “everybody say love” 
brand necessitates that he not act abusively toward or flagrantly wield power over his queen-
contestants, but the relative lack of expertise that he communicates to the subjects he judges - 
save for his instructions for crafting a lovable television persona - does resemble an authoritarian 
logic by which his authority rests largely in his claim to authority.  Because the “authenticity” Ru 
seeks lies in the perception of an imagined audience, his game is not structured around the care 
for the self, or in the invention of new modes of aesthetic existence via the technologies of drag, 
but instead focuses on placing its contestants in situations in which they might provide 
affectively-resonant moments of self-revelation that can be shaped into a “lovable,” branded 
persona. 
Other scholars have also noted the show’s discourse of authenticity and questioned its 
relationship to realness, with Brennan arguing that “‘realness’ is another concept we can apply to 
drag authenticity as conveyed by [Drag Race],” which he reads “in terms of performer/audience 
relations,” gesturing toward the perception of authenticity as a cornerstone of affective parasocial 
relationships, as I described in Chapter Four.  He also places his discussion of authenticity in the 
context of reality television conventions, arguing that “the authentic quality of the [reality tv] 
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genre is [...] revealed when contestants’ artifice breaks down and their ‘true’ selves are 
revealed,” and insists that on Drag Race, “while authenticity seems to contradict the nature of 
drag, successful drag still hinges on authentic performances of femaleness [...] as well as 
consistently authentic performances of femaleness in consistently different ways” (Brennan, 32).  
But he also struggles to see any coherence in the appraisals of the contestants’ performances 
offered by the panel of judges, arguing that “the judges pose the greatest problem in terms of 
attempting to contain the elusive nature of drag authenticity,” as there is “little agreement among 
the judges about what constitutes authentic drag in the first place” (Brennan, 36).   
While other creative talent reality competitions also rely on subjective appraisals by 
panels of judges - perhaps most hilariously, for a television viewer, on Top Chef, which pivots 
around the flavor of food you cannot taste - the campy and subversive and discursively-tangled 
knot of drag’s plethora of historical meanings, combined with the utter absence of drag queen 
judges (besides Ru herself) on the panel makes Drag Race’s judgements and critiques especially 
incoherent.  Sometimes the “realness” of female illusion is lavishly praised, and more complex 
gender presentations - like Season 4’s Milan dressing as androgynous pop icon Janelle Monet in 
a masculinized woman’s suit - are critiqued for “reading too much like a boy” (S4E5, “The 
Snatch Game”).  In other instances, though, queens like Courtney Act are given negative 
feedback for “resting on pretty” and not being subversive enough in their glamorous 
presentations (S6E6, “Oh No She Betta Don’t”).  The only semi-consistent throughlines for 
critiques - other than ones which conspicuously support dramatic wins or lip sync elimination 
battles, based upon the rest of the episode’s edited storylines - come via Ru’s twin obsessions 
with his own perception of a nebulous “authenticity” by which his queens can craft warm 
television personas and his own tastes and expertise in popular culture itself.  Brennan mentions 
 209 
contestant Kenya Michaels being critiqued for not presenting a “credible impersonation of 
Beyonce” and thus being read by Ru, who says “that’s what drag is about, you have to have a 
knowledge of pop culture” (S4E4, “The Snatch Game,” quoted in Brennan, 36).  Season 11’s 
Plastique Tiara is given the same admonishment to “learn about pop culture” (S11E3, “Diva 
Worship”) and in All Stars 3, Aja is scolded by Ru for not knowing how to pronounce France 
Jolie’s name, resulting in Ru telling her that “we’re queens, so it’s important to know pop culture 
and things like that, I just expect queens to do a little bit more research” (AS3E5, “Pop Art 
Ball”). 
The inconsistency and incoherence of Drag Race’s evaluative criteria is at least partially 
owed to the heterogeneity of its panel of judges, and their tenuous relationships to drag 
performance - another feature that clearly separates the show from the world of the ball children 
it has borrowed so much from.  The judging panels of the ball culture are comprised of ball 
walkers themselves; they consist of “no less than six prominent members of the Ballroom 
scene,” with members “selected by the housemother and/or the housefather of the house that 
organizes the ball,” and who are often “well known as successful competitors in the Ballroom 
scene on local or national levels” (Bailey, 11).  In contrast, the Drag Race judges panel has never 
featured a drag queen other than RuPaul, despite the fact that this panel is tasked with evaluating 
queens from a position of perceived authority and expertise.  Each season, Ru is flanked by 2-3 
“main judges” - in the first two seasons, the main judges were fashion writer Merle Ginsberg and 
former Project Runway contestant and fashion designer Santino Rice, indicating how these 
earlier outings were more aligned with the evaluation of fashion and femininity as seen on 
Project Runway or America’s Next Top Model.  Since the third season, though, Ru’s right-hand-
woman has been Michelle Visage, a cisgender, white, heterosexual former pop singer who 
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served as Ru’s co-host on his VH1 talk show and morning radio show in the late 1990s.  Her 
bonafides as an expert in drag are limited to the fact that she is “best friends” - at least on camera 
or on mic - with RuPaul, and that she was a staple in the New York gay club circuit of the early 
1990s.  Ru’s other two main judges for the past five regular seasons (and past three All Stars 
seasons) are Ross Mathews - a white gay comedian and general television “personality” - and 
former Queer Eye fashion expert Carson Kressley, who has successfully moved about the reality 
television economy for nearly two decades now.  Each week the show hosts guest judges drawn 
from media and entertainment industries at large - actresses, writers, reality show stars, models, 
writers, choreographers, olympic athletes, singers, etc… - some of whom claim queer identities 
or queer-culture-adjacent careers, and others who are just famous (enough) and available.  In 
short, the only real authority that the main and guest judges offer is that they have already 
achieved success in the entertainment industry, reinforcing the fact that Drag Race is much more 
concerned with producing media personalities than it is engaged with the history of - or personal 
and political and subversive possibilities inherent to - the multivalent practices of drag itself. 
The discrepancies between the relationships of contestants to judges on Drag Race versus 
those we see in the world of Paris Is Burning highlight the way that Drag Race abandons - or at 
least severely reconceives - the intrinsic importance of queer kinship and community in the 
history of drag, which for the legendary children of the ballroom provided a means by which 
urban queers of color, who have historically been prevented from entering social and economic 
worlds in which they might find meaningful labor and personal validation, could help one 
another survive and foster their creative, self-fashioning passions.  The subjects of Paris Is 
Burning have a keen understanding of the rigged structures of capitalism and their own 
disenfranchisement at the hands of an exploitative global economic order built upon the 
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subjugation of people of color.  Junior Labeija offers a monologue in the film that explains 
clearly that “this is white America, [and] any other nationality that is not of the white set knows 
this and accepts this to the day they die,” arguing that “everybody’s dream and ambition as a 
minority [is] to live and look as well as a white person,” because mass media, “from TV to 
magazines to movies to films,” only shows white opulence, like “Dynasty, The Colbys, All My 
Children.”  Junior ends his monologue by saying that black Americans “have had everything 
taken away from us, and yet we have all learned how to survive.”  Much of Paris Is Burning is 
formally structured around the juxtaposition of the aspirations and self-fashioning survival 
tactics of the ball children against images of Wall Street businessmen and women and opulent, 
conspicuous luxury commodity culture, providing a thematic exploration that explicitly links the 
proliferation of media images centered around wealth, fashion, and beauty with white privilege, 
showing how the legendary children understand and respond to the world as tenacious queers of 
color.  In contrast to this, Drag Race does everything it can to dance around any meaningful 
conversation of the economic and cultural structures of class and race while simultaneously 
riffing on ethnic stereotypes and appropriating black culture; given its investment in an 
exploitative creative economy that cannot sustain a meaningful labor politics, and its interest in 
fashioning “professional” entertainers who should be more interested in incorporating products 
into their self-branded enterprises than discussing, say, the racism that pervades the show’s fan 
base, this should not be much of a surprise. 
 
Category Is: Apolitical Realness 
In her exploration of the show’s relationship to the governing logics of capitalism, 
Ferrante acknowledges drag’s legacy of competitions in pageants and balls, but argues that in 
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Drag Race it is “necessary to re-contextualize the competitive dimension of drag as portrayed 
through the frame of television discourse,” claiming that “it is certainly no coincidence that [the 
show’s] format is that of a talent show” since this is the “congenial format of the mise en place” 
of late capitalism.  She argues that “the very idea of competition is in line with a market 
ideology, which manifests itself in terms of annihilating competition,” and compares Drag Race 
to the ballroom legacy when she claims that “while drag queens traditionally fought against their 
own selves in staging the ideal of realness, in [Drag Race] the competition takes on the 
characteristics of material elimination of competitors though the mechanism of its challenges” 
(Ferrante, 156).  Because of the show’s investment in the logics of capitalism, it is delimited in 
expressing any real criticism of the intersectional vectors of exploitation by which economic 
structures unevenly distribute resources and opportunities - or violence, incarceration, and 
exploitation.  Ferrante is thus disappointed in Drag Race for squandering “drag’s true 
performative potential” for “tearing down identitarian politics in order to produce a subject 
crystalized in a unique interpretation - that of social expectations - of what femininity should be,” 
and thus “highlighting a universalization of femininity as it is built through the experiences of 
class and race” via the process of disidentification (Ferrante, 155-6).  There are moments in the 
show that do not simply elide questions of race and class, but which directly confront them in 
order to marginalize their impact on some of the contestants who come into the competition with 
much more modest apparel and accessories than their more privileged counterparts.  Queens who 
enter the competition with the resources and relationships to bring couture outfits crafted by 
professional designers are often given lavish praise for “looking expensive” and rewarded for the 
taste and access to material goods that their privileges afford them.  Despite the potential for drag 
to evoke, as Muñoz puts it, “uncertain desires” that could work to “confound and subvert the 
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social fabric” and invoke more imaginative subject positions, Drag Race queens are most often 
praised by judges for garments and makeup and hair styling that instead read normatively as 
wealthy and opulent and “high fashion” (1997, 85-6).  The official World of Wonder YouTube 
series Fashion Photo RuView reinforces the emphasis on conventional fashion-industry 
aesthetics and the rewarding of access to material goods, featuring Drag Race alumni reviewing 
each episode’s runway looks and determining if they are “toots” or “boots” - that is to say, if 
they are good or bad as objects of high fashion. 
When Season 8’s Chi Chi DeVayne - who had disclosed to her fellow queens in mirror-
time segments in the Werk Room that she had to leave two jobs in order to appear on the show, 
and had recently declared bankruptcy - is critiqued on the runway by Michelle Visage for 
wearing a “basic” outfit, she voices her struggle to compete with queens who have more means.  
“I don’t have the expenses to pay for something like this,” she tells Michelle, gesturing to fellow 
competitor Naysha Lopez’s expensive-looking designer catsuit.  When he continues, saying “I’m 
in bankruptcy, I just don’t have--” he is cut off by Michelle, who literally wags a finger at him 
and offers an eyebrow-raising bit of advice: “Hold on, you don’t need money, girl, that’s never 
an excuse.  I know you can turn a show.  What concerns me is the attitude a little bit.  I’m getting 
the feeling that you have fought very hard to be where you are, I get it, but we’re lifting you up.  
Let us” (S8E4, “New Wave Queens”).  This rhetoric of personal, individual responsibility for 
overcoming the structural inequalities visited upon queer people of color in order to secure the 
power and privilege afforded to those who can successfully integrate themselves into 
entertainment industries recurs frequently on the show, and was dramatically reinforced by Ru 
himself in a confrontation with contestant The Vixen in Season 10’s reunion episode (S10E13, 
“Queens Reunited”).  When The Vixen attempts to respond to accusations from Ru that she was 
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prone to starting conflicts with the other queens by explaining that the white queens whom she 
had fought with were not subjected to the same sorts of questions about their behavior - 
reiterating her claims from earlier in the season that black queens are portrayed on Drag Race 
and in other reality shows via “a narrative of ‘I am the Angry Black Woman who has scared off 
the Little White Girl’” - she is rebuffed by Ru, who tells her that she “could choose to not say 
anything” instead of responding to the white queens who provoked her.  After some heated back-
and-forth with Ru, The Vixen leaves the stage; when fellow black queen Asia O’Hara tries to 
speak up in her defense, Ru begins to lecture her and the other queens while getting visibly 
frustrated, eventually erupting by yelling: “Look at me, look at me, goddamnit, I come from the 
same goddamned place she comes from!  And here I am - you see me walking out?  No, I’m not 
walking out.  I fucking learned how to act around people and how to deal with shit.  I’m not 
walking out and saying ‘Fuck all y’all.’”  When he arrives at “fuck all y’all,” he code-switches 
his language and comports his hands in a heightened performance of black vernacular - a 
common bit from his repertoire of class-coded black expressions that he frequently deploys for 
comedic effect - reinforcing that his disciplinary advice for The Vixen is, ultimately, to stop 
performing her black anger, to drop her rhetoric of racial injustice, in order to appear appealing 
for the cameras and to be pleasant and professional in their workplace.  The lovable “persona” 
that is the central focus of this competition cannot risk the frictions of a real discourse on racism 
in popular culture - even if this is the “authentic” experience of a queen and the source of her 
vulnerability. 
At the end of his passionate lecture/tirade, Ru reinforces that his advice to the queens is 
rooted in his own experiences navigating an intersectional identity in an entertainment industry 
and U.S. culture that has historically been hostile and marginalizing to queer and black 
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performers, telling them, “I have been discriminated against by white people for being black, by 
black people for being gay, by gay people for being too femme - did I let that stop me from 
getting to this chair?  No.”  Despite the largely apolitical and commercialized nature of much of 
Ru’s queer media productions throughout his career, it must be noted that his very presence as a 
femme black queer in mainstream mass media was unprecedented when he first exploded into 
prominence, and the space he has carved out continues to disrupt a popular media landscape that 
privileges white bodies and normative standards of white beauty.  In Nicole R. Fleetwood’s 
critical exploration of the “racial iconicity” of Ru’s idol Diana Ross, she argues that when we 
take into account “the normalization of beauty as white, we then see that one of the major effects 
of the black celebrity as racial icon is a disruption of iconic whiteness through another staging of 
face” (Fleetwood, 63).  Janet Mock cites the importance of RuPaul’s visibility as a queer femme 
of color when she was coming of age in the early 90s, marvelling that it was “a time when a 
brown, blond, and glamorous drag queen was a household name, beaming on MAC Cosmetics 
billboards at the mall in shiny red latex,” reinforcing the particular power and personal meanings 
that visible queer of color icons provide for young queer people who might otherwise be isolated 
from queer culture and community (Mock, 114).  Fleetwood’s exploration of Ross’s career 
provides a crucial context for understanding Ru’s own iconicity, and not only because Ru can be 
counted among those who were inspired by Ross, whose “performance of cinematic face [...] has 
served as an aesthetic for other black celebrities, entertainers, and countercultural performers” 
(Fleetwood, 64).  She argues that Ross practiced a “queer iconicity” that “goes beyond fandom 
and connects to an affective performance of sensuality, recognition, and love” and functions as 
“an affinity, an aesthetic, a sexual exploration, and [evokes] notions of belonging,” all of which 
figure as crucial elements in Ru’s repertoire as an entertainment persona (Fleetwood, 65).  Much 
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like Ross, Ru also embodies an ambivalent tension between politicized racial and queer identities 
and mainstream assimilation and appropriation of the radical cultures his work draws from, 
resembling the way Ross “appears as racially aestheticized and politically nonthreatening in 
American public culture,” which is at least partially due to their having to navigate a culture of 
celebrity that is “interwoven into capitalist accumulation,” with the “intensified forms of 
recognition that come with fame” and “shifting notions of value” that render “black celebrity [as] 
a fraught category” (Fleetwood, 69).  Fleetwood quotes Anne Anlin Cheng’s study of Josephine 
Baker to contextualize the way black icons like Ross are “viewed as either a groundbreaking 
performer or a shameful sellout,” concluding that the tensions between these framings cannot be 
fully resolved (Fleetwood, 74).  Ru’s career and highly-visible status as a queer of color 
entertainer certainly exists in the tensions between these two frames; like Ross, as a black icon 
his “celebration of self and audience [and] claiming of love and recognition” is always haunted 
by “the devaluation of black life, aesthetics, and talent,” making it painful to gloss over his 
tenacity, wit, and abundance of spirit when critiquing his commodification of queer culture and 
embracing of catastrophic capitalism’s logics of competition and individual responsibility 
(Fleetwood, 80).  
Despite its limitations and erasures of critical discourses surrounding the intersections of 
race, class, gender, and sexuality, Drag Race is still one of the only popular media enterprises 
that showcases and celebrates queers of color and effeminate expressions by gay men.  Eliza 
Rodriguez y Gibson argues that Drag Race’s latina queens have demonstrated the ways that 
“drag illustrates how fashioning an identity that is simultaneously and fluidly raced, sexualized, 
gendered, and classed can be a way to negotiate structures of power and find new ways to 
articulate oppositional subjectivities through queer performativity and disidentificatory 
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practices” (Rodriguez y Gibson, 52).  By evoking Muñoz’s concept of disidentification, 
Rodriguez y Gibson convincingly argues for the way the queens themselves keenly negotiate and 
navigate the limiting political possibilities presented by a Viacom-owned popular television 
show, in order to still offer subtly subversive dissent and critiques of the normative logics of 
white privilege that undergird the production, which mostly offers what Dieter Brusselaers 
describes as “an aestheticized, normative representation of drag that forfeits complexity or 
extreme transgression, and that makes use of stereotypes” (Brusselaers, 54).  McIntyre and Riggs 
argue that there is a fundamental ambivalence and precarity for queens of color navigating self-
presentation in the racial discourses of Drag Race, as “choosing to self-present as Latinidad 
and/or play to Latina types is the prerogative of Latinx queens who are often rewarded in the 
competition for doing so,” though this can “come at the price of provoking racialized laughter 
and linguicism” and open them up “to criticism and ridicule by North American competitors who 
not only attempted to deplete the cultural capital [Latinx] queens had accrued, but did so in order 
to reassert their own upper hand as North American universal subjects” (McIntyre & Riggs, 72). 
The proliferation of celebratory images of femmes and effeminacy is also a fundamentally 
critical discourse provided by Drag Race, especially given that most queer media - and 
commercial gay culture at large - has privileged white gay masculinity for decades, reaching 
from the phenomenon of the “hyper-masculine Castro Clones” that Arthur Evans spoke out 
against in San Francisco in the 1970s all the way to the homonormative butches of modern-day 
San Francisco in HBO’s Looking (2014-2016).  As Tan Hoang Nguyen argues, we need to find 
ways to “strategically [reattach] gender deviance (i.e., effeminacy) with homosexuality,” and we 
need to stop retreating “from the taint of effeminacy by postulating a manly gay style.”  If we 
wish to find “a more productive strategy for undermining a heteronormative social order,” we 
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need to “make space for a plurality of gender expressions, including effeminacy” (80).  I believe 
that Drag Race performs this work, and fulfills Nguyen’s call for “a reclaiming of effeminacy” 
which could in fact “constitute an affirmation of a stigmatized gay tradition” (81). 
While the proliferation and veneration of femme and effeminate personalities in popular 
media productions provides vital cultural space for queers who may otherwise struggle to accept 
and understand their non-conforming sexual desires and gender identities in a global cultural and 
economic order that is structured by the domination of a toxic masculinity wedded to the 
destructive and exploitative practices of catastrophic capitalism, we must question the efficacy of 
a queer politics reduced to broad liberal gestures of visibility and inclusion.  Despite the long 
tradition of queer counterculture providing content and context for radical queer politics that 
have challenged the corrupt economic and cultural order of a racist, homophobic, transphobic, 
misogynistic U.S. culture for decades - and despite coming to prominence in an era of 
heightened political stakes, as climate change threatens to destroy the world’s habitats due to 
capital’s unchecked plundering and sullying of the planet’s natural resources, the U.S. military 
continues to wage covert and largely-ignored endless wars in the Middle East, white ethno-
nationalist populist movements gain steam in the U.S. and Western Europe, and as a tiny number 
of extraordinarily wealthy elites exploit the weakening of collectivized labor and democratic 
regulation to extract more and more natural resources and wealth from the rest of us - Drag Race 
remains a stridently apolitical entertainment enterprise, and even frequently celebrates and 
reinforces the assimilation of gay culture into institutions that unethically wield inordinate power 
and influence.  Ferrante adopts Foucaultian language to argue that “the techniques of discipline 
that occur throughout [Drag Race are] the evolution of a homonormative regime of visibility, a 
regime which radically transforms reality or [...] empties the reality of drag of its radicalism,” 
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drawing attention to its corruption of the legacy of the queer spaces and communities 
documented in Paris Is Burning when she claims that “the same practices, in the ballrooms and 
on the television screen, have shifted from producing destabilizing discourse to producing 
discourses that are reassuring for the order of the nation” (Ferrante, 156).  She argues that the 
show frequently evokes a “homonationalist” rhetoric of American exceptionalism, such as when 
Ru introduces a challenge in which the queens have to makeover gay men who formerly served 
in the U.S. armed forces by saying he is “so proud to show them what they are fighting for,” 
which is “our freedom to dress up in drag - this is a fabulous country and I’m so proud to be an 
American citizen” (Ferrante, 162).  His insistence on proudly claiming American identity was 
strongly reinforced by his release of his album and single, American, in 2017; yet despite the 
song’s repeated refrain that implores the listener to “stand up for yourself, we've just begun to 
fight,” Ru’s personal political involvement has been as limited as the political rhetoric on Drag 
Race, reduced to assertions of the progress of gay rights in the form of marriage inequality and 
the repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, and encouraging his queens and viewers to vote - embodying 
what Muñoz describes as the “liberal-pluralist mode of political strategizing [that] only 
eventuates a certain absorption, but nothing like a productive engagement, with difference” 
(1997, 85). 
RuPaul’s relationship to queer political activism is perhaps perfectly captured in the way 
he narrates his experience performing at the 1993 March on Washington for Lesbian, Gay and Bi 
Equal Rights and Liberation in Lettin’ It All Hang Out.  The march, which drew an estimated 
crowd of one million protesters, was the third of its kind, following 1979’s National March on 
Washington for Lesbian and Gay Rights and 1987’s Second National March on Washington for 
Lesbian and Gay Rights.  Initiated by the efforts of Urvashi Vaid of the National Gay and 
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Lesbian Task Force, the 1993 march was organized by a coalition of queer activist groups; the 
March On Washington National Steering Committee published an official platform that listed a 
series of demands for political action on behalf of the interests of queer people.  This platform 
included the demand for “passage of a Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender civil rights bill 
and an end to discrimination by state and federal governments,” the “massive increase in funding 
for AIDS education, research, and patient care; universal access to health care including 
alternative therapies,” a call for “legislation to prevent discrimination against Lesbians, Gays, 
Bisexuals, and Transgendered people in the areas of family diversity, custody, adoption and 
foster care and that the definition of family includes the full diversity of all family structures,” 
the “full and equal inclusion of Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgendered people in the 
educational system, and inclusion of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender studies in 
multicultural curricula,” the “right to reproductive freedom and choice, to control our own 
bodies, and an end to sexist discrimination,” and “an end to racial and ethnic discrimination in all 
forms” (Cox et al, 1993).  While this platform included “Transgendered” people in all of its 
action items, it should be noted that the name of the march did not, despite the efforts of 
transgender and transsexual feminist groups and their allies within the MOW coalition who 
fought for their inclusion (Gabriel).  Nonetheless, the official platform indicates the breadth of 
mainstream, visibility- and inclusion-oriented LGBT political activism of the era, and the 
specific tactics and strategies that comprised the agenda of the MOW coalition. 
But in Ru’s account of the event - at which he performed in full drag, dressed as Wonder 
Woman - he does not so much as mention the official title of the march, the organizations that 
brought it together and invited him to perform, or any details of the political agenda to which it 
was dedicated.  His appearance at “the big march on Washington where over a million lesbians 
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and gays were marching on the White House to make their presence known to the new 
administration and the people of America” is narrated as another gig that demonstrates his 
ascendance to popular culture relevance, and provides a backdrop for a personal tragedy, as his 
mother died on the very same day.  Providing no information or context for the meanings of the 
march, he discusses his apparel (“I arrived at the march wearing a black tube dress and 
Birkenstocks”) and drops names; waiting to be called to the stage, he “found refuge in a trailer 
full of the world’s most powerful dykes, Martina Navratilova, Melissa Etheridge, Lea Delaria, 
and practically every other lesbian celebrity in the western world,” and when he finally gets to 
perform, his idol Cybill Shepherd is coming off stage before him, and Ru says that “she 
screamed when she saw me and said, ‘You look incredible’” (RuPaul, 163-4).  His political 
rhetoric during his performance is limited to him telling the crowd that “In ten years I’ll be in the 
White House - Miss Thing goes to Washington! Paint the mother pink!” (163).  After describing 
that he received a phone call an hour after performing, letting him know his mother had passed 
away, he summarizes the event in personal - and perhaps self-aggrandizing - terms: “As long as I 
live I will not forget standing on that stage and looking out over a sea of people - it looked like 
millions - toward the Washington Monument [...] it was a heavenly moment, standing there on 
that stage on the same spot where Martin Luther King had once stood before me.  I really feel 
that on that very special day, my mom and I both found freedom” (RuPaul, 166).  Faced with a 
crowd of over a million queer people organizing around a very specific, collective agenda, Ru 
sees an audience of spectators, witnessing his own personal drama of emancipation - though 
from what, exactly, goes unsaid. 
 
Category Is: Mothers of Legendary Children 
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Figure 3 
 Motherhood looms large in the practices of drag and in the ball culture, with drag 
mothers and the mothers of the legendary houses of the ballroom providing their children 
instruction, encouragement, shelter, clothing, and knowledge of queer history and social 
structures.  In Paris Is Burning, there are two unnamed teens whose interview outside of a 
ballroom is interspersed throughout the film, who offer some poignant and astute comments on 
the nature of the gay community they have found in the world of the ball children.  One of the 
teens says that in the ball world, "they treat each other like sisters, mmhmm, sisters, or brothers, 
or mothers. You know, like I say, ‘Oh that's my sister, because she's gay, too, and I'm gay, and 
she's a drag queen or whatever,’” and says that he does not have any family outside of this 
community.  Hilderbrand argues that “amongst the most important work Paris Is Burning does is 
introduce audiences to queer forms of alternative kinship,” and highlights the way that Pepper 
Labeija “explains that the ball children come to the scene seeking a surrogate family,” and 
closely analyzes how the film’s interview segments “are often staged with House mates, friends, 
lovers, tricks, and even would-be competitors in the background, surrounding them,” which he 
concludes might “indicate a lack of personal domestic space for some of the subjects, but it also 
indicates a strong sense of community and kinship” (Hilderbrand, 60).  In the film, we see some 
house mothers who are drag queens (Pepper Labeija), some who are trans women (Angie 
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Xtravaganza), and others who present as men (Willie Ninja), demonstrating the way their queer 
kinships owe little to the rigid gendered organization of the family institutions and roles they 
refer to.  As Hilderbrand argues, “motherhood is not defined by gender but by acts of love and 
mentorship” (Hilderbrand, 62). 
 Despite its individualizing and entrepreneurial logics of competition and the pursuit of 
audience affection via the revelation of unique selfhood, Drag Race is also a site where queer 
kinships are displayed, discussed, formed and contested; but it also positions itself as a 
consumable queer family that the audience can aspire to belong to, especially if they can afford 
to purchase a ticket to RuPaul’s DragCon.  Because it draws its contestants from a pre-existing 
network of queer performers, Drag Race frequently showcases competitors who are already 
friends, family, allies and coworkers in the professional drag circuit - and the queens are well 
aware that they will continue to work and tour together after the production of their season has 
wrapped.  Thus the show frequently showcases collaboration and solidarity amongst its 
competitors, even when teamwork is not an explicit part of a challenge, with queens aiding each 
other by sewing garments, teaching makeup techniques, or offering emotional support and 
advice.  Labor scholar Monica Wilk describes the makeshift collective labor practices of drag 
queens, arguing that “even within a badly fragmented gig economy, the [drag] industry has a rich 
history of mutual support and solidarity,” and that outside of the world of Drag Race, “local 
queens typically find work through grassroots networking and informal labor organizing,” with 
“seasoned queens adopt[ing] compelling new talent into their house, or drag family, creating a 
mother-daughter bond that provides professional mentorship and emotional support” (Wilk).  
She describes drag houses as “semiformal networks of solidarity through which aspiring drag 
queens receive job training and access professional networks,” and argues that they resemble 
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“early labor support groups” (Wilk).  Emphasizing the fact that queer people comprise a 
community in which “discrimination and rejection are common experiences,” Wilk notes how 
drag houses also function as “important social support systems that help build solidarity between 
performers.”  Appraising some of Drag Race’s alumni, Wilk notes that Shangela - a very popular 
competitor from Seasons 2 and 3 of Drag Race, as well as Season 3 of All Stars, who has gone 
on to high-profile gigs like appearing in a substantial role in the Bradley Cooper/Lady Gaga 
remake of A Star Is Born - founded her own talent management company in 2014, Say What 
Entertainment, to help represent other queens who exit the show, after having terrible 
experiences attempting to navigate the entertainment industry as a queer performer.  In the 
supportive network of performers in the drag circuit, mothers play a central role in providing 
material and practical support.  Wilk describes the way that “drag mothers may also introduce 
daughters to other professional drag queens, promoters, and club owners, or use their contacts to 
help broker their daughter’s first gigs as a paid performer,” and argues that “being adopted into a 
well-regarded house is seen as an honor and validation of talent,” as famous drag house names 
themselves are “an important part of the profession,” with drag daughters taking their mothers’ 
names “in part to brand themselves as members of their house, but also as a symbol of intimacy 
and solidarity” (Wilk). 
 When RuPaul re-emerged from his decade hiatus from popular culture to host and rule 
over Drag Race, he repositioned his persona and brand to present himself as Mama Ru, drag 
mother to the “children” that comprise his cast of competing drag queens.  He refers to the show 
itself as “my house” and frequently invokes the language of kinship, telling contestants like 
Roxxxy Andrews and Plastique Tiara that “as gay people, we get to choose our families” and 
that he is their mother now (S5E7, “RuPaul Roast & S11E7, “From Farm To Runway”).  Ru’s 
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music includes frequent allusions to his position as a drag mother; in “Sissy That Walk” he 
claims to be “Mother of the house of no shame,” and “Call Me Mother” is a song-length rapped 
demand that we do just that.  But if the mothers of the ball culture and the drag performance 
circuit lend their name, time, talents, and material support to their drag children, we must 
question if Ru really acts as drag mother to the queens who appear on his show.  In Pose, Candy 
Abundance, a daughter of the fictional house of Abundance, accuses her house mother Elektra of 
wanting “subjects, not children,” and we might ask the same question of RuPaul, whose image 
covers every available surface of her house, and who has not trained or lent her name to a single 
one of the “children” that have appeared on her show.  While Ru’s career-long brand has pivoted 
around a generalized message of “love” that has been seamlessly redeployed as a specifically 
familial, motherly affection extended to both the queen contestants and the viewing audience, 
and while the show arguably showcases “the affective communal quality” amongst its 
competitors, especially as “the dancing at the end of [every episode] affirms a community 
alongside the competition, articulated most explicitly through an affirmation of self-love,” 
viewed through the logics of branding and persona-crafting that Ru himself has articulated, the 
show’s version of queer kinship cannot be disentangled from the commodification of feeling and 
the desire for belonging (Rodriguez y Gibson, 52).  Belonging to Ru’s family, and entering Ru’s 
house via your television or cell phone or laptop screen, will not provide you shelter or support if 
you are kicked out of your own home for your sexual desires or gender presentation - but it will 
allow you to feel affection for a celebrity who would like to sell you chocolate bars with his 
name printed on them.  While collectivity and queer kinship do animate Drag Race, the show 
also consolidates and extends the power and authority and personal enrichment of its host and 
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namesake, while promoting drag as an individual economic practice rather than a countercultural 
or personally meaningful means of expression, resistance, or survival. 
The push and pull between individualism and collectivity is perhaps an intrinsic tension 
in the constitution of queer kinships, whether they come in the form of alternative family 
structures, social or artistic communities, or activist groups, given that queer identities are 
simultaneously organized around and animated by one’s relationship to their own body, desires, 
and sense of self as well as the outward expression of one’s self and desires.  We are queer when 
the normative knowledges about who we are and what we are to do and desire that circulate in 
the institutions of our culture - families, schools, medical psychological and juridical discourses 
among others - cannot be internalized, adopted, and reconciled with our sense of self.  But even 
if we seek, like Foucault, to understand “the way in which the subject constitutes himself in an 
active fashion, by the practices of self,” we must remember that even for those of us who are 
queer, “these practices are nevertheless not something that the individual invents by himself,” as 
we still must rely on “patterns that [we find] in [our] culture and which are proposed, suggested 
and imposed on [us] by [our] culture, [our] society and [our] social group” (Practice of Freedom 
122).  This is why, for Foucault, queer social movements organized around “liberation” are 
limited if they do not also involve an active search for the constitution of a personal ethics; we 
cannot simply be freed and return to some unsullied condition, for even if we are to escape the 
disciplining knowledges that would interpellate us into a culture that opposes our desires or 
aspirations or sense of self, we still must create and constitute that self and navigate the ethics of 
how we relate to one another in the alternative social forms we choose.  We may have innate 
sexual drives or predispositions to so-called masculine or feminine expression of body and voice, 
but these can only be understood and accessed - even to ourselves, by ourselves - via the social 
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and cultural knowledges, protocols, and technologies of the self that provide scaffolding and 
instruction for their outward expression.  In other words, we can only create and understand our 
selves as individuals in the context of relationality, which is why, for Foucault, the relationship 
of self to self is ethically intertwined with the relationship of self to others.  We can only come to 
know ourselves as “queer” - or gay or bi or trans or lesbian or non-binary or non-conforming - if 
we have come into contact with knowledges about queer identities, and our understanding of our 
queer identities is always in dynamic and productive tension with the multiplicity of queer 
cultures that coalesce and circulate in material spaces and in media.  This is perhaps why the 
creative economy - an economy of attention, of desire - has created such a demand for the 
circulation of queer entertainers in digital media, as queer fans are eager to feel seen and 
validated and reflected via the connections they feel they forge in the parasocial relationships 
fostered by drag queen productions and social media interactions.  Personality-focused 
entertainment that highlights queer sexual desires and non-conforming gender performance 
allows queer audiences to feel their own feelings and identities are being expressed and made 
real, and their attention in turn sustains the confidence and self-assurance of the performers 
whose media they consume, creating an affective attention-circuit.  But as I argued in Chapter 
Four, these relationships are built on differences in power and access that empties the fan 
“community” of the possibility of real kinship and support that traditional queer spaces have 
allowed, as the performer’s presence and attention remains firmly in their control, as they choose 
when and how to give gated access via the media they use to connect with their fans.  By never 
truly meeting in the same space, in present time, there are none of the negotiations or risks or 
productive frictions of a true dynamic relationship which might allow power to circulate more 
freely between performer and fan. 
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For queer individuals, our freedom from normative regimes of self-formation and social 
relations provides us the opportunity to invent new practices of freedom and ethics of 
governmentality; new relationships to ourselves and to one another which might provide an 
ethical substance by which we could “advance into a homosexual ascesis that would make us 
work on ourselves and invent - I do not say discover - a manner of being that is still improbable,” 
one in which we “make ourselves infinitely more susceptible to pleasure” and “escape and help 
others to escape the two readymade formulas of the pure sexual encounter and the lovers’ fusion 
of identities” (Foucault, Friendship As a Way of Life).  For much of the 20th century, queer 
culture flourished in spaces that were tucked away from, but still engaged with, popular culture: 
the ballroom, the gay bar, the youth shelter, the back-pages of muscle magazines.  In these 
spaces, kinships and rituals and social structures and their histories were invented and 
transmitted intergenerationally, creating queer networks of culture and knowledge that held the 
promise - if not the achievement - of forming radical new ways of living and being that rejected 
the naturalized order of patriarchal capitalism.  But with the rise of a politics of visibility 
combined with the assimilation of liberal and fashionable queer figures into consumer culture 
and popular media in the 1980s and 1990s - facilitated in part by the proliferation of reality 
television’s mode of production - knowledges about queer identities began to circulate more 
widely through mainstream channels, offering the possibility of queer self-formation in isolation 
from the spaces and communities that had articulated same-sex desire and non-conforming 
gender practice to social and political subject positions.  For those of us who come of age and 
come to understand ourselves as queer when we are children who are physically and socially 
isolated from other queer people and institutions of queer culture, the circulation of affirming 
and supportive narratives about living in an antagonistic world as a gay or trans person can be 
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life-saving, providing an amelioration and relief from the internalization of shame and self-
hatred and confusion that comes with living amongst those who ignore or attack your very sense 
of self.  But this is in many ways a Faustian bargain; for affirming images of queer life to 
circulate via popular culture, they have historically been removed from the productive painful 
frictions and resistant kinships that have animated a queer counter-culture forged by a coalition 
of those who have been marginalized for disrupting the logics of a social order organized around 
masculine white supremacy.  Being gay became a part of a personal identity organized around 
discrete compartmentalized tastes and interests, another facet of a consumer profile, an aspect of 
an individualized narrative of self that - so long as you were white and performed your gender 
correctly enough - would otherwise not prevent you from assimilating into normative economic 
production and social institutions.  Queer identity had become solidified not as an alternative 
way of relating to others, but as a means of expressing an inner truth that belonged to the 
individual, which was validated and reinforced - for homonormative white gay and lesbian folks, 
at least - by the presence of queer people in popular media. 
   
Category Is: Producing Subjects in Space & Time 
 Because the bulk of this dissertation has been concerned with explicating the specific 
historical, cultural, and technological conditions in which Drag Race is embedded as a 21st 
century media enterprise – and the specific modes of production that it embodies and deploys - I 
believe it is necessary and fitting to conclude this final chapter by considering its relationship to 
the particular modality and context of Paris Is Burning as a documentary film produced in the 
very specific time and space(s) of New York City in the late 1980s.  By thinking through their 
different modes of production and the means by which they have been distributed in a changing 
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cultural landscape and media economy, I aim to examine the ways these productions function as 
technologies of the self – as practical utilities that proliferate practices of freedom – for both the 
subjects/contestants who appear in them, as well as for the multiple audiences who encounter 
them and make meaning from them, and also to explore what we can decipher from them about 
what has changed in the political and personal lives of queer people in the three decades since 
Paris was produced.   
 Produced over a five-year span (from 1985 to 1990) and released in 1991, Paris Is 
Burning emerged at a very specific moment that allowed, against all odds, for a queer 
documentary to become a minor popular culture phenomenon and major academic object of 
study.  Hilderbrand argues that “in terms of popular culture, Paris Is Burning was released at a 
time when any representation of queerness was transgressive, progressive, threatening, and 
debated,” coming about just as the “culture wars” were leading Republican congressmen to 
target PBS and the NEA for funding queer artworks and artists, and as queer activists were 
fighting the multi-front war on HIV/AIDS and the political and popular discourses surrounding 
its ravaging of gay and trans communities (Hilderbrand, 31).  Access to the means to produce 
and distribute film or television – outside of community access stations, perhaps – was 
prohibitively expensive and required training and knowledge that was largely inaccessible to 
those who were not already culturally or personally connected to the institutions that provide 
education or apprenticeship.  Thus queer cultural production – especially media regarding the 
lives of queers of color – was extremely limited in the late 20th century, with Paris Is Burning 
and Marlon Riggs’ Tongues Untied serving as two of the first films that actually documented 
queer lives in the U.S.  As Hilderbrand argues, Paris “epitomized a cultural moment and 
anticipated many of the emergent developments in cultural politics,” and also “anticipated the 
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mainstreaming of gay representations in the media in the 1990s” that would revolve, 
significantly, around the rise of RuPaul just a few years later (30-31).  The unlikely existence of 
the film came about by chance when Jennie Livingston met three young men voguing in 
Washington Square Park and approached them to ask what they were doing, and they invited her 
to a drag ball at the Gay & Lesbian Community Center in the West Village.  Livingston had 
studied photography at Yale, but had never made a film, and never “thought of herself as a 
filmmaker,” but upon going to the drag ball, she “knew […] that she had encountered an 
extraordinary documentary subject, one that pushed her queer-feminist-leftist politics to a whole 
new level of cultural analysis and potential” (Hilderbrand, 25).  So without really knowing what 
she planned on doing, she began to take photographs and audio record interviews with the ball 
children she encountered, only later starting to film the balls themselves after aggressively 
pursuing funding via grants.   
 The production of the film took multiple years because funding only came “incrementally 
in the form of grants from foundations and non-profits, including the [NEA],” and fascinatingly 
(and tellingly) Livingston was “repeatedly refused funding from gay and women’s foundations 
for not advancing an assimilationist image of gays or seeming to reflect proper ‘feminist’ 
politics” (Hilderbrand, 28).  While she began to conceive of the film as “a cinéma vérité 
documentary about the ball walkers and their lives, following them around in observational 
footage,” it was too expensive to do so, as there was “simply never enough funding to shoot 
endless hours of such footage,” and thus Paris “became a different kind of documentary, 
drawing from the resources it did have: interviews and documentation of balls” (Hilderbrand, 
27).  The film was finally completed in 1991, and just in time to be taken up by a film economy 
that was beginning to expand the possibilities for the distribution of “art” and documentary films.  
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Making the rounds of a rising festival circuit – including screenings at the New York Gay and 
Lesbian Festival, the New York Lesbian and Gay Experimental Film Festival, and the San 
Francisco Gay and Lesbian Film Festival – the film made a splash at Sundance, placing it on the 
radar of the growing Miramax Films.  It was “picked up by Miramax Films in 1991 and 
distributed nationally in the US by its short-lived specialty division Prestige,” and would come to 
be that division’s “most prominent release and biggest hit” (Hilderbrand, 105-106).  It received a 
theatrical release in August of 1991 in fourteen markets, with “such a wide release [being] 
undoubtedly a first for a documentary put into the theatrical marketplace by an independent” 
studio, and went on to gross “nearly $3.8 million theatrically for Miramax” (Hilderbrand, 107).  
While fourteen cities represents a relatively modest release, the fact that it received a significant 
marketing push from Miramax was unprecedented for a film about queer lives, and it is even 
more remarkable that the publicity efforts included “Livingston and some of the cast tour[ing] to 
local events in different cities and appear[ing] on national television to promote the film’s 
theatrical run,” including appearances on Donahue, The Joan Rivers Show, and Good Morning 
America” (Hilderbrand, 108).  After its modest-but-substantial theatrical run, Paris was released 
on home video – where, as Hilderbrand argues, “in the early 1990s, films were both more widely 
seen and more profitable […] than in theatrical release” – but it was only carried by Blockbuster 
stores in the larger urban markets where it had played theatrically, with “its ghettoization as an 
‘art-house’ film [seemingly] confirmed by which stores stocked it,” which has lent credence to 
“a popular perception that the film appealed - and was most available to - privileged audiences” 
(111). 
 Despite the limitations it initially faced in reaching an audience outside of the “art-house” 
circuit, Paris Is Burning “continues to screen (and now stream online), to be taught, and to be 
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quoted” well over two decades after its release, and “the ball children’s statements throughout 
the film have entered our lexicon” (Hilderbrand, 32).  And even in its own time, I would argue 
that the film functioned as a technology of the self for those who were able to access it, offering 
a glimpse into a queer world and mode of being that was inaccessible for many queer people 
who were otherwise isolated from the community and kinship documented in the film.  
Hilderbrand describes his own hour-and-a-half road trip as a rural South Dakota teenager to see 
the film in Sioux Falls, at a special “art film series” screening at a multiplex.  He explains that 
“movies had long been a way for me to find ‘my people,’ and some of my primary relationships 
were with the films themselves,” and thus his relationship with Paris was complex but deeply 
personal, “marked by first reading about an elusive text and experiencing queer longing, 
followed by feeling transgression upon viewing it and, peculiarly, seeing it with friends, yet still 
alone,” and he describes how he did not want to talk about the film with the friends he had taken 
along, as “it was too personal, and I wanted to keep it inside me” (Hilderbrand, 22).  For him, the 
film offered a “testimony that there are other ways of being in the world, ways that are self-
defined,” with its subjects vibrantly sharing the “fabulous ways they invented their own forms of 
community and validation” and showing how one can “find ingenious ways to live in spite of” 
systematic oppression (23).  Screenings of the film at queer film festivals also provided a context 
for imagining new forms of community; Martha Gever, writing about its debut at the San 
Francisco Lesbian & Gay International Film Festival, wrote that “because [we] approach these 
places with a presumption of community, no matter how fictional, these become cultural spaces 
that can change our relationship to the screen,” and argued that “our identities are constituted as 
much in the event as in the images we watch” (quoted in Hilderbrand, 89).  And of course, the 
film’s power as a technology of the self is perhaps most fatefully attested to in the impact it made 
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on RuPaul, who reviewed the film for Premiere magazine when it was released on home video, 
demonstrating how “it quickly became part of the gay vernacular” (Hilderbrand, 117).  Ru wrote 
that “after Mahogany, Paris Is Burning has got to be the number-one movie pick for any queen 
who’s got her wig on straight […] after our sixth viewing, we had most of the lines memorized, 
and it was like watching The Rocky Horror Picture Show,” which Hilderbrand reads as elevating 
the film “to cult film status” and possibly “trivializing its social realism,” but also argues that 
like Rocky Horror, “the film matters to the people who invest in seeing it repeatedly, and a 
community develops through spectatorship” (118). 
 While the film has improbably escaped the limited confines of early-1990s art house 
cinema to become a sustained cultural touchstone for queer communities, and while it helped to 
give rise to increased visibility and representation of queer lives in popular culture, the world that 
is depicted in Paris Is Burning was itself relatively bereft of the kind of supportive, celebratory 
culture the film itself represents.  Thus the subjects of Paris are dually shaped by the practices of 
the ball culture and by popular culture that did not reflect their lives – but to which many of them 
aspired to break into.   The ball culture itself – as documented and proliferated by Paris – offers 
a means to conjure and embody fantasies of selfhood that both laugh at and earnestly aspire to 
assimilation into the privileged white culture circulated by Dallas, by Vogue magazine, by MTV 
music videos and the manufacturing of “supermodels” into celebrity personalities.  Octavia St. 
Laurent says in the film that she wants “to live a normal, happy life, whether it's being married 
and adopting children, whether it's being famous and rich” – perfectly capturing the 
contradictions of American personhood at the dawn of the reality television era - and says she 
wants her name “to be a household product.”  She says, “sometimes I sit and I look at a 
magazine, and I try to imagine myself on the front cover, or even inside," articulating precisely 
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the way that popular culture can shape our sense of self and our aspirations, all at the same time.  
Hilderbrand refers to Octavia’s aspirations in the film when he describes how it “reflected a 
general turn toward celebrity culture and revealed the contradictions inherent in the ideology of 
the American Dream, both of which would fuel the rise of reality TV: the articulation of 
‘average’ people’s contradictory desires to be both famous and ‘normal’” (Hilderbrand, 32).  The 
presence of documentary film cameras is clearly exciting to Octavia and some of the other 
subjects of the film, like Willie Ninja, who actively aspire to become famous as entertainers; but 
they are also keen in their appraisals of the media economy of the era, and do not expect the film 
itself to provide them the ability to shape themselves into marketable personas, as the reality 
television mode of production would begin to offer to “ordinary” people in the next decade.  But 
still, the film is uniquely authored by its own subjects in many ways, and Livingston herself 
wrote that she believed it to be “a collaboration on the deepest level […] the people who we 
filmed are articulate, funny, and poised; while the editor and I made coherent form of all that we 
shot, the documentary was truly written by the ball people themselves” (Livingston quoted in 
Hilderbrand, 26). 
 Obviously, RuPaul’s Drag Race has emerged at a much different time and offers a 
markedly different mode of production than Paris Is Burning.  As I have described over the 
course of this dissertation, Drag Race has fused an evolving set of reality television production 
practices with new forms of social, digital media production, providing its queer contestants and 
queer audiences with a broad platform for proliferating images and forming communities around 
the art of drag and queer identities – the ability to produce themselves as multimedia personas.  
While Paris appeared “just as the very category of ‘identity’ was beginning to be interrogated 
(particularly gender identity), and the intersections of race, gender, and sexuality were becoming 
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recognized” and “significantly contributed to the rise in transgender visibility and culture,” Drag 
Race began broadcasting in a cultural landscape that had become accustomed to 
“homonormative” images of gays and lesbians in film and television, and in which social media 
(and the spread of gender and sexuality studies in higher education) had led to a much broader 
and complex sustained discourse about gender, sexuality, and intersectional identities 
(Hilderbrand, 31).  In 2009, mainstream gay politics had long abandoned the radical and angry 
rhetoric and theatrics of the ACT UP era, focusing mostly on fighting for assimilation into the 
institutions of marriage and the military; and while many queers were (and are to this day) still at 
risk of bodily harm, of losing jobs, of harassment and debasement and death for displaying their 
difference, we had become a much more visible and normalized part of U.S. culture than we 
were in the early 1990s.  And while I have argued in this dissertation that Drag Race in many 
ways offers a safe, sanitized, purposely commodified version of drag performance, it still must 
be credited as a powerful utility – a technology of the self – that documents and proliferates ways 
of being femme and effeminate as a gay man or trans woman (or straight/cis man/woman and 
everything in between) that are celebrated and validated.  Drag Race’s success has given rise to a 
whole queer economy of digital media and commodity production centered on the modification 
of body, face, voice, vernacular and linguistic expression – distributed via YouTube, at DragCon, 
through magazines and talk shows and live performances – that allows those who encounter it to 
find new ways to be themselves, to practice their freedom by giving voice to vulnerable feelings 
or learning to walk, fiercely, in high heels, or to paint a new face and new identity on their face 
with makeup, or don a new persona via a lace-front wig. 
 Despite its own contradictions and confusions regarding the inclusion of trans contestants 
in its competition, Drag Race has also undoubtedly contributed to the wider visibility and 
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representation of trans folks, and has aided in demystifying still-solid myths about the 
naturalization of toxic gender roles that sustain the misogynistic, homophobic, transphobic 
structures that persist in our culture.  The late 20th century saw a lot of cultural productions that 
depicted trans women in degrading, dehumanizing terms.  Janet Mock recalls growing up in the 
1990s and learning “that being trans was something you did not take pride in” and thus “yearned 
to separate myself from the dehumanizing depictions of trans women that I saw in popular 
culture,” like Lois Einhorn in Ace Ventura: Pet Detective and Dil in The Crying Game, and 
“numerous women exploited as modern-day freak shows on Jerry Springer and Maury.”  The 
media she consumed as a child told her that “trans women were subject to pain and punch lines,” 
so Mock “spent [her] younger years internalizing and fighting those stereotypes” (Mock, xv).  
Mock herself has helped lead the way in the last half-decade of a rising public discourse about 
trans lives, identities, and rights, which has also been accompanied and bolstered by more 
complex depictions of trans lives in film and on television.  As Capuzza and Spencer argue, the 
“commercial success and critical acclaim of scripted series such as Orange is the New Black and 
Transparent, as well as the increase in the number of reality television series such as I Am Cait, 
Becoming Us, and I am Jazz,” have helped to push “transgender identity and expression into the 
forefront of U.S. popular culture,” with the volume of programming “across broadcast, cable, 
and on-demand platforms […] featuring lead or supporting transgender characters […] on the 
rise across all classifications, including scripted, reality, made-for-television movies, and 
documentaries” (Capuzza & Spencer, 215).  As with the earlier era of tokenizing and stereotype-
fueled depictions of gay and lesbians on television, this proliferation of media about trans lives 
runs the risk of spreading a “dominant narrative, one that equates ‘trans’ with ‘transitioning’ 
[which] causes concern because it functions as a form of gender policing in which transgender 
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characters exist only to support a liberal and often individualistic message about tolerance and 
inclusion rather than challenging cisnormativity or creating a space for genderqueer expression 
on television” (Capuzza & Spencer, 215). 
 In bringing together gay and trans contestants, and selling them to heterogenous 
audiences of young, old, straight, gay, trans, genderqueer, and nonconforming folks of all stripes, 
Drag Race does offer the possibility for imagining a new kind of community and way of relating 
to self and others that does not rely on rigid practices of gender – and which creates a cultural 
space for a multiplicity of gendered expressions and identities to be formed, reformed, and 
reimagined.  While its devotion to the branding and commodification of queer identities and 
expressions and selling of a queer attitude-as-lifestyle robs it of the radical anti-capitalist energy 
that I, for one, long to see out of queer cultural production – as a mode of production, the show 
throws queens into an attention economy where creativity is to be evaluated for its potential 
value and utility and not for its ethics or meaning - I still must commend the show (and confess 
much love for it)  for the work it performs to fight against normative, toxic masculinity, as the 
denial of our pain, our struggle, our feelings is at the root of the distrust and corruption that rules 
capitalist logics.  It is loud, and flashy, and fizzy and colorful and too-fast-paced and frequently 
shallow and aesthetically flat – but it’s also a gay old time that occasionally knows how to 
campily thumb its nose at the culture that traditionally rejected it.  But as it garners higher 
ratings, accumulates Emmys and press clippings – as Ru and World of Wonder extend their 
productions to include a scripted comedy series for Netflix starring Ru, a syndicated talk show 
(simply titled RuPaul) for Fox, a spinoff/glocalization of Drag Race for BBC Three (still hosted 
by Ru) – it is harder to think of the show, or the queer culture it represents, as operating on the 
margins. 
 239 
 
Postscript on Pose 
 There are many other television texts that speak productively to the narratives, power 
struggles, and technologies of the self that circulate in Drag Race’s queer economy, and which I 
wish I had more time and space to consider in this project – from the fight for crowns via Houses 
on Game of Thrones to the subversive and critical comedy of straight men in drag in Tim & Eric 
Awesome Show, Great Job! and Kroll Show, or the straight-culture appropriation of lip syncing 
in Lip Sync Battle and Jimmy Fallon’s late night show – but the show which is most deeply 
related to Drag Race in an intertextual conversation with Paris Is Burning is FX’s historical-
fiction scripted drama, Pose.  While it would take a more rigorous theoretical framing to do 
justice to the differing contexts of a reality competition program and this scripted drama, and 
while there are so many fruitful avenues to explore in Pose’s vivid reimagining of the ballroom 
culture of late 1980s New York City that an analysis of its single season could probably 
constitute a dissertation-length study itself – the depth of its visual field and breadth of its 
historical imagination in conjuring the queer spaces and kinships of its place and time, its 
exquisite costuming and soundtrack; its production practices which have brought queer of color 
and trans laborers into the unions, in front and behind the camera as both above- and below-the-
line talent; its inclusion of ballroom legends as consultants and performers; the way it crafts a 
hopeful narrative of living and surviving and thriving during the HIV/AIDS crisis in the face of 
so much loss, grief, death; its mixture of camp humor, extravagance, sincerity, and grounded 
human experience in conveying trans experiences that have been elided or erased from most 
popular depictions of queer history –I will simply offer, as a final thought and point of contrast to 
the demands of the Drag Race economy, a mention of one pivotal storyline from the show.  
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Elektra Abundance – mother of the fictional House of Abundance and one of the show’s 
protagonists – has enjoyed the patronage of a wealthy lover for a decade, who has offered her 
fine clothes and jewelry, a penthouse, and an allowance in exchange for a sexual relationship.  
When she is offered access to a new form of sex-confirmation surgery – which will allow her to 
have the body she has always desired – her longtime client/patron tells her that modifying her 
body will end their relationship, as his desire for her hinges on his fetishization of the anatomy 
she wants to transform.  She ultimately chooses her own desire, her own deeply-felt sense of self, 
and forfeits the comfort, security, and luxury of the lifestyle she had received for offering this 
audience of one the body she did not want, utilizing modern medical technology to claim her 
anatomy for herself.  She loses her house, her income, and begins working in a Times Square 
peep show booth, dancing behind glass for quarters.  While grounded in the realist depiction of 
the sex work many trans women must perform to survive, this ultimately-triumphant storyline 
dramatizes the personal and ethical choices we all must make in an attention economy that 
demands we put our feelings and beliefs aside to play whatever role our employers ask of us, and 
which is made literal for the Drag Race queens, whose self-formation and self-revelation via 
reality television is performed not to reflect their desires or reimagine themselves and the world, 
but to gain and sustain the patronage of a loving audience.   
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